War

[Montuno]

Air News
29-March-2022

The Russian Air Force is losing its best planes in the Ukraine.


The Sukhoi Su-34 was supposed to change the Russian air force. This twin-engine, two-seat supersonic fighter-bomber - a highly evolved variant of the Su-27 air superiority fighter - promised to usher in a new era of high-tech, precision bombing.
Instead, Su-34s have flown into Ukraine carrying the same old bombs as always. The lack of precision-guided munitions - not to mention Russian doctrine that views the planes as essentially flying artillery - forces these $50 million warplanes to fly low through the thickest Ukrainian air defenses to have any chance of dropping their bombs with any degree of accuracy.
As a result, Su-34s are falling from the sky in numbers that must be surprising to air force commanders. Its newer planes are suffering the same fate as its older ones.

The Russian air forces ordered its first batch of 32 Su-34s in 2008. A second batch of 92 followed in 2012. As of 2021, the Russians possessed some 122 Su-34s in various regiments. Even taking into account the losses, by 2030 the air forces could operate close to 200 Su-34s.
The plan, at all times, has been for the Su-34 to replace the Su-24 of the 1970s, of which about 70 examples remain in service. Nowhere was this more evident than in Syria. The Kremlin deployed Su-34s to Syria starting in November 2015, shortly after a Turkish F-16 shot down a Russian Su-24 that allegedly strayed into Turkish airspace.
The Su-34 is impressive. The aircraft borrows the fuselage of the Su-27, but adds a two-person cockpit with side-by-side seats. The Su-34 can engage targets up to 600 miles away while carrying 12 tons of bombs and missiles, including air-to-air missiles.
The 22-ton aircraft is armed with a 30-millimeter cannon and also features multi-mode radar and a Khibiny electronic countermeasures suite. In theory, the Su-34 supports a number of precision missiles and bombs, making the type roughly analogous to the Boeing F-15E, the US Air Force's fighter-bomber.

But there is a fundamental difference. While the Americans buy thousands of satellite, laser, and infrared guided missiles and bombs every year, train frequently with them, and use them in combat almost to the exclusion of unguided weapons, the Russians all but stopped buying guided munitions years ago because of to its high cost and, after 2014, to the effect of foreign sanctions on Russian bomb and missile manufacturers.
So while the Su-34 can carry guided munitions, it - and all other tactical warplanes in Russian service - almost never do. “The bulk of the 300 [Russian air force] fixed-wing fighter jets massed around Ukraine only have bombs and unguided rockets for ground-attack sorties,” Justin Bronk said in a recent analysis for the Royal United Services Institute of London.
This is evident not only in the videos the Kremlin has released showing the fighter-bombers in combat in Ukraine, but also in the model's loss rate. Independent analysts have confirmed the destruction of four Su-34s in Ukraine. The Ukrainians have reportedly captured at least one Sukhoi pilot, Alexander Krasnoyartsev, alive.
If photos and videos from the front show four Su-34 losses, it can be safely assumed that more losses have occurred, but they are not well documented. Only one of Russia's fixed-wing aircraft has suffered more in the current war, the Su-25 subsonic air support aircraft, which flies even lower and slower than the Su-34.
Ukrainian authorities claimed on March 18 that troops firing a shoulder-launched Stinger missile destroyed a Su-34. A week later, kyiv officials attributed the shooting down of another Su-34 to "mobile" air defense units. It is unclear whether they were referring to man-portable missiles or air defense vehicles.

In any case, it is clear that the Su-34s are falling prey to short-range missiles that are likely to be guided by signal or infrared. These missiles, including Soviet-designed Strelas and American Stingers, typically have a range of a few kilometers out and a few kilometers up.
A warplane using missiles or precision bombs, perhaps directed by drones or observers on the ground, could drop the munitions from tens of miles away and up to three or four miles high, putting them beyond the range of defenses. more numerous short-range aerials.
But the Su-34s flying over Ukraine seem to strictly carry unguided munitions, although the latest Su-34M variant does come with a specific interface for the new UKR-RT sensor module that should, in theory, help the type deliver guided bombs. through bad weather and cloud cover.
The Sukhois drop the same type of dumb bombs that the Su-24 carried in its heyday. And that means crews must actually see the ground to achieve any degree of accuracy. They have to get below the clouds, where the Ukrainian missileers can locate them quickly.

It is not just the limitations of technology that put the Su-34 at risk. Even the most sophisticated warplane is a slave to the doctrine, rules, and expectations that guide the conduct of an army in war.
The Russian doctrine, unlike, for example, the American one, does not give the air forces freedom to carry out their own campaign. In Russian doctrine, aircraft are extensions of the ground force. They are airborne artillery: uncompromising vehicles for the delivery of massive firepower. The Russians are not in favor of precision munitions because they are not in favor of precision.
As long as that is the case, Sukhoi crews will continue to face extreme danger over Ukraine. The Su-34 is a new warplane whose crews are at the mercy of old weapons…and even older doctrine.

David Ax

• ← B61 the atomic bomb that the United States deploys in Europe and that can be transported in the F-35.

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[Montuno]

Articles News
How the Ukrainian military strategy stops the Russian offensive.

28 March, 2022

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When the Russian military invaded Ukraine, many expected that kyiv would fall within 72 hours. A month later, the Ukrainian military has managed to contain the Russians, who have only captured 10% of the country. In this first phase of the war, the Ukrainian strategies seem to have been more successful than those of the Russians. Although details are not publicly available, reports of the war, military doctrine, and open source images provide insight into how each side planned to defeat its adversary.
At the start of the invasion, estimates put the Russian force at approximately 120 battalion tactical groups, each with 10 tanks, 30 armored personnel carriers, and a wide range of artillery. These ground forces were augmented by air, naval, and cyber support. This invasion force is massive and intended to quickly sweep through the Ukraine, crushing any opposition. This strategy is not unlike the “shock and awe” approach used by Coalition forces in Iraq or the German “blitzkrieg” technique of World War II. This strategy is based on the principle of momentum, in which the offensive force continually advances at a rapid pace, giving the defense no time to regroup.

Russian forces advanced from the north and northeast through Belarus and Russia with the plan to capture kyiv. If the kyiv government falls, the country is likely to capitulate. Meanwhile, other Russian forces advanced from the east into the Donbas provinces and from the south through Crimea. Before the invasion, Russia had recognized the independence of the Donbas provinces and actively supported separatist groups in the region. The multiple converging fronts were intended to isolate the Ukrainian forces, disrupt their command structure and force them to surrender.
In this operation, the Russian military never achieved the necessary momentum. Without achieving and maintaining momentum, the Russian forces bogged down. Although part of this is due to an excessive reliance on outdated technology, the main reason was the strong Ukrainian defense.
The Ukrainians, who have been preparing for this invasion since 2014, probably anticipated this invasion plan, which aligns well with Russian military doctrine. Even with advanced planning and preparation, the Ukrainian army had significantly less firepower - tanks, artillery, air support - than the invading Russian force. Therefore, his strategy had to limit the Russian offensive while conserving his own resources.

In the initial invasion, the Ukrainian forces focused on ensuring that the Russian invasion force could not build up the necessary momentum to level the country. To do this, they attacked the leading elements of the Russian assault and destroyed bridges and other infrastructure. Additionally, Ukrainian anti-tank units used Javelins shoulder-fired missiles and other anti-tank weapons to destroy the tanks, further disrupting the assault. By preventing the Russians from gaining momentum, the Ukrainians were able to establish a strong defensive posture that kept the Russians at bay.
With the Russian offensive stalled, the Ukrainians had to carefully select their targets and conserve their resources. Although the international community provided Ukraine with “lethal aid”, the Ukrainians continued to lack artillery, armor and aviation equipment. Every time the Ukrainian military engaged the Russians, they put themselves in a vulnerable position, especially considering the counter-battery systems. These systems allow the Russians to detect incoming gunfire and pinpoint the location of the Ukrainian shooter, with whom the Russians would engage. Since the army is smaller, each equipment loss is more significant for the Ukrainians.

In any case, the Ukrainian military had many targets to choose from. Russia's formidable tank army has spent much of the last month sitting on the roads. However, the Ukrainians limited their attack to the stationed Russian armored columns. The Ukrainians benefited from not destroying the tanks, which have become a liability for the Russians due to their constant need for diesel fuel. Instead, the Ukrainians turned their attention away from these tanks, opting to destroy the targets that would have the most effect. It is noteworthy that the Bayraktar TB2 drone, which is known for its anti-tank capability, has only destroyed six armored vehicles in this conflict. Rather, the Ukrainians have used it to destroy more important targets.
One of the most important Ukrainian objectives was to destroy Russian air defense systems, which were targeted by a series of artillery and drone strikes. Destruction of these systems prevents the Russians from gaining control of Ukrainian airspace, thus allowing further air and drone strikes. The Ukrainians also identified the location of Russian electronic warfare equipment and attacked those systems. These systems disrupted Ukrainian communications and drone operations.
The Ukrainian military also attacked Russian command nodes, throwing Russian forces into disarray. In the process of destroying these command posts, the Ukrainians killed seven Russian general officers, a great loss for the Russian forces. Furthermore, without these command posts, the Russian military cannot synchronize its efforts, further stalling the offensive.
Another common target for the Ukrainians was resupply convoys. Often unarmored, these resupply vehicles are softer targets than tanks, so their destruction requires less sophisticated weaponry. According to Oryxspioenkop.com, a website that compiles open source images of damaged military equipment, the Ukrainian military has destroyed or captured more than 500 resupply vehicles, along with two large fuel trains. Some reports indicate that the Russian military has run out of resupply trucks, given the number of Ukrainian attacks on resupply convoys. Without resupply, the Russian advance cannot advance, as the tanks require a large amount of diesel fuel. What's more,

The Ukrainian strategy appears to have been somewhat effective in accomplishing its two main goals: limiting Russian advances and conserving resources. Entering the second month of this invasion, the Russians seem to be changing their strategies, moving away from multiple fronts and focusing their efforts on “liberating” Donbas. By doing so, they can consolidate their forces and concentrate their attack on a single region. The Ukrainians, in turn, will have to adjust their strategies for this evolving war.
Vikram Mittal

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[armedoldhippy]

i keep reading that Russia has now pivoted to "liberating" the Donbass region. i thought their "separatist" rebels already had control of there and other eastern regions? have they told so many lies that they are now tripping over them?

 

[eHo]

Russia is fucking piece of shit, only what they can is propaganda. They have shit army like always. We will destroy this country, Japan also waiting to do something with them and take
Kuril islands. Putin will die during this war. Slava Ukraini

 

[HempKat]

Putin is cleaning up the Globalist NWO. You are under the impression the USA/Ukraine are the good guys. Ukraine has been touted as one of the most corrupt countries in the world by the liberal media prior to now telling you to put humanity at risk of nuclear war to uphold this corruption.

Hunters laptop is for real and is the key.

And I see Russia sold their 20% stake in US Uranium 1 that H Clinton sold them when she was SoS. I bet that is coming back in the news via Durham indictments.

Ukraine was known for corruption back in the days when Hunter Biden first started working with Burisma but what you are forgetting or deliberately ignoring is more likely, all that corruption was when the Government was being run by Putin's lapdog Viktor Yanukovych. It was he who sparked the protests that led to his coup in 2014 when he back out of a favorable deal with the EU to take a much less favorable deal with Russia, even though it was his promise to take the EU deal that helped him to get elected. The current President got in office to clean up corruption which he has done but Putin distorts this because he and Russia were the source of that corruption. It was also the current President's anti corruption stance that kept him from getting involved in the corruption that Trump was trying to get him involved in.

As for US Uranium 1 that deal was made with Russia not Ukraine and it wasn't brokered solely by Hillary Clinton who was Secretary of State at the time but also included the secretaries of the treasury, defense, homeland security, commerce and energy; the attorney general; and representatives from two White House offices (the United States Trade Representative and the Office of Science and Technology Policy). The Secretary of State does not have the power or authority to broker such a deal all by herself even if she happened to be the wife of a former President. The amount you don't know but spout off as if you have a clue, is shocking.

 

[HempKat]

i keep reading that Russia has now pivoted to "liberating" the Donbass region. i thought their "separatist" rebels already had control of there and other eastern regions? have they told so many lies that they are now tripping over them?

Well sort of but not really, liberating the Donbas region is the lie they tell the world to then move troops into the area to reinforce the separatists and other forces there in taking the southern land bridge to Crimea and also the port of Odessa too while they're in the area. All goals they might have actually accomplished in a few days had they not engaged in their "distraction" campaign of taking Kyiv and denazifing Ukraine. Which is just further proof that they've been lying all along and their real goal was taking all of Ukraine until they learned that Ukraine has REAL soldiers and that the Russian military has been seriously degraded by the corruption of it's own government and yet supposedly Ukraine is the most corrupt country in the world according to the Putin sock puppets here.

 

[Montuno]

Russia's strategy for the Mediterranean, and its recent change in naval military doctrine.

Analysis of the prestigious military digital magazine "EJERCITOS", in Spanish, English, and French, signed on 28-Nov-2021, by Augusto Conte de los Ríos, Frigate Captain, and Head of Studies and Deputy Director of the Submarine School "Almirante García de los Reyes" at the Cartagena base of the Spanish Navy.​​​​​​ :

https://www.revistaejercitos.com/202...-mediterraneo/

 

[Montuno]

Russian geopolitical strategy in the Mediterranean

Putin's national priorities are the basis of his global strategy, but his perceptions of the intensity of threats determine his pragmatism in the region.

Mark N Katz



Moscow has varied geopolitical interests in the Mediterranean basin. However, some are incompatible with each other. After reviewing what these interests are and identifying how they are mutually exclusive, we will discuss and assess Vladimir Putin's strategy to further these conflicting goals.
A key geopolitical interest of Russia in the Mediterranean is to maintain access by sea, through the Turkish straits, so that its military and commercial ships can easily transit between the Dead Sea (which bathes the Russian coast), on the one hand, and the Mediterranean and other regions on the other. The achievement of this purpose requires a stable Turkey, which can guarantee an orderly passage through these straits, as well as a Turkish government not hostile (and, preferably, friendly) with the Kremlin.
Another of its objectives is to promote its economic interests in the region, especially in the oil sector, on which the Russian economy largely depends. In this case, progress depends not only on the market, but also on Russia's image as a safe supplier and a desirable partner for the oil-importing states of the region. To achieve this objective, naturally, Russia must compete with other producers, whether they are from the region (such as Algeria), major exporters (such as Saudi Arabia) or candidates to do so (such as Iran). However, even rival countries in the oil market (for example, Algeria and Libya) can also offer investment opportunities to Russian companies.
For Putin, the United States, NATO and even the EU are hostile to Russia, and one of his great geopolitical interests is to weaken them. One option to achieve this is to support different actors (governments, political parties, public opinion) in the region that are also at odds with all or some of their opponents, to a greater or lesser degree.
Another of Moscow's main geopolitical interests is to prevent Sunni jihadist forces from continuing to grow in the region, which could threaten Russian interests and Russia itself. Putin has wanted to collaborate with each and every one of the Mediterranean governments (as well as with others active in the region) to achieve this end, including Western democracies, secular Arab dictatorships (including the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria, Shia forces ( Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon) and even Israel.
As in Soviet times, Putin considers it important to maintain a permanent military presence in the Mediterranean. Thus he accomplishes several things, from the specific goal of supporting the Al Assad regime (Moscow's troubled ally in Syria) to the more general goal of projecting Russia's image as a great power. And it goes without saying that, with a certain military presence already in the region, it is easier to achieve other unforeseen purposes. This requires at least one government in the area willing and able to provide Russia with military facilities. Syria plays that role today.
As has already been said, the problem with pursuing these disparate geopolitical interests in the Mediterranean is that some of them are incompatible. Moscow's strong support for the Al Assad regime, for example, is at odds with the desire to build and maintain a good relationship with Turkey, especially when Ankara demands that the Syrian president resign. In addition, it is difficult for Russia to maintain good relations (also in the economic aspect) with European countries that are members of NATO and the EU, due to Putin's support for parties of the extreme left and of the extreme right of those countries, in order to wear down the European governments, the two institutions and perhaps even democracy itself. Likewise, Moscow does not have an easy time building and maintaining the trade relations it needs with European countries in the region; its political-military actions (by supporting separatism in Ukraine or unauthorized military flights in the airspace of many European states) undermine its attractiveness as an economic partner. It also finds it difficult to persuade European and Middle Eastern governments to back Al Assad in order to thwart the forces of radical Islam; for many, on both shores of the Mediterranean, the actions of the Syrian regime (and its supporters) only strengthen these forces.
Of course, Russia is not the only country with conflicting geopolitical interests in the Mediterranean (or elsewhere). The Mediterranean is a truly complex context, not only because it is divided between the Old Continent and the Middle East (in addition to the enormous differentiation that exists on each side), but also because Russia feels threatened on both sides.
Divergent geopolitical approaches

Has Putin adopted an effective geopolitical strategy to deal with these challenges, as well as the country's conflicting interests in the region? To answer this question, it is necessary to understand what geopolitical strategies countries with incompatible interests have within their reach.
One possibility is to design a global strategy that manages to overcome the inherent contradictions of the objectives sought in foreign policy and achieves them more or less at the same time. Another is to decide that competing interests cannot be realized simultaneously; therefore, it is necessary to establish priorities, through a pragmatic strategy that puts less emphasis on those considered less relevant or less attainable, and thus make the most transcendental and most feasible a reality. A third is to subordinate foreign policy interests to those of a national political nature; pursuing contradictory geopolitical interests at the same time may interfere with the achievement of some or all of them, but it can also serve to anticipate what are the priority national political objectives of an administration (or just a leader). A fourth possibility is not to consciously adopt a national, global, or priority-based geopolitical strategy, but to go after divergent interests in a piecemeal fashion, as opportunities arise.
Which has Putin decided on? Up to a point, by four. Just as Russia aspires to conflicting goals in the region, its president has taken divergent approaches to doing so. The key to understanding the cohesive geopolitical strategy produced by these disparate strategic approaches is to understand the priority Putin gives them and when he relies more on one than the other.
Putin's internal problems seem to inspire his global geopolitical strategy in the Mediterranean. In his view, the rise of Islamist forces in the Middle East threatens to spread to Muslim areas of Russia. Likewise, he believes that the US, NATO and the EU (especially, although not only, the European shore of the Mediterranean) can put an end to his mandate, based on advocating democracy.
The attitude adopted before this double threat of the Mediterranean has several explanations, which we find in the other three approaches. At his most optimistic, Putin seems to follow a kind of global geopolitical strategy, consisting of acting against the Western “threat” on the one hand and collaborating with the West against Islamist forces on the other. This strategy is based on the conviction that, regardless of the West's differences with Russia, for the former the Islamist threat is a greater concern, for which he should be willing to fight with Russia to counter it. Moreover, Moscow believes that the European Mediterranean countries and Turkey (and even Israel) understand this, since for them the Islamist danger is more immediate. In consecuense, they should act to convince the White House and certain European Nordic countries that this is a much more serious problem. In other words, despite the fact that they do not like certain aspects of Russian foreign policy, "the logic of the situation" will lead - not only to the US allies in the Mediterranean, but also to Washington itself - to park the Western misgivings about Moscow, to face the common Islamist challenge present in that region. It was this logic that, even with the marked differences between Russia and much of the West regarding Ukraine, gave rise to Putin's call to "join efforts to confront the problems that we all face and create an international coalition that is truly broad against terrorism,
Instead, when Putin is more pessimistic and sees the West as more concerned with harming his country than with responding to the Islamist threat – or perhaps just when the occasion arises – he adopts a more tactical and fragmented approach to the Mediterranean, in particularly towards the European side and Turkey. Putin has not founded far-right parties like the National Front in France , Forza Italia and the Northern League in Italy, or SYRIZA and Golden Dawn in Greece, hostile to Washington, NATO and the EU. The political popularity of these formations, as well as their generally pro-Putin stance, however, provide an opportunity to undermine efforts by the United States and certain clearly more anti-Russian European administrations to increase sanctions against Russia,

However, it seems that when he bets on pragmatism, Putin adopts a strategy in the Mediterranean that privileges certain purposes to the detriment of others. Moreover, on the three recent occasions in which he has chosen which interests to pursue in the Mediterranean, he has shied away from confrontation and has favored a pragmatic strategy.

For example, on many occasions, Putin has raised his voice against the intervention of various Western and Arab countries in 2011 against Muammar Gaddafi, promising that he would not allow something similar to happen in Syria. Nevertheless, the Kremlin has quietly established more or less good relations with the internationally recognized post-Gaddafi Libyan government based in Tobruk; thus, several agreements signed during the previous regime have been recovered. Moscow is also in talks with the rival government in Tripoli. In this case, Putin is more interested in restoring commercial ties with Libya than in staying away from the forces responsible for the overthrow of Moscow's longtime ally.

Everyone knows that the Russian president in Egypt supported the removal in 2013 of the elected leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Morsi, led by the former head of the army, Abdelfatah al Sisi. Likewise, he took advantage of the Obama administration's disapproval of the military's actions to improve Moscow's relations with Cairo. Now, when Morsi was in office in 2012-13, Putin was more or less on good terms with him. The two leaders met at the BRICS summits in South Africa in March 2013 and again in Sochi, Russia, in April 2013. At the latter, they reportedly agreed that Russia would help Egypt build a nuclear reactor and develop its uranium deposits. In conclusion, when he had to decide what attitude to adopt before an Egyptian president of the Muslim Brotherhood,

Moreover, when Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras asked Russia for financial support to avoid the strict bailout conditions imposed by Germany and the EU to resolve the Greek debt crisis, Putin refused and urged Tsipras to reach an agreement with the Union. Apparently, the Russian president did not think that the apparent geopolitical gains that Moscow could obtain if Greece moved closer to Russia and away from Brussels and Washington outweighed the economic burden that his government would have to assume if it helped Athens. Without forgetting that the negative economic repercussions that all of Europe would have suffered due to “Grexit” would also have harmed Russia. Despite Western sanctions, Moscow still prefers a stronger Europe, one that can afford to buy relatively more Russian oil, before a weaker one that cannot do it. So when the time came to choose between advancing national economic interests and politically undermining European institutions, a pragmatic Putin opted for the former.

These examples suggest that although the Russian president today strongly supports the Al Assad regime, if it collapses, he will try to be pragmatic and forge good relations with the regime (or regimes, if the country ends up fragmented) that replaces him, if you are willing to work with Russia. So maybe Moscow can keep (or get back, if it loses them) its military installations in a post-Assad Syria. And even if that is not possible, perhaps it could install others in Egypt, Cyprus or Greece. It goes without saying, however, that Putin would prefer not to be forced to make such pragmatic decisions.

For the Mediterranean countries, and also for those that are not but are active in the region, it is very different when the Kremlin implements a global (and generally aggressive) strategy in favor of all or almost all interests. Russian geopoliticians at the same time; a fragmented and tactical strategy in the face of what it sees as aggressive Western moves (or simply the opportunity to do so), or a prioritized strategy that often favors pragmatic interests to the detriment of more bellicose ones. If it is true, as we have stated, that the Russian leader's national priorities are the basis of his global geopolitical strategy in the Mediterranean,

 

[Montuno]

Russia returns with force to the Mediterranean

Moved by military and economic interests, Moscow takes advantage of the Syrian civil war to expand its influence to the Mediterranean coasts of the Middle East.

Marc Marginedas



Since the end of summer, an intense traffic of merchant ships has traveled the 1,636 nautical miles that separate the port of Novorosíisk, in the south of Russia, with the Tartus dock, on the Mediterranean coast of Syria, under the control of the regime of Bashar al-Assad. As Reuters recapitulated in an agency dispatch released in September, after having consulted the public data on marine traffic, between the 9th and the 24th of that month, a total of six Russian ships had made this journey, crossing the Black Sea and the Turkish straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, which contrasted with the immediately preceding period, in which approximately one ship per month completed the journey, which lasted about seven days in favorable weather conditions.
One of the vessels designed to reinforce this newly established sea bridge between Russia and Syria is the Aleksándr Tkachenko, an old cargo ferry previously assigned to link both sides of the Kerch Strait, the arm of the sea that separates the newly annexed Crimean peninsula from the coasts of the Russian krai (region) of Krasnodar. The rusty hull of the Aleksándr Tkachenko, painted a striking yellow, was photographed in September just as she was crossing the Bosporus towards Syria with an ostentatious military cargo, specifically camouflage-green trucks tied to the deck.
This, together with the additional maneuvers that the Kremlin is carrying out in the eastern Mediterranean in a discreet manner, without subjecting them to any public debate in the Russian media, constitute the tip of the iceberg of a powerful tectonic movement that, of course, is not going unnoticed in the eyes of military strategists in Europe and the United States. After annexing the Crimean peninsula in 2014, significantly increasing the operability of its ships in the warm waters of the Black Sea, Russia intends to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the Syrian civil conflict to continue expanding in a southerly direction, now expanding its influence to the Mediterranean coasts of the Middle East. It is not just about old-fashioned military expansionism, as it was in the style of the 20th century;
As Sean R. Liedman writes in The National Interest, an American publication specializing in military issues, after having invested significantly in the maintenance and modernization of its navy during the first decade and a half of the 21st century, Russia now needs “access” to “ logistical support bases" on the Mediterranean coasts to be able to carry out "sustainable deployments". During the cold war, the Russian navy had ports in Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Yugoslavia, as well as the old-fashioned Syrian docks in Tartus, the only ones it still has from that era of military might. And although, for the moment, it cannot "generate (in the area) the deployments of the Soviet navy" of the last century, "it has restored the ability to maintain its presence where its fundamental interests are at stake,
The port of Tartus is becoming the pivot on which all budding Russian maritime expansion in the Mediterranean will be based. In Russian military jargon, the site until recently was not even classified as a base. It was a Russian “material-technical support point” (punkt materialno-teknicheskogo obespechenia) that spared the ships of this country operating in the Mediterranean a painful transfer through the Turkish straits at the time of refueling and resupplying.
The drawback now is the inadequacy of its facilities, which are not up to the needs of the increasingly assertive Russian navy: only four medium-sized ships can be accommodated in its docks, leaving out, for example, the aircraft carrier Almirante Kuznetsov, its flagship, 305 meters long, or the four Kirov-class cruisers it has, 252 meters long. "Tartus has not been used much, nor has it been renewed" in recent years, noted Yuri Barmin, a Russian expert on the arms trade in the Middle East, in an article recently published in The Moscow Times.
The place, which until the summer was being run by a handful of soldiers and contractors, is currently undergoing a profound transformation, as the Kommersant newspaper revealed in early autumn. A process whose visibility in the Western media overshadows the din of the nearby Syrian civil war. Some 1,700 specialists, an unusual number in the last decade and a half, are "cleaning up and restructuring the docks", in the words of an anonymous soldier to a Russian reporter for this liberal Moscow publication, stationed next to the access door.
Russia's intentions basically consist of turning the small and sleepy port into a proper naval base, whose mission will be to put into practice the expansive Russian military doctrine, modified in the summer, and which announces for the immediate future an increase in frequency of Russian maritime patrols in the Mediterranean Sea. It is, in short, a strategic change of direction given by President Vladimir Putin in a southerly direction, for the materialization of which the Kremlin has, in the future, ports in northern Cyprus, Egypt, Italy and Greece. Even Spain could end up entering Moscow's plans. In August, the Novorosíisk submarine made a stopover in the port of Ceuta, causing outrage from legislators in Gibraltar, who described the stoppage as a “provocation” to the United Kingdom.
energy interests

Parallel to the military projection in the Mediterranean, Moscow also defends the interests of the powerful and influential national hydrocarbons sector, dominated by managers from Putin's entourage. The depths of the eastern Mediterranean are home to rich natural gas deposits whose extent and limits have yet to be determined and which would be distributed among the coastal countries of the so-called Levant basin: Israel, Gaza, Cyprus, Lebanon and Syria. According to a US geological report carried out in 2010, the area could contain up to 84 billion cubic meters of this energy source, in addition to important oil deposits, enough not only to supply the local market, but also for export to the European market. And in this race for positions, Russia is also determined to play a decisive role.
At the end of 2013, shortly before the New Year, the Russian company SoyuzNefteGaz signed a contract with the Damascus government for a total amount of 84 million euros to explore the Syrian sector of the Levantine basin and determine whether the hydrocarbon reserves it contains were enough to start their extraction. Described by France Presse as "the first contract for the exploration of oil and gas in Syrian waters", the pact formalized the irruption of Russia in the dispute that is brewing to control these deposits and that, surely, it will add in the future Not far away, new doses of tension in the area.
Lastly, Syria's strategic position as a potential transit country for oil and gas pipelines that will in the future allow oil and gas to be pumped directly from the Persian Gulf to a European market anxious to ease its dependence on Russia, fuels the Kremlin's interest in war that is taking place there. And it is to such an extent that Moscow currently perceives as vital for its long-term survival the maintenance in Damascus of an allied government that maneuvers in its favor on that chessboard of crossed strategic and economic interests that the miserable Middle Eastern state.
The events date back to 2009, when the Syrian conflict had not yet started: President Al Assad then refused to sign a contract with Qatar to build a long pipeline, crossing Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria itself and Turkey, linking Europe and the South Pars-North Field natural gas field, which it shares with Iran. Agence France Presse then described Al Assad's refusal as a move by the Syrian president to "defend the interests of his ally Russia." Instead, he signed a memorandum in 2012, with the civil war already underway, to begin construction of another gas pipeline that would link said field, but this time through Iran and Iraq, countries with a Shiite majority, a confession close to the Syrian political elite. .
At that time, the Damascus regime was going through a delicate situation, with the armed opposition exerting a threatening and disturbing military pressure on its fiefdoms in the capital and Aleppo, the country's second largest city, and it urgently needed the support of its allies – Tehran and Moscow – so as not to end up disintegrating. According to diplomatic sources quoted by the British newspaper The Guardian, the guarantees offered to the always suspicious and skeptical Russian President, Putin, by Prince Bandar bin Sultan, then director of the Saudi Intelligence Agency, in the sense that no post-Al Assad, under the influence of Riyadh, would authorize in Syria the construction of the necessary infrastructure for the Persian Gulf countries to export oil and gas directly to Europe. They were not enough.

 

[Montuno]

Links are good. Cut and paste takes up pages and pages.

I also tell you : I see much more interesting in this thread the boring and long articles that I copy and paste for pages and pages...than to see those same pages and pages filled with the same meme of two tennis players hitting a ball with the inscription "NAZI", or denials of the Nazi Holocaust, accusations of total guilt about the evil of the world to ethnic/cultural/religious groups, delirious historical revisionism, or geopolitical analyses with teleshopping type videos, by guys who are still not very clear or have just learned the map of Europe, to whom you talk about the conflict in Europe of the Republic of Transnistria, and they look at you as if you wanted to tease them with names of countries taken from Marx Brothers' movies.....and other shit that adorns this entire thread, je.


By de way:
SHOCKING LATEST NEWS UKRAINIAN WAR :

Finally lands in Ukraine the offensive support arms shipment promised to Zelenski by the Nazis from their bases on the far side of the Moon.

Likewise, emergency humanitarian aid has also arrived for the Ukrainian resistance, which has traveled and crossed with solemn and slow ceremonial step (two steps forward and one step backward) all over Europe, from the Brotherhood of the Holy Remedy for All Problems and Evils:

Putin states that in addition to the Moon Nazis, this proves that the KKK also supports Ukraine.
Brotherhood responds to Putin with official statement :

¡¡ No pasarán ¡¡


To know more: Journal of Geopolitical, Criminal Cultural Marxism Conspiracy and Paranormal Studies of the Association of Affected and Victims of Abductions and Transcutaneous Microchip Insertions.

 

[Gypsy Nirvana]

Ahh - Torquemada - never forget The Spanish Inquisition!

 

[unclefishstick]

Ahh - Torquemada - never forget The Spanish Inquisition!

no one expects the spanish inquisition!

 

[chilliwilli]

no one expects the spanish inquisition!

 

[Three Berries]

Ukraine was known for corruption back in the days when Hunter Biden first started working with Burisma but what you are forgetting or deliberately ignoring is more likely, all that corruption was when the Government was being run by Putin's lapdog Viktor Yanukovych. It was he who sparked the protests that led to his coup in 2014 when he back out of a favorable deal with the EU to take a much less favorable deal with Russia, even though it was his promise to take the EU deal that helped him to get elected. The current President got in office to clean up corruption which he has done but Putin distorts this because he and Russia were the source of that corruption. It was also the current President's anti corruption stance that kept him from getting involved in the corruption that Trump was trying to get him involved in.

As for US Uranium 1 that deal was made with Russia not Ukraine and it wasn't brokered solely by Hillary Clinton who was Secretary of State at the time but also included the secretaries of the treasury, defense, homeland security, commerce and energy; the attorney general; and representatives from two White House offices (the United States Trade Representative and the Office of Science and Technology Policy). The Secretary of State does not have the power or authority to broker such a deal all by herself even if she happened to be the wife of a former President. The amount you don't know but spout off as if you have a clue, is shocking.

Yes thanks for the Official CI A narrative. I could have Googled and got that crap. What the government tells you is called propaganda. Completely legal now in the USA. Goverenmt wants a narrative then make one and the media plays along.

 

[Montuno]

Ahh - Torquemada - never forget The Spanish Inquisition!

Never:

Nazis attack Castrillo Mota de Judíos town:

Image of the Nazi graffiti in the town of Castrillo Mota de Judios. —Lorenzo Rodriguez

12/12/2021 08:34
FERRAN BARBER

"They are not four kids, but members of neo-Nazi associations, " says the mayor of Castrillo Mota de Judíos, Lorenzo Rodríguez , regarding the new anti-Semitic attack suffered by the population on December 6. It is not the first time that white supremacists have carried out intimidating graffiti in some emblematic places of this small town devoted entirely to the recovery of its past.

Only that on this occasion the attackers have thoroughly attacked the City Council and its first mayor, dirtying the future center of Sephardic memory and all the signs in the town and its surroundings with graffiti like this: "Long live the Catholic Monarchs", "Torquemada was a comrade", "Mayor sold to the murderous Jew", "Juden Raus".

In the welcome sign they have replaced the "o" of Mota with an "a", Castrillo Matajudíos.

The Civil Guard has not yet been able to identify its perpetrators, but it is assumed that it was a well-organized group of at least three or four people. On May 1, 2016, that same village in Burgos woke up littered with similar graffiti , also accompanied by the classic Celtic crosses, which is the traditional symbol of all political movements associated with white supremacism. On that occasion, they also modified the toponymy of the town to turn it into "Castrillo Matajudíos".
The first mention of Castrillo dates back to 1623, of course the town was born six centuries earlier precisely as a Jewish settlement. "Mota" means "Hill" : "Walled village of the Hill of the Jews".

The alleged protagonists of those events, JRBA and JHA, were however identified and arrested by the Civil Guard and will face trial next month for a crime of incitement to hatred that could carry sentences of up to five years in prison, in addition to an economic sanction of more than 4,000 euros . The court hearing has been postponed several times for various reasons.

The City Council has not yet made a precise estimate of the material damage caused by the attackers. " The important thing is the emotional impact it has had on us. They acted between two and four in the morning with nocturnality and treachery"Rodriguez assures. "The real damage is psychological because people feel threatened and harassed, even if they are not going to achieve anything because we are going to go ahead with our plans to create an itinerary and a center of Sephardic historical memory.

However, it is true that some neighbors have considered what could happen if they went further in the future. On this occasion, they have tried to burn a flag. What would happen if they tried to burn one of the flags? houses? There was also a girl who confessed to me that she had a hard time falling asleep for fear that they would come back with worse intentions.

The Federation of Jewish Communities of Spain (FCJE), the institution that officially represents Spanish Jews, has condemned the threats and acts of intimidation that occurred in Castrillo Mota de Judíos (Burgos) while requesting that everything possible be done to arrest the authors of these threats.

https://www.publico.es/politica/nazi...icion.html/amp


Pd:
Gypsy, last offer for being you:
2 kebabs, 1 acorn of hashish, and a and a tray of french fries...5€

 

[Montuno]

no one expects the spanish inquisition!

CONFIRMED ! : All the victims of the Spanish Inquisition were actually victims of...POLISH FALSE FLAG ATTACKS .

 

[Petrochemical]

 

[GOT_BUD?]

Rumor round the water cooler is Russia has resorted to using technicals in Ukraine.

 

[HempKat]

Yes thanks for the Official CI A narrative. I could have Googled and got that crap. What the government tells you is called propaganda. Completely legal now in the USA. Goverenmt wants a narrative then make one and the media plays along.

Whatever dude, congratulations, you have created a system of rationalizations by which you can always be misled. Sure the government might get some things wrong or might distort things sometimes and thereby mislead some people but you will always be misled all someone has to do is create some story that is disproven by government sources and you'll just accept it because you believe the government is in the business of always deceiving the public.

 

[armedoldhippy]

CONFIRMED ! : All the victims of the Spanish Inquisition were actually victims of...POLISH FALSE FLAG ATTACKS .

are you sure it wasn't Hillary's Arkansawyer hit teams or Soros' goon squads? i hear lots of bad shit about them...CIA too.