War

[Roms]

 

[Roms]

'Republic Of Lies' Explores The Fixation With Conspiracy Theories

Author Anna Merlan's recitations are chilling, as are her warnings that fringe beliefs tend to go mainstream — and how their rise is seen against a resurgence in nationalism and white supremacy.

www.npr.org

 

[Roms]

300 billion Russian dollars seized and stolen since two decades!!!​

 

[Roms]

by avic.

For two decades, the Anglo-Americans, flanked by their European minions, have been trying by all means, and on several fronts, to reach Russia. Directly or indirectly. Chechnya, Afghanistan, Georgia, color revolutions cascading all around the country, not to mention the formation of an army of jihadist mercenaries who are used wherever Western interests are at stake. The last two destabilization attempts have affected two of Moscow's main immediate allies, Belarus and Kazakhstan, two key countries in Russia's security. The danger was approaching.

Despite this, the big teddy always seemed to sleep, as if everything was going for the best in the best of worlds, with nice partners all around, admittedly sometimes turbulent requiring a few reminders with a few grunts. Of course, it took a few scratches here and there to prevent the situation from getting out of hand, as was the case in Georgia, Syria and Kazakhstan with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The image of the big sleeping teddy bear is the perception that Russia wanted to give of itself and that has been nurtured for years. We have to believe that it worked, because this is the image that prevails in the West, including among most Western analysts of the Russian world. We then understand the incomprehension and sometimes the anger of some of them in front of the apparent inertia of this big pile of muscles which calmly tolerates all the kicks given to it by weaklings.

Those who fell for it are the same people who today are amazed at how easily Russia was robbed of $300 billion by the West. For them, Russia, the big sleeping teddy that it is, did not expect to have its assets confiscated. After 8 years of anti-Russian sanctions, after the various raids and looting of central banks around the world (Iraq, Libya, Venezuela, Afghanistan, etc.), the Russian leaders, like big placid neuneus unable to see beyond the end of their nose, would have said to themselves: our nice partners will not do the same thing to us?

Even supposing that the Russian leaders saw nothing coming until February 22, the date of the recognition of the two republics of Donbass, we remember that a shower of new sanctions immediately fell on Russia, with Western ads implying that this was just an appetizer. Russia still had the possibility of repatriating all its assets abroad. Remember, just in case, that we are no longer in the time when caravans or caravels were needed to transport wealth around the world. With the Swift system, the 300 billion Russian dollars could have been transferred instantly. They did not do it. They continued to play dorks.

In the past, the Anglo-Americans have accustomed us to actions following long-established agendas, sometimes years in advance. What is happening in Ukraine is no exception. However, there seems to be a kind of telescoping between two agendas, and the one that wins out so far is another plan that is starting to come into view, that of Russia. It is as if the Russian agenda had completely engulfed the Anglo-American agenda, relying entirely on it and using it to move forward in disguise. It is clear that, since the famous "ultimatum" that Russia issued to the United States and NATO, it is she who leads the dance and who manages the tempo, while hiding behind the unfolding of the Anglo plans -Americans. To get where?

The West, to remain faithful to the image it has of itself and which it has imposed on the world, cannot leave any prank or disobedience unpunished. The problem is that to punish a power like Russia, there are only sanctions, military action being excluded. The Russians have had 8 years to prepare, not only to turn each sanction into an asset, but also to make it a boomerang that hurts the opponent as much, if not more. For this new wave of sanctions, they were therefore fully prepared. It even seems that the Russians have fueled the exacerbation of Western countries, pushing them into a kind of one-upmanship that will lead them to exhaust their potential for economic sanctions, and will force them to touch the financial sphere and squint towards Russian assets in West. It was all the more tempting since this simpleton Putin had left a pretty jackpot of 300 billion dollars in Western banks that he had forgotten to repatriate before starting his nonsense in Ukraine. You can't refuse such a bargain, can you?

Like a mouse in front of a piece of cheese, the West could not resist and took control of the Russian treasure. That day, the Kremlin strategists had to pop the champagne. It was, indeed, a crucial step, because it made it possible to move on to the major step in which we currently find ourselves. The Russian money had to be stolen so that the Russian rulers could impose the Petro-Ruble on everyone who participated in the theft. It's not just about punishing thieves, but about breaking the foundations of the system they sit on.

What will happen in the next few days? The Anglo-Americans and their minions clearly see that an earthquake has just occurred. They are, for the moment, in a state of shock, in complete denial of reality. They just won't admit that anyone can treat them the way they've always treated the rest of the world, and they're still stunned by it. They are currently at the stage of the child who refuses to breathe to get what he wants. But Russia seems determined to let the child suffocate rather than show compassion, especially since it knows that the capricious child will, sooner or later, regain his inspiration. Beware all the same of anger whose manifestations can be thoughtless...

So here we are far from the war in Ukraine which found itself despite itself as one of the main pieces of the Anglo-American strategy against Russia. For 8 years, they had every opportunity to transform the country, ideologically and militarily. The constitution of an armed force of more than 250 men in the Donbass is only the culmination of a long preparation. According to some analysts, Russia, with all the power of observation at its disposal, would have seen nothing but fire. Can we imagine that Belgium could mass 000 men near the French border for weeks and months without the French defense not being informed? Of course not. Moreover, when the Russian army began its offensive, the way in which they deployed, and all their movements thereafter, demonstrate that they knew exactly what they were going to find and where. This may sound cynical, but one could say that, faced with the existential threat posed by NATO at its doorstep, with Ukraine as an outpost, Russia has also, like the West, made use of the Ukrainians (not let's not forget that the inhabitants of Donbass are also Ukrainians). Who said everyone is handsome and everyone is nice? But is it really cynicism? The Ukrainian dead are indeed victims of a Russian world war against the West, like the 250 million Soviet dead (including Ukrainians on both sides) of the previous war led by another Zelensky named Adolf Hitler who worked also on behalf of these same Western sponsors. It just means that Russia does not shrink from death to preserve its freedom and independence. This is no longer the case in the West.

It is obvious that to implement a project of this magnitude, Russia had to consult its partners, obtain their support and define a coordinated action plan. These silent allies for the moment because they don't need to reveal themselves, are just waiting for the right moment to come out of the shadows. And among them, we could well find a sleepy panda waiting for the zero hour to enter the scene.

 

[Roms]

Army General Sergey Surovikin's "win-win" (I win every time) tactic in the fight against the Ukrainian AA defense​

by Valentin Vasilescu

The Russian military has begun to successfully use target drones such as the E-95M (featuring a blocky reflector that mimics the radar signal of cruise missiles). They are sent at the forefront of attack waves of Geran drones and cruise missiles. Unlike the Gerans and cruise missiles, the E-95M does not bypass the Ukrainian AA missile batteries, their task being to enter their zone of action to force the Ukrainians to launch missiles to shoot them down.

The E-95Ms are "decoys" for Ukrainian AA missile batteries, deployed behind the front line to a depth of 100 km. Because during the launch of the wave of missiles and drones, Russian Su-30 and 35 planes equipped with Kh-31 and Kh-58 anti-radar missiles patrol the airspace near the line of contact. The implementation of detection radars of Ukrainian AA missile batteries allows them to be located and destroyed by Kh-31 and Kh-58 missiles. At the same time, from the ground, the Russians launch Lancet-3 kamikaze drones against AA missile launchers and radars as soon as their position is revealed.

The win-win tactic according to Surovikin then translates as follows:

1. Either the Ukrainians turn on the radars and launch AA missiles. In this case, they shoot down "decoys", cheap and unarmed E95M drones, but reveal their positions.

2. The Ukrainians do not turn on radars and cruise missiles and Geran kamikaze drones, which come behind the "bait", cut through the defense of the Ukrainian AA like butter and destroy their targets.

The Russian E95M system (and its latest E17M variant) was designed to train combat aircraft and air defense systems in close combat conditions at the Astrahan firing range. The E95M Air Target simulates maneuverable targets such as drones, cruise missiles and aircraft. The E95M target drone has a wingspan of 2,5m, can fly for 40-60 minutes at low altitude, performing turns, climbs and descents at a speed of 400-500 km/h.

To neutralize the Ukrainian AA defenses, General Sergei Surovikin was inspired by Operation Mole Cricket. This is a Syrian air defense suppression campaign launched by the Israeli Air Force on June 9, 1982, during which Israel struck 29 AA missile batteries deployed in the Beqaa Valley. The Israelis first launched a wave of Mastiff drones simulating attack aircraft to trick the Syrians into turning on their radars. Once the Syrian AA battery crews launched their missiles and shot down the drones, F-4 Phantom jets attacked the AA batteries with AGM-78 and AGM-45 anti-radar missiles

https://en.reseauinternational.net/la-tactique-win-win-je-gagne-a-tous-les-coups-du-general-darmee-serguei-sourovikine-dans-la-lutte-contre-la-defense-aa-ukrainienne/

 

[Roms]

 

[Roms]

Anyway "in gold we trust" ^^

8,133 tons for U.S.

 

[mean mr.mustard]

Do you actually consider any of this propaganda applicable to the thread?

 

[Roms]

2,200 tonnes for Russia

In 20 years, Vladimir Putin increased the value of Russian gold from 4 billion dollars when Yeltsin left to 130 billion dollars this year. In tonnes, the acquisitions of ingots made it possible to reconstitute the reserve, going from 450 in 1998!

 

[Roms]

A Russian company discovers the largest gold reserve in the world !​

Polyus Gold announced that it had spotted a deposit of approximately 40 million ounces, or 1,134 tonnes, of gold in a Siberian mine.​

By Annick Berger
Published on 10/24/2020 at 10:13 a.m. & updated on 10/24/2020 at 11:13 a.m

It's a discovery that will pay off ! Russia’s largest mining company has announced that it has discovered an untapped gold deposit. A real treasure for Polyus Gold since it would simply be the most important reserve in the world, details Bloomberg. The deposit is located on the Siberian mine of Sukhoi Log and would represent approximately 40 million ounces, or 1,134 tonnes with an average gold content of 2.3 grams per tonne. The deposit alone accounts for a quarter of Russian gold reserves.
The Sukhoi Log mine is located in the remote region of Irkutsk in Siberia. It had been discovered by Soviet geologists in 1961. After having long sought to get rid of this deposit, the Russian government ended up selling it to the mining company Polyus. According to the company, the production costs for this huge deposit could reach $ 2.5 billion.

Record for gold in August​

"We are satisfied with the results. The publication of the first estimate of ore reserves represents an important step for Polyus' long-term development strategy and confirms Sukhoi Log's position as one of the deposits of the highest caliber gold in the world, "said Pavel Grachev, managing director of Polyus, in a statement.

The reserves discovered this week could allow a total annual production of around 1.6 million tonnes, details the Financial Times. The deposit should also encourage the Russian mining company to increase its annual production by at least 70%.

The fact remains that the deposit is complicated to exploit and that Russian society will have to develop important technologies to access it. But efforts could pay off while gold prices hit record in August. According to Forbes, this discovery also represents a boon for the majority shareholder of Poluys. With this announcement, Suleiman Kerimov has indeed become the richest man in Russia.

 

[mean mr.mustard]

I didn't think so.

 

[Roms]

The Sakhalin region offers highly appreciable reserves, estimated at 1.5 billion tons of oil and 1,000 billion m 3 of gas.

 

[mean mr.mustard]

By all means just keep turbo posting bullshit.

I'll be back to see how many pages you can fill by yourself.

 

[Roms]

But free energy is real, Nikola Tesla tower secret

With free energy will there still be wars ???

Free the world!

 

[Roms]

Nikola Tesla — Wikipédia

fr.wikipedia.org

If you want to find the secrets of the universe, think in terms of energy, frequency, information and vibration.

 

[Roms]

The unseen and unknown electronic war in Ukraine​

The unseen and unknown electronic war in Ukraine

It is a real but intangible force. It does not have the visual or emotional impact of the explosions caused by missiles, rockets, bombs and artillery shells, or the destruction caused by machine gun and rifle bullets. And it does not devastate civilian and military buildings or infrastructure...

atalayar.com

 

[Roms]

INFORMATION NOTE, TECHNOLOGY AND ARMAMENT N ° 12 / SEPTEMBER 2019​

ELECTRONIC WARFARE: RUSSIAN SUPREMACY​

By OLIVIER DUJARDIN​

Russian electronic warfare capabilities have been put forward for several years now. If these competences started to be evoked in 2008 during the short war with Georgia, it is especially from the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, that Russian means of electronic warfare have been popularized. Their know-how was illustrated by the jamming of the AN / SPY-1 radar of the ’USS Donald COOK, which temporarily put the American ship unable to use its combat system[ 1 ]. Since then, there has been no shortage of interference demonstrations by radars, GPS navigation systems, drone remote control links and communications. However, the skills of the Russians in this area are not new. From the start of the operational use of radio, they understood the value of disrupting this new means of communication. Thus in 1905, they successfully jammed communications from the Japanese fleet. The Russians very early perceived that this new means of communication was also a vulnerability. They have never lost sight of this aspect and have therefore always developed strong capabilities in electronic warfare throughout their history. Although this observation may have been shared by other armies, they remain ahead in this area.

SPECTRUM CONTROL ​

The electromagnetic spectrum describes all electromagnetic radiation, classified by frequencies or wavelengths. theoretically starting at 0 Hz to infinity – that is to say electric radio waves to Gamma rays -, only the band of electric radio waves ( 0 Hz at 300 GHz ) is treated by electronic warfare in the broad sense[ 2 ]. The band of electric radio waves has different physical characteristics, depending on the frequencies. Thus a means of communication will rather use a frequency at the start of the spectrum for a long range « emission; on the other hand, if a greater transmission flow is necessary, higher frequencies will then generally be preferred. Likewise, a radar that wants to carry very far will generally use a low frequency band, but will choose a high frequency if its role is the detection of small objects with great precision. It's all about compromise as needed.

The use of the electromagnetic spectrum is indicative of different needs and different applications. Mastering it therefore involves knowing what can be found in each frequency range, what applications are possible and recognizing what is actually used there. This therefore requires a thorough and broad knowledge of all the transmitters which use the electromagnetic spectrum. This knowledge then allows each user to make the best use of this spectrum for their own needs, but also to know how to disturb the opponent in their exploitation of this spectral space. However, this knowledge requires significant intelligence work. To do this, you must have suitable materials and competent operators in the field. Russian forces,by multiplying electronic warfare units at all levels, thereby ensuring control of the electromagnetic spectrum. In the West, this type of unit also exists but in very limited numbers, which does not allow it to be available all the time, nor at all levels.

INTELLIGENCE​

Being able to recognize active transmitters and their function is essential in order to control the electromagnetic spectrum. Indeed, it is on the quality and completeness of the associated database that the effectiveness of spectrum control will largely depend, especially if we plan to entrust a ( artificial intelligence ) to part of the work. For that, you have to know the maximum number of signals, so you have to go and collect them; this is le ROEM work ( electromagnetic education ). In this case, it's even the technical ROEM[ 3 ] which is implemented for the construction of databases. This work must be carried out in a complete and exhaustive manner and not be limited to the signals that are considered to be associated with a threat.

Indeed, it is easier to intercept minor « signals », since often civil and widely used all over the world, than signals considered to be priority. Indeed, the priority « » signals have the defect of being poorly known and are therefore difficult to differentiate if one does not first control those which are considered as « minor ». Devoting yourself only to priority signals is a source of ambiguity and error. However, this is the mistake often made, for the sake of savings in personnel and equipment.

The problem of identifying signals creates the same problems. Indeed, it happens that an intercepted signal is misallocated for lack of visual identification of the transmitter, thereby causing distortion in the database. These faults have, in the radar domain, failed to fire fratricidal repeatedly because the database of electronic war sensors was not able to differentiate a threatening radar from a friendly radar, poorly known because not a priority. Even without being in this extreme case, signal confusion has important tactical consequences, because instead of participating in the reduction of the « fog of war », it helps to intensify it ! In a context where most of Western operations take place in coalitions, the risks of errors are all the more significant.Without a global view of all the signals that can be used, no spectrum control can be hoped for because there will always be too many unknown signals, including sometimes our own signals, to properly exploit the spectrum to our advantage.

TECHNICAL SKILLS​

The previous step can only be carried out with specific materials in order to ensure the accuracy of the knowledge acquired. Since the laws of physics apply to everyone in the same way, it is logical that there are strong similarities between signals that have the same function. This is true for both telecommunications and radars. Only very precise measurements will make it possible to differentiate them correctly. It is for this reason that the construction of reference databases cannot be made from information from simple electronic warfare sensors which have a tactical function and which must therefore favor the speed of interception and processing over precision.Even if technology today considerably improves the accuracy of the measurements made by recent electronic warfare sensors, this is still too imprecise and above all incomplete, although some industrialists would like to believe the opposite. Despite everything, it is a common practice to integrate information from electronic warfare into the database, again for the sake of saving resources. And, more than bringing knowledge, it brings mostly confusion and it hurts spectrum control.there again for the sake of saving resources. And, more than bringing knowledge, it brings mostly confusion and it hurts spectrum control.there again for the sake of saving resources. And, more than bringing knowledge, it brings mostly confusion and it hurts spectrum control.

But beyond the identification of signals, the precision of the measurements is essential to move on to the offensive part. How to intelligently jam a system, that is to say without it realizing it[ 4 ], if we do not send him precisely the right signal ? It is obvious that a database that does not contain the right information will not allow effective interference. If today, in most Western countries, the idea of carrying out offensive interference has been abandoned for a long time, the fact of not having information of sufficient quality prohibits the return of this capacity in the medium term. This also poses a problem for the operation of defensive jammers with which aircraft or combat buildings are equipped.It is therefore necessary to always know the origin of the data that we handle in order to be able to assess its quality and in particular to be wary of information exchanged or from databases ( NATO has its own electronic war database ) which is not controlled by either the sensors used or the interpretation made of the measures.

Beyond the material aspect, it is also necessary to have trained and experienced personnel. This aspect is all the more difficult to manage as this population is reduced. When human resources are limited, it becomes very difficult to transmit competence when experienced people have to both do their job and train beginners. Emergency management systematically favors the operational aspect at the expense of training. If we add sometimes reduced allocation times to this situation, we have all the ingredients for continuous erosion of skills. The Russian armed forces, by maintaining numerous electronic warfare units, therefore have a probably larger pool of personnel enabling them to effectively perpetuate skills.

DOCTRINE AND TRAINING​

Unlike most Western countries, the Russian armies have never abandoned a single area of electronic warfare[ 5 ]. Their doctrinal reflection on the subject has never dried up, especially at a time when the electromagnetic spectrum is increasingly used, whether for communications, navigation or detection. The Russians understood that the informational revolution of the battlefield was largely based on the electromagnetic spectrum and that there was a exploitable fault. At the same time, they are also working to reduce their own vulnerability to interference. Thus all their military training includes an offensive and defensive electronic war component. By applying interference to themselves, this allows them both to perfect their offensive tactics and to practice operating in an atmosphere of intense interference.The realism brought in the training allows them to constantly improve their capacities, which undoubtedly has repercussions in the design of their equipment. Perhaps one of the reasons can be found there for the slightest digitization of their forces ?

In the West, in the absence of offensive capabilities, countries do not train to operate in an atmosphere of electronic warfare or, if this aspect is taken into account, it is generally simulated, which lacks realism. The simulation itself can be questionable because it is not based on any real experience and all the imagined answers are only through the imagined scenarios. This lack of realism, a consequence of an absence of means, does not favor creativity in terms of jamming or resistance to jamming. As a result, Western forces have been little or not made aware of their own vulnerabilities, which therefore does not encourage investment in this area, the snake eventually biting its tail.

The operational consequence is that in Syria, Western forces are at the mercy of electronic warfare actions that can be carried out by the Russians. In the absence of jamming, training and doctrines, they are generally destitute.


*


Russian forces today have a comfortable lead in the area of electronic warfare, which is no coincidence because they have given themselves the means. Doctrine, training, equipment, skills, knowledge, and by effective technical and tactical information, give them all the cards to dominate the discipline. However, if their advance will last several more years, some countries have started to react, such as China, which acquired an electromagnetic spectrum management staff in 2015.[ 6 ], or more recently the United States which, since 2018, has gradually started to reinvest the domain. It is possible that, in the next 10-15 years, other countries may be able to compete with Russia. European states are slow to react. Victims of the significant reduction in their defense budgets for the deflation of their workforce since the 1990s, they have lost a lot of capacity and skills, particularly in the area of electronic warfare. With too small staff, skills to be rebuilt and very constrained budgets, it is unlikely that significant efforts will be made in this area while other new areas ( cybersecurity, Big Data, artificial intelligence ... ) add to the list. But we must not forget that at a time when we consider that « la connectivity will be a decisive sovereignty issue for the Air Combat System of the future »[ 7 ], not being interested in the field of electronic warfare amounts to leaving the password administrator of a critical system written on a sticky note stuck on the screen.


[ 1 ]

Russian Jamming System Kills All NATO Electronic Systems In Syria

Russia have deployed new electronic jamming systems that are able to blind radar, disrupt electronic guidance systems, and interfere with satellite imagery. NATO have complained that Russia have effectively blinded their electronics in Syria, inside [...]

newspunch.com

[ 2 ]https://cf2r.org/documentation/renseignement-electromagnetique-definitions-et-contours/

[ 3 ] https://cf2r.org/recherche/le-renseignement-technique-dorigine-electromagnetique-applique-au-radar/

[ 4 ]https://cf2r.org/reflexion/guerre-electronique-le-retour/

[ 5 ]https://cf2r.org/documentation/renseignement-electromagnetique-definitions-et-contours/

[ 6 ]

https://analysedefense.fr/blogs/articles/passe-muraille-n-14

[ 7 ] http://www.opex360.com/2019/03/31/l...nt-pour-le-systeme-de-combat-aerien-du-futur/

Guerre électronique : la suprématie russe » Centre Français de Recherche sur le Renseignement

Cela fait maintenant plusieurs années que les capacités de guerre électronique russes sont mises en avant. Si ces compétences ont commencé à être évoquées dès 2008 lors de la courte guerre avec la Géorgie, c’est surtout à partir de la crise ukrainienne en 2014, que les moyens russes de guerre...

cf2r.org

 

[Roms]

New missiles, electronic warfare, denial of access and strategic bastions: how Russia could take over on a European battlefield​

Russia is putting into service new missiles to which NATO forces will be very vulnerable, and electronic war systems capable of eroding the technological advantage of Westerners, while strengthening its access denial capacities. What to change the game on a battlefield ?

• 

Aurélien Duchêne​

Feb 13 2021 •34 min read

The observation was already valid during the Cold War and has applied again for less a few years : Russia enjoys military superiority in Europe which would quickly be overtaken by the arrival of American reinforcements and a full mobilization of European resources in the event of conflict. Overall, it is lagging behind Western forces in technology, despite the entry into service of high-tech armaments and equipment generally more numerous and more available than in European forces. In the context of a conventional war in Europe, it would constitute a formidable adversary capable of having the upper hand during the first phase of the conflict, before yielding to the combined force of the United States and what will remain of European forces.En restant sous le seuil nucléaire, même au plan tactique, la seule solution qu'aurait la Russie pour tenir la dragée haute à ses adversaires serait de disposer « d'armes miracles » capables de renverser la situation.

However, it turns out at the start of the 2020s that Russia has not miracle weapons, but technologies potentially capable of turning the game upside down : new missiles to which NATO forces will be very vulnerable, very efficient anti-aircraft defense and denial of access systems, and capabilities in electronic warfare capable of seriously eroding the technological advantage of Westerners. What change the outcome of future clashes on the battlefield ?

In addition to these new armaments and technologies, the Russian armies could rebalance in another way the power relations in the event of a confrontation in Europe. The Russian General Staff is fully aware of the advantage of the NATO forces, in the first place. A conflict between Russia and its potential Western adversaries would be symmetrical concerning the nature of the belligerents ( of the state powers capable of fighting high intensity and determined in the duration ), but asymmetrical in terms of balance of forces since it would be largely uneven. Faced with this situation, the Russian forces seek to reduce their disadvantage in the face of a much more powerful potential adversary by developing situations of asymmetry.Russian power in the XXIecentury is largely built in mirror of that of Westerners, focusing on the weaknesses of the latter to compensate for their overall superiority. This applies, for example, to the « information war », but also to the development of military technologies capable of weakening the advantage of Western armies, as we approach in this article.

In view of a conflict in Europe, Russian forces could also install a situation of asymmetry thanks to the skillful use of space. How could we talk about asymmetry ? The weakening of Western superiority would rest here on the defense by Russia of strategic points very difficult to take, forcing NATO forces to redouble their efforts or seek other less costly options for men and equipment to advance against the enemy. These are assumptions about what an effective tactic could be for Russian forces, but several elements give them credit. First, the development of « bastions » and « bubbles » capable of leading life hard for Alliance forces thanks to denial of'access whose importance we will see. Second, the potential use of certain geographic advantages which, if they cannot reverse the outcome of a conflict, could change that of certain confrontations.

Russian superiority in hypersonic weapons upstarts​

Hypervelocity is one of the main military technological challenges of the beginning of XXIecentury ( a vehicle is qualified as hypersonic when it can move at a speed greater than Mach 5, generally beyond 6,174 km / h ( 1.7 km / second ), where what is between Mach 1,2 and Mach 5 is qualified as supersonic ). However, in this area, Russia has managed to speed up the rest of the world by developing superior capacities. The most emblematic example is obviously the Avangard missile, capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads over 6,000 km from a distance at an average speed equivalent to Mach 20 ( 24,700 km/h ), speed which can climb to 27 times that of sound ( 33,000 km / h ). In addition to its speed which makes it today ( and probably for a long time ) in fact impossible to intercept,Avangard can suddenly modify its trajectory to make it unpredictable before impact, thus correcting the main fault of ballistic missiles which is the predictability of their trajectory. The Avangard adds up the advantages of the ballistic missile and those of the cruise missile, while removing the weaknesses of each of them. This hypersonic glider, which will be launched in the long term by the intercontinental ballistic missile RS-28 Sarmat, will be the first HGV ( Hypersonic Glide Vehicle ) to be deployed, while Moscow and Washington had been striving for several decades to dispose of such devices.

At a tactical level, Russia has already commissioned a hypersonic cruise missile, the Kh-47М2 Kinjal, derived from the Iskander missile. This is assumed to be able to reach a speed of the order of Mach 10 to Mach 12 ( 12,000 to 14,700 km / h ), for an estimated range of 2,000 km. If such performances are proven, it appears that the Kinjal missile, which is today the only aerobalistic missile ( ALBM )serving the world1, is simply impossible to stop by current Western defense systems. Some experts believe that this missile would be more dangerous for the United States Navy than the famous « Chinese aircraft carrier killers »2. For Fabrice Wolf, with the Kinjal missile, « Russia takes the strategic initiative in Europe3 » on an air level, « creating a unique situation since the years [ 19 ] 50 ». Previously, Western forces could compensate for their inferiority in terms of ground forces stationed in Europe by their ability to pose an air threat to Russian devices and to quickly secure superiority in the sky. While the Russians have largely remedied this problem by strengthening their defensive capabilities on the ground at a pace that surprised Westerners, and by modernizing their air forces, the entry into service of Kinjal missiles is upsetting the situation since Russia now has deep strike capabilities apparently impossible to intercept.

Russia will increase this superiority with the upcoming entry into service ( planned for 2021 or 2022 ) of hypersonic cruise missiles 3M22 Tsirkon ( or Zircon ), supposed to be able to destroy land targets, marine or underwater more than 1,000 km at a speed equivalent to eight to nine times that of ( sound, i.e. more than 11,000 km / h ). Due to the technical requirement of these missiles, their admission to active service has already been postponed, but their declaration of operationality is only a matter of time. In January 2020, Russia was carrying out a new conclusive test of the Tsirkon on the frigate Admiral Gorshkov: fired from the Barents Sea, the missile destroyed its target in the north of the Urals, more than 500 km away4.In October of the same year5, a frigate this time tested the Tsirkon missile against a naval target, 450 km apart and at a speed greater than Mach 8 ( 9 878 km / h ), operation reissued in December with the same success. The use of the Tsirkon hypersonic missile will be generalized for most types of combat ships, which will considerably strengthen the Russian naval forces and allow them to improve the balance of power with the Western navies, or even to gain control over them in certain configurations.

Still on the cruise missile side, the Kalibr missile does not fall into the category of hypersonic weapons, but will also help to reduce the gap with NATO. The 3M-14E version of the Kalibr missile will have a range between 1,500 and 2,500 km6( in terminal phase ) and will allow, over such a distance, to cover both Europe, the Middle East and the Arctic space as well as the Pacific zones likely to become a major confrontation ground, offering Russian forces an advantage over the most strategic theaters. In October 20207, our French Navy carried out the first test ( successful ) of a naval cruise missile ( MdCN ) from a submarine, Suffren : France is now one of the few countries in the world, with the United States, the United Kingdom ( which uses the American Tomahawk missiles ) and Russia to be able to strike heavy infrastructure in the depth of the land from the seas – the MdCN having a range exceeding 1 000 km. However, our performance will remain below that of Russian cruise missiles, at least with regard to range. The 3M-54E version of the Kalibr missile, designed for the fight against ships, will have a range of 220 km, ten times less than that of the 3M-14E, but will be able to reach a Mach 2.9 speed, ie nearly 3,600 km / h.This missile will fly extremely low ( which will improve its stealth ) and will be able to perform flexible « » maneuvers which will make it all the more difficult to intercept.

The development of Kalibr 3M-54E anti-ship missiles should be seen in the context of a modernization of the Russian fleet : improvement of maritime patrol and anti-submarine control aircraft ( Tu-142 modernized ) and supersonic bombers ( Tu-22M ), development of stealth combat drones ( Okhotnik-B ), recent or scheduled entry into service of a large number of new generation Kilo class submarines ( project 636 ) extremely difficult to detect, modernized long range bombers capable of harassing western fleets to complicate reinforcements and large-scale operations.... We are entering a situation where NATO naval forces, including our own, will find it much more difficult to progress in the Baltic or Black Sea,and will see their advantage reduced on Mediterranean or arctic maritime theaters. Overwhelmed in 2016 by the Chinese navy, the « Russian Military Maritime Fleet » remains the third largest in the world with a tonnage of around 1.2 million tonnes. Despite their critical size inherited from the Soviet era, the Russian naval forces were however regularly singled out for their aging, their technological backwardness ( which tends to be caught up ) and their lack of adaptation to the new realities of the maritime world. Russia has certainly operated for ten years a rise in power of its naval forces which has accelerated since the arrival of Valery Gerasimov at the post of Chief of Staff, but it still bows over the seas facing western fleets.Where our aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle embodies the technological excellence of the National Navy, the obsolescence of the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kouznetsov, whose chimney spits an impressive plume of black smoke, illustrates the delay of the Russian navy ( which has only one aircraft carrier where the United States alone deploys eleven at the time of writing these lines ). Even by developing equalizing technologies such as the worrying Tsirkon hypersonic missile or by strengthening the tonnage and quality of their fleets, Russian naval forces are not seeking to rise to the height of Western naval forces or take ascendancy on the high seas ( which, on the other hand, seeks to do China ). The modernization and extension programs of the Russian fleet are mainly aimed at defense ;the Russian naval power of the 2020s seems more to follow the doctrine of defense of the territory formerly defended by Admiral Kouznetsov, than that advocated at the same time by Admiral Gorshkov, in favor of the constitution of a high seas fleet. This logic, on the other hand, includes support for land and air operations on a potential European theater.

The announced objectives ( or discernible ) which guide the strengthening of the Russian navy speak volumes. Emphasis is placed on strengthening access denial capacities, particularly in the Baltic, Black and White and even Caspian seas, while the current access denial capacities ( « bubbles A2/AD » ) are already considerable although less impenetrable than many statements by American military observers suggest. Beyond this improvement in the defense of Russian territory and its « close foreigner » ( therefore of the potential zone of massive intervention of Russian armies ), the Russian navy improves its projection and intervention capacities on distant theaters ( North and Barents Seas, Persian Gulf and Eastern Mediterranean ), consistent with reforms within the'army of Earth. Russian naval forces will continue to modernize in the coming years, through programs on which we will not expand because they will not be likely to influence the balance of power with NATO; we can still emphasize, as Igor Delanoë does, that the Russian navy is « largely deprived8 » by the 2018-2027 armament program of which it is the poor relation. So, although they retain the third world rank behind the United States and China in terms of tonnage, Russian naval forces are not able to rise to the level of western navies and they do not have the objective. However, the development of the Kinjal, Tsirkon and Kalibr 3M54-E missiles will give them for a long time an advantage that Moscow intends to perpetuate. Neighboring projects are also about to succeed in aviation, where new generation missiles will be put into service in the 2020s: Russia will thus, among other things, equip its R37M missile fighter planes, manufactured by Vympel, with a speed greater than 6,000 km / h and a range'

We must add to the development of Russian capacities in the hypersonic field the progress made by China: whether or not the Russian-Chinese partnership evolves in a military alliance, China and Russia are both on the way to becoming leaders in the hypersonic field, and in the development of subsonic or supersonic missiles of different types capable of seriously handicapping Western forces on the battlefield. Much has already been said for several years about Chinese Dongfeng medium range ( DF-17, DF-21 ) or intermediate range ( DF-26 ) missiles. The DF-21D ( anti-ship version of the DF-21 ), nicknamed « aircraft carrier killer », aroused as many fantasies as doubts about its real abilities, but seems today capable of'inflict heavy damage on the United States Navy in the event of conflict. The DF-26 is nicknamed « Guam killer » since it could strike American military installations on the very strategic island of Guam from Chinese soil, about 4,750 kilometers from the Chinese coast – China maintains the vagueness about the possibility that the DF-26 can carry a nuclear charge. The DF-17, capable of reaching a Mach-5 speed ( 6,125 km / h ), is with Russian missiles one of the only hypersonic missiles in service in the world since October 2019. He will be able to take the DF-ZF hypersonic glider, potentially capable of reaching Mach 10 ( 12,350 km / h ). In the fall of 2020, an amateur video of an Xian H-6 bomber carrying under his fuselage what appeared to be a DF-17 hypersonic missileThe DF-26 is nicknamed « Guam killer » since it could strike American military installations on the very strategic island of Guam from Chinese soil, about 4,750 kilometers from the Chinese coast – China maintains the vagueness about the possibility that the DF-26 can carry a nuclear charge. The DF-17, capable of reaching a Mach-5 speed ( 6,125 km / h ), is with Russian missiles one of the only hypersonic missiles in service in the world since October 2019. He will be able to take the DF-ZF hypersonic glider, potentially capable of reaching Mach 10 ( 12,350 km / h ). In the fall of 2020, an amateur video of an Xian H-6 bomber carrying under his fuselage what appeared to be a DF-17 hypersonic missileThe DF-26 is nicknamed « Guam killer » since it could strike American military installations on the very strategic island of Guam from Chinese soil, about 4,750 kilometers from the Chinese coast – China maintains the vagueness about the possibility that the DF-26 can carry a nuclear charge. The DF-17, capable of reaching a Mach-5 speed ( 6,125 km / h ), is with Russian missiles one of the only hypersonic missiles in service in the world since October 2019. He will be able to take the DF-ZF hypersonic glider, potentially capable of reaching Mach 10 ( 12,350 km / h ). In the fall of 2020, an amateur video of an Xian H-6 bomber carrying under his fuselage what appeared to be a DF-17 hypersonic missilehe could hit American military installations on the very strategic island of Guam from Chinese soil, about 4,750 kilometers from the Chinese coast – China maintains the vagueness about the possibility that the DF-26 can carry a nuclear charge. The DF-17, capable of reaching a Mach-5 speed ( 6,125 km / h ), is with Russian missiles one of the only hypersonic missiles in service in the world since October 2019. He will be able to take the DF-ZF hypersonic glider, potentially capable of reaching Mach 10 ( 12,350 km / h ). In the fall of 2020, an amateur video of an Xian H-6 bomber carrying under his fuselage what appeared to be a DF-17 hypersonic missilehe could hit American military installations on the very strategic island of Guam from Chinese soil, about 4,750 kilometers from the Chinese coast – China maintains the vagueness about the possibility that the DF-26 can carry a nuclear charge. The DF-17, capable of reaching a Mach-5 speed ( 6,125 km / h ), is with Russian missiles one of the only hypersonic missiles in service in the world since October 2019. He will be able to take the DF-ZF hypersonic glider, potentially capable of reaching Mach 10 ( 12,350 km / h ). In the fall of 2020, an amateur video of an Xian H-6 bomber carrying under his fuselage what appeared to be a DF-17 hypersonic missileabout 4,750 kilometers from the Chinese coast – China maintains the vagueness about the possibility that the DF-26 can carry a nuclear charge. The DF-17, capable of reaching a Mach-5 speed ( 6,125 km / h ), is with Russian missiles one of the only hypersonic missiles in service in the world since October 2019. He will be able to take the DF-ZF hypersonic glider, potentially capable of reaching Mach 10 ( 12,350 km / h ). In the fall of 2020, an amateur video of an Xian H-6 bomber carrying under his fuselage what appeared to be a DF-17 hypersonic missileabout 4,750 kilometers from the Chinese coast – China maintains the vagueness about the possibility that the DF-26 can carry a nuclear charge. The DF-17, capable of reaching a Mach-5 speed ( 6,125 km / h ), is with Russian missiles one of the only hypersonic missiles in service in the world since October 2019. He will be able to take the DF-ZF hypersonic glider, potentially capable of reaching Mach 10 ( 12,350 km / h ). In the fall of 2020, an amateur video of an Xian H-6 bomber carrying under his fuselage what appeared to be a DF-17 hypersonic missileone of the only hypersonic missiles in service in the world since October 2019. He will be able to take the DF-ZF hypersonic glider, potentially capable of reaching Mach 10 ( 12,350 km / h ). In the fall of 2020, an amateur video of an Xian H-6 bomber carrying under his fuselage what appeared to be a DF-17 hypersonic missileone of the only hypersonic missiles in service in the world since October 2019. He will be able to take the DF-ZF hypersonic glider, potentially capable of reaching Mach 10 ( 12,350 km / h ). In the fall of 2020, an amateur video of an Xian H-6 bomber carrying under his fuselage what appeared to be a DF-17 hypersonic missile9has aroused much speculation. If it is proven – it is moreover the most likely hypothesis – that China has airborne hypersonic missiles, that is to say capable of being fired from an airplane as is the case with the Russian Kinjal, this will contribute to upset the balance of forces between the Chinese and American forces in Asia-Pacific. According to Fabrice Wolf, « on the basis of a transposition of the performance of the DF-17 and the more imposing booster which equips the new missile, as well as its airborne component, the range of this new vector should reach, at a minimum, that of the DF-26 missile, ie between 4,000 and 4,500 km. The DZ-DF hypersonic glider will allow [ ... ]keep a hypersonic speed greater than Mach 5 until the impact or detonation of the load [ ... ]while maintaining significant maneuverability, rendering [ s ] anti-ballistic missile systems inoperative [ ... ]. In addition to the range of the missile itself, the range of the 3,500 km H-6N bomber would naturally be added and potentially much more by refueling in flight. Thus, Beijing would have the capacity to strike targets as distant as Honolulu or Sydney with conventional charge missiles, a new capacity for the Chinese authorities10 ».

Overall, Russia's superiority in the hypersonic field, where the Americans have been speeded up and could be left behind by China, is a real game change, as well as the development by Moscow of non-hypersonic missiles capable of giving it an advantage on the ground. The deployment of missiles for a long time out of the reach of Western defenses, and capable for some of threatening opposing forces on the scale of entire regions the size of Europe or the Middle East, will upset the balance of power between Russia and its potential adversaries. If the new Russian missiles have been the subject of a buzzand mythification in the same way as Russia's A2 / AD capabilities or the nature of its tactical nuclear arsenal, everything shows that they will be able to erode the relative advantage of NATO forces in the event of a conflict in Europe. To the point of weighing on the course of decisive clashes ?

Electronic warfare: how Russian supremacy could turn the game on the battlefield​

The domination of Western forces, American in the first place, is known about their technological advance in practically all areas. What if this situation were in the process of being partially called into question by the supremacy of Russia in electronic warfare ? It is now a very credible risk. Since the end of the Cold War, Western forces have exponentially increased their dependence on electronic systems without developing enough protections for them. In addition, Russian forces, which have never lowered their guard over innovation in the « top of the » spectrum and preparation for high intensity conflicts, have strongly relied on electronic warfare technologies when American forces neglected them, not to mention Europeans of course.Has our technological advance paradoxically become an Achilles tendon ? If it is not necessary to generalize, this could well become the case in certain clashes. The electromagnetic jamming technologies developed and tested by the Russian armies ( and to a lesser extent Chinese ) are now considered capable of partially or totally inoperative most American equipment – and obviously those of the Allied forces, considerably reducing their technological advantage and turning the balance of power back on the battlefield. Many American experts today believe that the Pentagon has underestimated Russian or Chinese jamming capabilities ( or overvalued the ability of American equipment to cope with it ), to the point that we can speak of a painful awakening.

Russia was one of the first countries to invest in the field of electronic warfare, even when it was not yet conceived as such. From the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Russian forces successfully interfered with communications from the Japanese fleet11 ; they have never lost sight of the potential offered by the electromagnetic spectrum and have continuously developed technologies in this field12to the point of getting ahead of the rest of the world. Much of Russia's current electronic warfare capabilities have been developing since the end of Soviet times13. Western forces have developed little of their capabilities in the field, including the United States, which largely underestimated the issue to the point of not waking up until the late 2010s, surprised by the advance made by Russia. Like those of other major Western powers, American forces have exponentially increased their dependence on electronic systems without developing enough protections for them. The United States is currently losing14the race for innovation in the electromagnetic spectrum against Russia15, and the gap with the latter is dangerously widening. Marc Chassillan sums up the issue as follows :« the Russians are vowing real electronic warfare and they have a unique set of means ranging from company to theater level. [ ... ] their presence in an opex theater could create very bad surprises for the Western forces, too sure to act in an operational comfort situation16 ».

A report by Roger McDermott published in 2017 by a research institute linked to the Estonian Ministry of Defense and prefaced by the American general Michael Hayden, former director of the CIA and the NSA, focused on Russian capabilities in electronic warfare and their development by 202517. If Hayden has a sulphurous reputation for his practices at the head of American intelligence and his role in the Snowden case, McDermott is a respected researcher; the report concluded that « more than any other factor in the development of Russia's conventional military capabilities, the EW [electronic warfare, often translated into French by GE, electronic war ] pose un défi fondamental et de long terme pour l'Alliance18 ». Le think tankmoderate American The American Security Project, which is one of its founding members John Kerry and stands out in the United States for the emphasis on climate change, the importance of nuclear disarmament, or the warming of relations with Cuba, published in April 2020 another study on the threat posed by Russian capacities in the field of electronic warfare. The report insisted that Russian electromagnetic capabilities are not as powerful as advanced by Moscow propaganda and on the need to qualify certain misconceptions, but confirmed the seriousness of the danger :Russian forces would be well able to challenge American supremacy on the battlefield as their capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum are developed and ahead of those of the United States.United and their allies.

On the ground, the effectiveness of Russian electronic warfare systems is well established. At the start of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Russian forces allegedly attacked Ukrainian electronic equipment ( especially radios ) manufactured in Russia using a sort of fault ( Ukrainian colonel Ivan Pavlenko speaks of « virus » ) of which they had knowledge19. Did the Russians sell trapped electronic equipment to the Ukrainians ? If it is difficult to answer this question, some lessons can be learned. Citing a study by the Asymmetric Warfare Group, linked to the US Army, Sébastien Roblin reports that in Ukraine, « les brouilleurs, qui perturbent les signaux de commande, ont abattu plus de 100 drones ukrainiens, tandis que le renseignement électromagnétique a été utilisé pour cibler des frappes mortelles d'artillerie20 ». Le dernier point est à rapporter avec le fait que la Russie ait utilisé les signaux des téléphones portables de soldats ukrainiens pour les bombarder. Les Russes continuent de déployer des capacités offensives dans le pays. En avril 2019, on apprenait ainsi qu'un système de guerre électronique russe dernier cri avait été repéré dans le sud-est de l'Ukraine21.

Russia has been suspected several times of jamming the GPS of NATO forces during border exercises, especially during the « Trident Juncture 2018 » exercise where even the GPS of Norwegian and Finnish civilians presented malfunctions22. It even seems that GPS jamming is used to protect the delusional « Poutine palace » whose regime has sought to hide the Russian people at all costs.23... Les forces de l'OTAN ont déjà été handicapées par l'usage de leurs propres matériels de brouillage électromagnétique lors d'entraînements incluant l'emploi d'avions américains de guerre électronique EC-130H Compass Call (modèle que le Pentagone a commencé à retirer du service en janvier 2020). Le brouillage généré par ces appareils pourtant bien moins puissants que les systèmes russes avait été suffisamment fort pour clouer au sol les autres avions qui devaient prendre part à l'exercice, au point que les Compass Call ont du être sortis de ces différents exercices pour permettre aux avions rendus inopérants par ces brouillages de décoller. Les Américains peuvent retirer leurs appareils systèmes de brouillage en plein exercice pour ne pas gêner leurs propres avions de combat et ceux de leurs alliés,but we can doubt the fact that in a confrontation situation, Russians or Chinese would hand over their electronic warfare devices to leave Westerners in control of the sky... While a number of voices are rising across the Atlantic to point to the lack of preparation and the delay of the Pentagon as American arms companies in the face of Russian and now Chinese capacities in terms of electronic warfare, some officers denounce the fact that the training exercises are unrealistic and « too easy » as they neglect the opponent; for them, American armies are actually not ready for this new realityWhile a number of voices are rising across the Atlantic to point to the lack of preparation and the delay of the Pentagon as American arms companies in the face of Russian and now Chinese capacities in terms of electronic warfare, some officers denounce the fact that the training exercises are unrealistic and « too easy » as they neglect the opponent; for them, American armies are actually not ready for this new realityWhile a number of voices are rising across the Atlantic to point to the lack of preparation and the delay of the Pentagon as American arms companies in the face of Russian and now Chinese capacities in terms of electronic warfare, some officers denounce the fact that the training exercises are unrealistic and « too easy » as they neglect the opponent; for them, American armies are actually not ready for this new realitytraining are unrealistic and « too easy » as they neglect the opponent; for them, the American armies are in reality not ready in the face of this new realitytraining are unrealistic and « too easy » as they neglect the opponent; for them, the American armies are in reality not ready in the face of this new reality24. It is interesting to note that the Pentagon, which sometimes exaggerates opposing threats in order to increase its funding, has dangerously underestimated a first-rate threat here.

If the Americans have the unpleasant surprise of discovering themselves in difficulty in the field of electronic warfare, the Europeans ( French included ) are practically out of the game. We have no type of electromagnetic jamming device capable of competing with those deployed by Russian forces. Worst of all, we are very vulnerable to those developed by the Russians. The SPECTRA ( Protection and Obviously system for the Rafale firing lines ) which equip our Rafales are probably insufficiently resistant to Russian jamming capacities. If we should not draw too hasty conclusions from it, otherwise keep in mind the problems noted during Operation Hamilton in 2018 ( initiated to strike the supposed chemical installations of the Bashar al-Assad regime ).On the three FREMM class Aquitaine frigates engaged in the bombing mission of the sites of Barzé and Him Shinshar, only the Languedoc frigate was able to fire three MdCN missiles within the time allowed. The Aquitaine and Auvergne frigates were only able to fire their missiles once the firing slot was closed ( and therefore did not fire any ). The answer put forward was first of all that of the internal « technical problem ». The fact that one of the five Rafals deployed in the same night could not fire its second Scalp-EG missile was indeed linked to technical deficiencies as our armies know too much about makes the difference between the missions entrusted to them and the means granted to them. But it later became apparent that the'impossibility for our two frigates to fire their missiles within the time allowed was probably linked to the presence not far of Russian ships. General Lecointre25and Admiral Prazuck, then Chief of Staff of the National Navy before his replacement by Pierre Vandier in 2020, estimated that these ships had engaged in unfriendly behavior26– a few days earlier, the Aquitaine frigate had also been the subject of a threatening overflight by an armed Su-24 tactical bomber, passed nearby27. A Russian Admiral Grigorovitch class frigate would have placed within reach of our frigates with an electronic jamming device capable of compromising the success of the operation. This is a simple assumption, but it is as credible as it is worrying.

One more field experience that confirms how the electromagnetic spectrum has become an Achilles heel for the Western European – armies in the first place – which rely heavily on their lead technological, and a decisive advantage for Russia. Like Ukraine, Syria has become a laboratory for Russia which tests its capacities in the electromagnetic spectrum. Russians use their electronic war systems there to obstruct American forces. Krasukha-4 scrambles radars, radios, drone control channels and control, make planes deaf and blind28. Russia also uses its capabilities directly on the Syrian battlefield: in February 2020, an electronic war system ( probably Krasukha ), for example, has disabled the drone control system used by jihadists to attack Hmeim air base and put them combat out of29. In Russia itself, the electronic jamming systems of Murmansk-BN radars installed on the Kola and Kamchatka peninsulas are supposed to be able to damage or render inoperative electronic systems for thousands of kilometers.

At the start of the 2020s, Russia is far ahead in controlling the electromagnetic spectrum. A note from the French Research Center on Intelligence ( Cf2R ) noting Russian supremacy in the field considers that « it is possible that in the next 10-15 years, other countries may compete with Russia30 »( which shows the level of advance taken by Russian forces ). But the most advanced country in electronic warfare after Russia is most likely China, which has long developed its capabilities in GE in order to be able to counterbalance American supremacy on the battlefield. In order to break the technological advantage of Western forces, Moscow and Beijing are emphasizing other ways of making them deaf and blind, particularly with regard to American forces. So anti-satellite weapons. In the event of a major conflict associating one or both of the two powers, most likely is that both Russia and China have to fight near their borders. However, their anti-satellite capabilities could drastically reduce the'effectiveness of American forces: they are very dependent on satellites to conduct operations outside American territory. Citing other technologies than those mentioned here, Fabrice Wolf wonders if overall, electromagnetism will be « the black powder of the XXIe siècle31 » : c'est en effet une possibilité à long terme tant des technologies telles que le canon électrique (railgun)pourraient révolutionner le combat dans les prochaines décennies).

Mais s'agissant de la guerre électronique stricto sensu, celle qui vise au contrôle du spectre électromagnétique notamment dans le C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), la Russie est potentiellement déjà en capacité de bouleverser les rapports de force. Et donc d'infliger de sérieuses difficultés aux forces européennes et américaines en cas d'affrontement en Europe. La Chine pourrait quant à elle être en mesure de réserver une mauvaise surprise aux États-Unis en cas d'affrontement entre les deux superpuissances. La maîtrise par la Chine de systèmes de guerre électronique capables de mettre en difficulté les forces américaines pourrait s'avérer être un l'un des Shashoujian that Beijing would develop to turn the situation around in the event of a confrontation against the United States or its allies in Asia-Pacific. Russia's superiority in electronic warfare also has everything Shashoujian, capable of threatening an adversary today superior on paper like NATO. It is a safe bet that we will have unpleasant surprises on this point in the coming years, with the risk of having even worse ones in the event of military escalation or armed conflict.

Myths and realities on A2 / AD ( access denial ) from Russia​

The Russian defense places particular emphasis on « strategic bastions » with « access denial » and zone ban capabilities; we speak in military jargon of « bubbles A2/AD » ( A2 / AD meaning anti-access / area denial). These « bubbles » are based on short and medium range air defense systems ( Pantsir, Buk, Tor ) and long range ( S-300 and S-400, the S-500 to enter service during 2021 when writing these lines after very conclusive tests ); ground-to-ground systems, like the Iskander-Ms which would be equipped for some of tactical nuclear warheads, that is to say employable on the battlefield ; mobile coastal batteries ( Bastion systems and supersonic cruise missiles P-800 Oniks, short range batteries Bal ... ). The question of Russia's capabilities in this area must be deepened as it has become crucial. In the vein of technological fetishism which sometimes animates the debate around defense issues, some think tanks and analysts have voluntarily or not exaggerated Russia's denial of access capabilities and ceded to a form of buzz. According to some not very rigorous publications, the Russian « A2 / AD bubbles » are impassable bastions capable of locking everything in the range of their missiles. Michael Kofman even talks about « threat inflinformism32 » to designate this threat overvaluation. Several studies have endeavored in recent years to put into perspective the real effectiveness of the denial of access capacities developed by Russia. A study published in 2019 by the Swedish Defense Research Agency concluded that « Russian A2 / AD capacities, although undeniably substantial, do not to date create vast impenetrable bubbles, and maximalist claims about their scope and accuracy tend to diminish by taking a closer look33 », while stressing that the threat remains very serious and should not be taken lightly from the perspective of a crisis or conflict. As Marc Chassillan writes, can speak of a « anti-aircraft umbrella and very dense A2 / AD formed by several congruent systems of different capacities, scope and nature, starting with the stainless ZSU-23-4, the Pantsir, the Tunguska, the BUR and the family S300 / 400/450/500. Properly positioned on the ground, well coordinated by a C4ISR system and possibly helped by air watch planes, this panoply leaves no hole34 ». Without pouring into the « threat inflationism »mentioned by Michael Kofman, a number of studies thus underline the effectiveness of Russian systems of denial of access.

« A2 / capacities/AD » Russians have caused a lot of ink to flow to the point that some have invented a whole Russian doctrine in the matter which exists especially in the heads of American analysts and Europeans who resume their analyzes. Like the so-called « Gerasimov » doctrine on information warfare, which is a western fiction forged from a few Russian concepts and operating methods. First, the concept of A2 / AD appeared stricto sensu in the jargon of the western strategic community to talk about the strategy and the denial of access capacities developed by China35in a very different geographical context from Eastern Europe, before being applied to Russia. As Michael Kofman writes, the Russians do not use the term A2 / AD and translate it by the concept of « restriction and denial of access and maneuver » (ogranicheniye i vespreshcheniye dostupa i manyuvra36); Jyri Raitasalo reminds him that Russia does not even have an A2 / AD strategy as it is often described37... Admittedly, Russia does have a form of denial of access doctrine, but it differs from the Western conception of A2 / AD; there is therefore a problem of understanding. Many Americans also start from the fact that the so-called Russian A2 / AD doctrine would aim to prevent any intervention against Russia in the event of a crisis, in an essentially dissuasive logic: serious error, since the « A2 / AD bubbles » deployed by Moscow are not designed as impassable dams, but to inflict heavy damage on NATO troops which the Russians believe could not prevent mass passage, only delay it with the main hope of a rapid exit from conflict which is to their advantage. To paraphrase Keir Giles and Mathieu Boulègue,who demystified the issue of Russian « A2 / AD bubbles » in a study38for Parameters ( academic journal of the United States Army War College ), it is also the fear of being faced with supposedly insurmountable Russian defenses, even if they are not, which could dissuade NATO from intervening in a crisis on its eastern flank, for example in the Baltic countries.

In any case, despite numerous exaggerations about Russian A2 / AD capabilities and misinterpretations concerning Moscow's doctrines and strategies in this area, the threat remains extremely serious and will be further reinforced by the deployment of new defense systems including the S-500. Russia's denial of access capabilities throughout the isthmus between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea should play a major role in the event of a military crisis in Europe, because they strengthen its credibility in the balance of power. Although the Russian « A2 / AD » bubbles are not impassable, they will inflict very severe damage on NATO forces and reduce the advantage they are almost guaranteed of obtaining as the'arrival of American reinforcements, in the event that these would not be reduced to face China in Asia-Pacific.

Suwalki's hole, an example of a strategic point exploitable by Russia in the event of a serious crisis​

We have seen that Russia seeks to develop situations of asymmetry to reduce the advantage of Western forces. However, the geography of Europe could create such a situation in the event of escalating tensions or even limited conflict. As an example, a weak point in European theater caught the attention of Russian and NATO strategists: the Suwalki hole. The Baltic States are linked to Poland and therefore to the rest of the EU and the Atlantic Alliance by this wide land corridor of around 65 km: east of this narrow passage, Belarus, militarily linked to Russia within the framework of the CSTO and defense partnerships, and which would be at best neutral in the event of conflict39, if not on the Moscow side; to the west, the Russian Kaliningrad Oblast, the most militarized zone in Europe, which has been the subject of continuous military reinforcement since the 2000s ( 15,000 to 30,000 soldiers would now be positioned there ). The land, covered with readily muddy wet fields, forests and lakes, makes displacement difficult in the Suwalki hole, especially since half of the hole is made up of a hilly massif; more to the west or to the south, natural treasures, the region of Mazuria lakes, Biebrza National Park and Bialowieza Primary Forest are hampering hypothetical troop movements from the rest of Poland. Only two highways and a rail link that will quickly be the target of Russian bombing allow troops to be dispatched quickly.In the context of a military operation limited to the Baltic countries, an increasingly credible hypothesis unlike that of a continental conflict, Russian forces are said to be largely in a position of strength and could isolate the Baltic states from their allies over a long period.

Russia has made the over-militarized enclave of Kaliningrad a « bubble A2 / AD » capable of ensuring a particularly effective denial of access. The S-400 missiles installed there can intercept enemy planes and helicopters over a radius covering a large part of Poland and Latvia, and from the Baltic to the Swedish island of Gotland. Coastal batteries with SSC-5 Bastion supersonic missiles and SSC-1 Sepal, with a range of 300 and 450 km respectively, make naval intervention extremely complicated. Iskander missiles, artillery batteries and electronic warfare equipment in the enclave complement this device, which has dangerously strengthened in recent years. If NATO forces wish to respond to Russian intervention in a European theater,they will face more intense resistance than anything that Western forces have faced since the Second World War.

During the Cold War, NATO and Warsaw Pact forces focused their attention on Fulda's hole in the event of a Soviet invasion. An operation in Suwalki's hole seems more possible today than was an invasion of the FRG on a large scale ( even taking into account all the strategic literature of the Cold War which studied such a hypothesis with the greatest seriousness ), and above all much easier for Russia than an offensive in that of Fulda was for the Red Army. In Suwalki, Russian forces would combine surprise, overwhelming superiority while waiting for reinforcements from the rest of NATO, mastery of the terrain, denial of access capabilities.If the Russian forces represent a much less serious threat than those posed by the immense forces of the Red Army located under the Cold War at two stages of tour of France of our their advantage in an operation in a place like Suwalki's hole would be paradoxically greater than that which the USSR had in Fulda's hole. A study by the RAND Corporation40saw NATO forces lose an operation in the Baltic countries against Russian troops reaching Tallinn and Riga in a maximum of 60 hours ( this last point is plausible ), leaving the Alliance faced with a limited number of options, all bad, ranging from humiliating de-escalation to avoid the worst at the cost of all credibility, to a major conflict with incalculable consequences. If such simulations are generally to be taken with tweezers, that of the RAND has been deemed sufficiently serious and substantiated.

On the ground, Suwalki's hole has been the subject of combat simulations in real conditions on both sides since 2015. NATO forces have led in recent years in Suwalki's military exercises hole (war games) international, especially in the summer of 2017 when 1,500 American, British, Croatian and Lithuanian soldiers simulated a field operation with relatively limited equipment; the same year, the Russian-Belarusian exercise « Zapad 2017 » hired far more staff with tens of thousands of men. Since 2016, NATO has organized mechanized force rotations ( 4,500 combatants ) between Poland and the Baltic countries, which has a deterrent effect but would not weigh heavily in the event of a conflict in the area. The forces of the Russian West Military District could very quickly hire 300,000 men and 450 operational tanks :the presence of NATO soldiers whom the Russians should fight and defeat serves above all to increase the risk of a disastrous military escalation and therefore to reduce that of a Russian aggression. In a similar logic, the presence of American forces near the European marches of Russia is also part of the enlarged nuclear deterrence of the United States, in the idea that the Russians would never dare to take the risk of killing American soldiers. However, a rapid response from the NATO forces ( 40,000 theoretically operational soldiers ) appears less and less easy in view of the devices put in place by Russia and its capacity to invade and defend Suwalki's hole in a reduced time. This strategic corridor is not able to tip the outcome of'a serious crisis or the conduct of a potential localized conflict, but it is one of the geographical particularities capable of having a strong influence on the course of a battle if it is used.



Faced with an insurmountable imbalance in terms of the ratio of forces on the conventional level ( an imbalance that only the equalizing power of nuclear weapons can cancel, whose use would put Russia as the member countries of NATO at the same level of desolation ), the Russian armies have largely worked on the issue of asymmetry through the exploitation of faults in Alliance forces. Russian superiority in electronic warfare, new missiles in service or in the process of being in Russian forces and Russia's denial of access capabilities should not be exaggerated ; in the case of Russian A2 / AD strategy and systems, these are often misunderstood in addition to being overestimated by part of the western strategic community.The foregoing elements are also not able to tip the outcome of a conflict in Europe on their own. However, a clever use of the space ( for example, a lightning occupation of the Suwalki hole ) coupled with the dissuasive aspect of « bubbles A2/AD » Russians could tip the end of a crisis by placing Russia in a position of strength ( bringing its adversaries to a crisis resolution advantageous for Russia ), or on the contrary by giving it the dangerous illusion that it is ( leading Russian leaders to take a reckless approach, even poorly calculated risks ). Above all, Russian capabilities in the various fields mentioned, starting with electronic means of warfare and new generation missiles,could each on their scale constitute « tactical surprises » for European and American forces on a European battlefield, surprises which can only be bad.

Aurélien Duchêne

Sources and notes :

1César Frezat, « Russia at the forefront of hypersonic missiles », note from CERPA ( Center for Studies, Reserves and Partnerships of the Air Force ) n ° 214, IRSEM , April 2019, https://www.irsem.fr/data/files/irs... l’avant-garde des missiles hypersoniques.pdf

2Abraham Ait, « Russia Inducts Its Own ‘ Carrier Killer ’ Missile, and It’s More Dangerous than China’s », The Diplomat, May 12, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/rus...er-missile-and-its-more-dangerous-than-chinas

3Fabrice Wolf, « With the hypersonic missile Kh47M2 Kinzhal, Russia takes the strategic initiative in Europe », Meta-Defense, August 9, 2019, https://www.meta-defense.fr/2019/08...ssie-prend-linitiative-strategique-en-europe/

4Xavier Vavasseur, « Russian Navy Test-Launched Tsirkon Hypersonic Missile For The 1st Time », Naval News, February 27, 2020, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-new...-tsirkon-hypersonic-missile-for-the-1st-time/

5« Russian Navy frigate succully test-fires Tsirkon hypersonic missile », TASS, October 7, 2020, https://tass.com/defense/1209579

6« SS-N-30A ( 3M-14 Kalibr ) », Missile Threat ( blog hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies ), June 15, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-n-30a/

7Anne Bauer, « The French navy is acquiring new strategic capabilities », The echoes, October 21, 2020, https://www.lesechos.fr/industrie-s...e-de-capacites-strategiques-nouvelles-1257894

8Igor Delanoë, « The army: Russia's best ally », Large Diplomacy Files n ° 57, Areion Group, July-August 2020.

9Laurent Lagneau, « The video of a Chinese bomber with a possible hypersonic anti-ship weapon circulates on social networks », Opex360, October 18, 2020, http://www.opex360.com/2020/10/18/l...hypersonique-circule-sur-les-reseaux-sociaux/

10Fabrice Wolf, « China would also have an airborne missile », Meta-Defense, October 20, 2020, https://www.meta-defense.fr/2020/10...sposerait-dun-missile-hypersonique-aeroporte/

11Patrick Smith, « Perspective – Russian Electronic Warfare: A Growing Threat to U.S. Battlefield Supremacy », The American Security Project, p. 1, https://www.americansecurityproject...20/04/Ref-0236-Russian-Electronic-Warfare.pdf

12Olivier Dujardin, « Note on Intelligence, Technology and Armaments n ° 12 / September 2019, Electronic War: Russian supremacy », French Center for Research on Intelligence, September 2019, https://cf2r.org/rta/guerre-electronique-la-suprematie-russe/

13Roger McDermott, « Russia’s Advances in Electronic Warfare Capability », Real Clear Defense, October 4, 2019, https://www.realcleardefense.com/ar..._in_electronic_warfare_capability_114786.html

14Paul McLeary, « Russia’s winning the electronic war », Foreign Policy, October 21, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/21/russia-winning-the-electronic-war/

15Sébastien Roblin, « Electronic warfare: The U.S. is losing the invisible fight to Russia's dominant capabilities », NBC News, November 26, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opini...ght-against-ukraine-united-states-ncna1091101

16Marc Chassillan, « The renewal of the Russian offer of terrestrial systems », DEFENSE & Industries n ° 14, June 2020, Foundation for Strategic Research website, https://www.frstrategie.org/sites/d...tions/defense-et-industries/2020/14-6(v2).pdf

17Roger N. McDermott, « Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025: Challenging NATO in the Electromagnetic Spectrum », International Center for Defense and Security, September 2017, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/ICDS_Report_Russias_Electronic_Warfare_to_2025.pdf

18Ibid., p. 48.

19Joseph Trevithick, « Ukrainian Officer Details Russian Electronic Warfare Tactics Including Radio "Virus" », The Drive, October 30, 2019, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zo...ctronic-warfare-tactics-including-radio-virus

20Sébastien Roblin, « Electronic warfare: The U.S. is losing the invisible fight to Russia's dominant capabilities », NBC News, November 26, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opini...ght-against-ukraine-united-states-ncna1091101

21Laurent Lagneau, « A state-of-the-art Russian electronic war system has been spotted in the south-east of Ukraine », Opex360, April 5, 2019, http://www.opex360.com/2019/04/05/u...cri-a-ete-repere-dans-le-sud-est-de-lukraine/

22« Finland to probe reports of Russia disrupting GPS during NATO drill », Deutsche Welle, November 11, 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/finland-to-probe-reports-of-russia-disrupting-gps-during-nato-drill/a-46253512

23Roman Goncharenko, « Is Russia distorting GPS signals to protect Vladimir Putin ? », Deutsche Welle, February 7, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/is-russia-distorting-gps-signals-to-protect-vladimir-putin/a-56484479

24Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., « US Forces Untrained, Unready For Russian, Chinese Jamming », Breaking Defense, October 30, 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/10/us-forces-untrained-not-ready-for-russian-jamming/

25Laurent Lagneau, « Operation Hamilton: Two French frigates were reportedly embarrassed by Russian ships when launching their » missiles, Opex360, May 4, 2018, http://www.opex360.com/2018/05/04/o...avires-russes-moment-de-lancer-leurs-missiles

26Guerric Poncet, « EXCLUSIVE. Syria: the secrets of Operation Hamilton », The point, May 4, 2018, https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/syrie-les-secrets-de-l-operation-hamilton-02-05-2018-2215289_24.php#

27Laurent Lagneau, « Syria: A Russian combat aircraft flew over the frigate « Aquitaine » in an unfriendly and dangerous way », Opex360, April 10, 2018, http://www.opex360.com/2018/04/10/s...gate-aquitaine-de-facon-inamicale-dangereuse/

28Anna Varfolomeeva, « Signaling strength: Russia’s real Syria success is electronic warfare against the US », The Defense Post, 1er May 2018, https://www.thedefensepost.com/2018/05/01/russia-syria-electronic-warfare/

29« Russian Electronic Warfare System Brings Down Hostile Drones in Syria », Defense World, February 3, 2020, https://www.defenseworld.net/news/2...ngs_Down_Hostile_Drones_in_Syria#.X1YMf3kzbIU

30Olivier Dujardin, « Note on Intelligence, Technology and Armaments n ° 12 / September 2019, Electronic War: Russian supremacy », op. cit.

31Fabrice Wolf, « Will electromagnetism be the black powder of the XXIe century ? », Meta-Defense, February 21, 2020, https://www.meta-defense.fr/2020/02...e-sera-t-il-la-poudre-noire-du-xxieme-siecle/

32Michael Kofman, « Russian A2 / AD: It is not overrated, just poorly understood », blog Russian Military Analysis, January 25, 2020, https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wor...d-it-is-not-overrated-just-poorly-understood/

33Robert Dalsjö, Christofer Berglund, Michael Jonsson, « Bursting the Bubble, Russian A2/AD in the Baltic Sea Region : Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications », site de la FOI (Agence suédoise de recherche pour la défense), 2019, p. 78, http://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4651--SE

34Marc Chassillan, « Le renouvellement de l’offre russe de systèmes terrestres », op. cit.

35Luis Simon, « Demystifying the A2/AD buzz », War on the Rocks, 4 janvier 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/demystifying-the-a2ad-buzz/

36Michael Kofman, « It's time to talk about A2 / AD: returning the Russian military challenge », War on the Rocks, September 5, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/09/i...ad-rethinking-the-russian-military-challenge/

37Jyri Raitasalo, « Russia Does Not Have an A2 / AD-strategy ! », Defense and Intelligence Norway, October 24, 2018, https://www.etterretningen.no/2018/10/24/russia-does-not-have-an-a2-ad-strategy/

38Keir Giles, Mathieu Boulègue, « Russia’s A2 / AD Capabilities: Real and Imagine », Parameters flight. 49, n ° 1 – 2 Spring – Summer 2019, United States Army War College Publications, July 2019, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3701.pdf

39The Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko having shown signs of distancing towards Moscow, Belarus could give up following its big neighbor in the event of a conflict and undergo an invasion to guarantee the passage of Russian troops ( when writing these lines, the anti-Lukashenko dispute, however, forced the latter to approach its Russian counterpart ). In the event of a replacement of the Lukashenko regime by a management team less favorable to the Kremlin, this invasion scenario would also be plausible, but neither the Belarusian opposition nor its leaders displayed anti-Moscow orientation, the overwhelming majority of the population remaining on a pro-Russian line unlike those of Ukraine or Georgia.

40David A. Shlapak, Michael Johnson, « Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics », RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html

Nouveaux missiles, guerre électronique, déni d'accès et bastions stratégiques : comment la Russie pourrait prendre l'ascendant sur un champ de bataille européen

La Russie met en service de nouveaux missiles auxquels les forces de l'OTAN seront très vulnérables, et des systèmes de guerre électronique capable d'éroder l'avantage technologique des Occidentaux, tout en renforçant ses capacités de déni d'accès. De quoi changer la donne sur un champ de bataille ?

aurelien-duchene.fr

 

[Roms]

Russian invasion is not unthinkable, it is inevitable​

Most French experts and political leaders still do not believe in an invasion of Ukraine. Probably wrong. Here's why.

• 

Aurélien Duchêne​

Feb 19 2022 •11 min read

Most French experts and political leaders still do not believe in an invasion of Ukraine. Probably wrong. Here's why.

For several weeks, Moscow has been hovering the threat of an invasion of Ukraine. A year ago, I wrote on this site that Russia could invade a neighboring state to defend the « Russian world ». This scenario is likely to happen in Ukraine in the coming days or weeks.

In an article published in March 2021 ( « Between defense of the "Russian world" and irredentism, Russian imperialism at the origin of a next "strategic surprise" ? » ), I put forward the idea that Russia could launch military intervention in a neighboring European state in the near future on the grounds of protecting ethnic Russians (russisiji) and Russian speakers, in the context of the defense of « Russian world ». I had defended this hypothesis for the first time in the fall of 2018, in an article that did not extend to how such an operation could take place and was content to open the door to such an improbable scenario : « after having twice risked an armed response from NATO which was content with a verbal escalation and a strengthening of its eastern devices, why would Vladimir Putin refuse to tip new regions of his "close foreigner", including southern Ukraine, into the Russian fold ? Think of the unthinkable ».

In April 2021, a first concentration of Russian troops on the Ukrainian border against the background of the worsening conflict in the Donbass had put on the table the hypothesis of a Russian attack. Such an eventuality had been ruled out by almost all of those who had seriously analyzed the renewed tension between Kiev and Moscow. General Tod D. Wolters, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, had estimated that the risk of an invasion was between « low and medium » : a more careful analysis than that of most experts who swept the risk of a backhand. Those who did not completely exclude a Russian attack considered such a hypothesis very unlikely. If I had published an analysis on this site during this period, I would have written that the probability of'an invasion in spring 2021 was close to zero due to the weakness of the Russian system and especially the lack of preparation ( notably logistics ) Russian side.

When Russia massaged troops at the borders again in November of the same year, my initial position was the same: Russia would not attack Ukraine this winter. Too early. In various articles published on this site, I have described several scenarios in which Russia could initiate a military operation in Europe, including against a NATO member state ( in the event that Russian leaders believe they can avoid an open war against the Alliance ). With the exception of the hypothesis of an ( incidentmentioned here with the example of Russian provocations in Northern Europe) can materialize at any time, all of these scenarios had in common that they would happen in the near future,but under conditions which are not ( or do not seem to be ) met in this winter 2021-2022.

First, the Russian government must believe that it has more to gain than to lose by launching a military intervention. This requires arriving at a situation where the Vladimir Putin regime believes that « the risk incurred is worth it, or either in a sufficiently critical situation » to launch an operation which could just as easily mean its loss ( in the idea that the Kremlin « could be attempted by an outside adventure, a headlong rush or an attempted fait accompli that could all degenerate » ): the scenario of an intervention aimed at « strengthen the regime with a new flash» was the most credible to me, but was very unlikely to materialize before 2024. At least. Indeed, the year 2024 will in all likelihood see Vladimir Putin soliciting a new mandate : if its popularity were to decline to the point where the manipulation of the elections would not be enough to guarantee it a new plebiscite and a fifth mandate where its power would be undisputed, engaging in an outside adventure in the months preceding the election could be possible. If the initiative were to backfire on the Russian regime, it would be after the re-election of Vladimir Putin, or the postponement of the elections. In a more plausible scenario, an external intervention would take place after the re-election of the Russian President ( or even the election of his dolphin ) in two years, as part of'a fifth mandate where the authority of the regime would wither during the rest of the decade. But the 2024 presidential election being scheduled for spring, I did not imagine an outside adventure being launched before the end of 2023 at the earliest, unless a regime crisis should occur by then. Indeed, in the event that Vladimir Putin misses his bet ( recul under international pressure, stagnation, military defeat, weight of sanctions on the daily life of the Russians ), public opinion could turn against him in a few months. Launching an operation one or even two years before the next presidential term seemed to me devoid of any logic. And the Russian regime does not seem to be at the wall today.presidential election of 2024 being scheduled for spring, I did not imagine an external adventure to be launched before the end of 2023 at the earliest, unless a regime crisis should occur by then. Indeed, in the event that Vladimir Putin misses his bet ( recul under international pressure, stagnation, military defeat, weight of sanctions on the daily life of the Russians ), public opinion could turn against him in a few months. Launching an operation one or even two years before the next presidential term seemed to me devoid of any logic. And the Russian regime does not seem to be at the wall today.presidential election of 2024 being scheduled for spring, I did not imagine an external adventure to be launched before the end of 2023 at the earliest, unless a regime crisis should occur by then. Indeed, in the event that Vladimir Putin misses his bet ( recul under international pressure, stagnation, military defeat, weight of sanctions on the daily life of the Russians ), public opinion could turn against him in a few months. Launching an operation one or even two years before the next presidential term seemed to me devoid of any logic. And the Russian regime does not seem to be at the wall today.in the event that Vladimir Putin misses his bet ( recul under international pressure, stagnation, military defeat, weight of sanctions on the daily life of the Russians ), public opinion could turn against him in a few months. Launching an operation one or even two years before the next presidential term seemed to me devoid of any logic. And the Russian regime does not seem to be at the wall today.in the event that Vladimir Putin misses his bet ( recul under international pressure, stagnation, military defeat, weight of sanctions on the daily life of the Russians ), public opinion could turn against him in a few months. Launching an operation one or even two years before the next presidential term seemed to me devoid of any logic. And the Russian regime does not seem to be at the wall today.hui at the foot of the wall.hui at the foot of the wall.

Second, Vladimir Putin must have enough guarantees about the ability of his armies to achieve a quick victory. I am part of the idea that Russia's real military might is underestimated in various respects : preparation of forces for a potential major conflict ( modernization, equipment, training, professionalization ... ), level of defense effort ( much higher than the most commonly used statistics ) suggest, breaking technologies capable of switching the situation to a battlefield ( hyperveloc missiles, electronic warfare, A2 / AD ), cyberwar capabilities... Russian forces are probably better prepared to lead a high intensity conflict than any European army : the only two military powers with a complete army model ( France and the United Kingdom ) lack mass and thickness to last, while the other European armies are either too small to prevail in a major conflict, or unable to lead one. But when writing these lines, it is not certain that the Russian army is able to obtain a rapid victory in Ukraine and to control large territories. More specifically: we can argue that the Russian forces would be able to crush the Ukrainian armies in a few weeks, but at the cost of heavy losses and fierce fighting in the largest cities ;if the Russian army seems capable of invading most of the country ( which seems to be looming today ), it will only be able to occupy a reduced portion. For example, it will take several more years before Russia can massively equip its forces with hypersonic missiles and supersonic cruise missiles, armored vehicles and new generation aircraft, sufficiently wave its troops; Russia today knows how to conduct giant military exercises that no European army would be able to carry out, but the reality of the fight is very different. The Syrian conflict offered combat experience to ( it seems ) 90% of the flying personnel, as well as several thousand soldiers of the land forces ( who were also involved in the Donbass War ),but the majority of the Russian army is unprepared for the demands of the invasion and occupation of a country larger than metropolitan France. The Russian army is a multi-speed army, and it will take a few more years ( less than the European armies, however ) before being genuinely ready for a major conflict. If it is likely that it would win a military victory in Ukraine in a few weeks ( without excluding the possibility of a stagnation in a guerrilla war led by the rest of the regular Ukrainian forces and by a civil resistance), it would be unable to occupy most of the country. Russia is therefore probably not yet able to achieve a quick and final victory in Ukraine. The Russian army is unprepared for the demands of the invasion and occupation of a country larger than metropolitan France. The Russian army is a multi-speed army, and it will take a few more years ( less than the European armies, however ) before being genuinely ready for a major conflict. If it is likely that it would win a military victory in Ukraine in a few weeks ( without excluding the possibility of a stagnation in a guerrilla war led by the rest of the regular Ukrainian forces and by a civil resistance), it would be unable to occupy most of the country. Russia is therefore probably not yet able to achieve a quick and final victory in Ukraine. The Russian army is unprepared for the demands of the invasion and occupation of a country larger than metropolitan France. The Russian army is a multi-speed army, and it will take a few more years ( less than the European armies, however ) before being genuinely ready for a major conflict. If it is likely that it would win a military victory in Ukraine in a few weeks ( without excluding the possibility of a stagnation in a guerrilla war led by the rest of the regular Ukrainian forces and by a civil resistance), it would be unable to occupy most of the country. Russia is therefore probably not yet able to achieve a quick and final victory in Ukraine. a country larger than metropolitan France. The Russian army is a multi-speed army, and it will take a few more years ( less than the European armies, however ) before being genuinely ready for a major conflict. If it is likely that it would win a military victory in Ukraine in a few weeks ( without excluding the possibility of a stagnation in a guerrilla war led by the rest of the regular Ukrainian forces and by a civil resistance), it would be unable to occupy most of the country. Russia is therefore probably not yet able to achieve a quick and final victory in Ukraine. a country larger than metropolitan France. The Russian army is a multi-speed army, and it will take a few more years ( less than the European armies, however ) before being genuinely ready for a major conflict. If it is likely that it would win a military victory in Ukraine in a few weeks ( without excluding the possibility of a stagnation in a guerrilla war led by the rest of the regular Ukrainian forces and by a civil resistance), it would be unable to occupy most of the country. Russia is therefore probably not yet able to achieve a quick and final victory in Ukraine. be truly ready for major conflict. If it is likely that it would win a military victory in Ukraine in a few weeks ( without excluding the possibility of a stagnation in a guerrilla war led by the rest of the regular Ukrainian forces and by a civil resistance), it would be unable to occupy most of the country. Russia is therefore probably not yet able to achieve a quick and final victory in Ukraine. be truly ready for major conflict. If it is likely that it would win a military victory in Ukraine in a few weeks ( without excluding the possibility of a stagnation in a guerrilla war led by the rest of the regular Ukrainian forces and by a civil resistance), it would be unable to occupy most of the country. Russia is therefore probably not yet able to achieve a quick and final victory in Ukraine. Russia is therefore probably not yet able to achieve a quick and final victory in Ukraine. Russia is therefore probably not yet able to achieve a quick and final victory in Ukraine.

Last condition, less important than the other two discussed just now, Russia must feel supported on the international scene, or at the very least not risk complete isolation, including from its closest partners. Starting with China. I defend the idea that the rapprochement between Russia and China is both deeper, wider and more sustainable than is generally imagined, to the point that the hypothesis of a true military alliance with fifteen, twenty years should not be excluded. Most likely, such an alliance would be de facto rather than de jure contractual ( failing to sign a treaty, the two powers would agree to support each other, even lend assistance without becoming cobelligent ), and above all punctual ( linked to a military crisis where the two parties would have common interests ). How could this non-binding and circumstance alliance materialize ? In the most plausible scenario, China could weaken the Western reaction to Russian intervention in Europe by posing the threat of a separate operation in Asia-Pacific, and vice versa.Even in the event that the main Western powers avoid any direct military involvement, the prospect of having to manage two large-scale conflicts in the event of an overly firm reaction to a first attack could be sufficiently dissuasive ( at least in the eyes of the Russian and Chinese leaders ). Inflicting massive sanctions on Russia and China would guarantee a major economic shock. Above all, the fear of a military escalation against the two giants at the same time would force to limit military assistance to countries attacked below a certain threshold, potentially to impotence. In the worst-case scenario, China and Russia could coordinate actions across Eurasia. Without dwelling on these still distant hypotheses,it nevertheless seems clear that the Russian authorities should first ensure the benevolence ( in the absence of the support ) of its main partners before launching such an operation, for at least three reasons: avoid complete isolation on the international scene, to be advantaged in power relations; limit the weight of the inevitable sanctions, especially in the long term ( for example by retaining suppliers for advanced technologies or investments, and outlets for exports ); corollary of the first point, prepare for post-conflict by keeping allies on the international stage. In recent weeks, the Chinese government has outbid the expression of its proximity to the Kremlin ;Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping's joint statement released a fortnight ago marks a new stage in the Russian-Chinese rapprochement. But it is very, very unlikely ( not to say inconceivable ) that China goes so far as to support a possible invasion of Ukraine under current conditions. We can envisage that China will blame the West to put the scope of Russian aggression into perspective, invoke the principle of non-interference so as not to have to condemn Moscow, and will get around the sanctions imposed on Russia as best as possible, but will go no further than its interests command. Even if the Russian army wins in a few weeks, displaying any complicity in Moscow's action in Ukraine will be detrimental to the'image and interests of China for several months. As for imagining that China would launch a military operation in its neighborhood in 2022, this is an insane scenario : as much as the Russian army is capable of winning a classic war in Ukraine ( or at least it can think ), as much the Chinese army is unable to invade Taiwan ( and it knows it very well ). Russia is therefore anything but assured of being able to count on strong allies to launch a risky military intervention this year.Chinese army is unable to invade Taiwan ( and it knows this very well ). Russia is therefore anything but assured of being able to count on strong allies to launch a risky military intervention this year.Chinese army is unable to invade Taiwan ( and it knows this very well ). Russia is therefore anything but assured of being able to count on strong allies to launch a risky military intervention this year.

The conditions that I imagined necessary for a future Russian external adventure are therefore not fulfilled when writing these lines. And yet, the scenario that I imagined to occur in several years, even in the following decade, will occur from the start of 2022.

My opinion changed from mid-December. This is for three main reasons: the consolidation of the Russian military system ( beyond the number of men and equipment, the deployment of logistical and operational coherence capacities gives a completely different meaning to this concentration of forces ); the requirements of Russian diplomacy, difficult to accept to the point of constituting red lines, even casus belli ( the Kremlin cannot reverse such claims without discrediting itself ); the intensification of the « information war » abroad and the hardening of propaganda in Russia itself, seeming to prepare Russian opinion for a war to the point that a possible appeasement ( improbable in view of the Russian requirements ) would demonetize the word of the regime.

Contrary to the scenario I had advanced a year ago, the Russian offensive will not only focus on the Russian-speaking regions of what once constituted « New Russia », from Odessa to Marioupol. Everything suggests that Russia intends to invade the whole country. Even if the Russian army does not seek to occupy the whole of Ukraine ( which is out of reach ), it is about to attack on all fronts. Even if Moscow fails to overthrow the democratic power of Volodymyr Zelensky ( achieving military victory is one thing, imposing a regime change in a hostile country is another ), it is likely that the Russian army will take Kiev and defeat the regular Ukrainian armies « » in a few weeks. Or at least she thinks she can do it.

Russia will trigger in the weeks, if not days to come, the worst conflict in Europe since 1945. February or March 2022 may have the same resonance in history as November 1989, tragically closing the open parenthesis of peace with the fall of the Iron Curtain. No one knows how this conflict will end. Will Europe rise to the challenge ? Will Vladimir Putin take the risk of too much, the one that will cause his fall ? Will Russia achieve a quick victory, which will allow the regime to mask future disappointments ( guerrilla warfare, resistance ... ) to the population, or will the offensive itself be a disappointment ? China will not let go of Russia, nor will it support it beyond what its interests dictate to it, but what will be'impact of this war on the Sino-Russian partnership ?

Almost a year ago today, I published an article explaining why the possibility of new major conflicts should not be underestimated. I argued that the main factors supposed to protect us from such a catastrophe ( globalization, interdependence, development, evolution of customs, demography, democracy loss aversion ) were actually much more fragile than it seems. Based on historical precedents ( 1914, 1870 ), I defended the idea that leaders of great powers of the 21st century, with their own rationality, could make miscalculations or appreciation that could lead them to a war they don't want, or to a war they think they can easily win. By writing that « the possibility of major conflicts involving powers like Russia, China and NATO members is much more credible than is believed », I projected myself on a more distant future of at least a few years. From 2024 for a Russian military adventure ( as explained above ), and even later for a major conflict involving China. I was wrong on this point. A single certainty, unless the invasion of Ukraine should result in such a failure that it would lead to the fall of the Russian regime ( plausible but unlikely hypothesis ), or even dissuade powers like China from using ( very unlikely ) force, conflicts worse than the upcoming war have significant chances of'burst in the coming decades :

The new character of the long period of peace we are going through does not make it eternal. The fact that peace has become a dynamic, the norm rather than a transitional state, does not make it immortal. The world is less violent than it is said, but risks becoming much more violent than you think. If long time shows a clear tendency to pacify the world, it also carries the clues of a potential conflagration. The possibility of a XXIecentury without wars between great power and at the end of which the war itself will have been marginalized remains serious: there is something to smile in view of other less encouraging prospects. Let us not, however, substitute for an excessive pessimism about the state of the world, which makes us forget how much we enjoy a period of peace, a reckless confidence in its solidity.
The invasion of Ukraine will take place. Whatever its outcome, it will mark for good the entry into a new cycle of conflict, a new cycle of international relations. The awakening will be extremely brutal for Europeans, who have essentially ( with the exception in particular of France and the United Kingdom ) communicated in a form of irinism. As the Ukrainians face suffering, misfortunes and probably humiliations, let us hope that this awakening will be beneficial for the future of Europe and France in an increasingly dangerous world. Will Ukraine's misfortune finally push Europeans to regain full control of their destiny,even in a reinforced transatlantic alliance ? This spring 2022 will probably open a new era in the history of Europe.

Ukraine : l'invasion russe n'est pas impensable, elle est inévitable

La plupart des experts et dirigeants politiques français ne croient toujours pas à une invasion de l'Ukraine. Sans doute à tort. Voici pourquoi.

aurelien-duchene.fr

 

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