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commies

Eltitoguay

Well-known member
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Yolanda Diaz, the Communist Vice-President of the Spanish government and Minister of Labor and Social Economy :​

MADRID, 14/01/2024.- The second vice president of the Government and leader of Sumar, Yolanda Díaz, participates in an event of the coalition with which she begins a year marked by the European, Galician and Basque elections. EFE/JuanJo Martín

Second Vice President of the Government and leader of Sumar, Yolanda Díaz;
Social-communist government.

Yolanda Díaz expresses her communist activism: “The capitalist system is leading us to disaster”​

The leader of Sumar has also stated that "there is no room for free women in the country of the masculinity of Mr. Feijóo (right, Popular Party) and Abascal (ultraright, VOX) "​

Ramiro Fdez Chillon
Ramiro Fdez-Chillon
Madrid 01/14/2024

The Vice President of the Government and leader of Sumar, Yolanda Díaz –affiliated to the Communist Party of Spain (PCE) since 1986– has stated during a rally of the 'magenta' party that «the very inertia of the capitalist economic system takes us and leads us to disaster ; because this is where we are going, to environmental disaster, and to disaster for lives ».

THE PROFILE:

Yoli's blonde hair, Iglesias' best trophy

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Mayte Alcaraz

This is what Díaz said at a Sumar rally in Madrid, where, in economic matters, she also pointed out that "democracy has to reach the economy, without a doubt, and the jobs. It should really be the public thing that decides the economic reasons of our country, and it would be a serious attack and risk if, as has happened for a long time, they were the ones that governed the economic destiny ."
Sumar leader and Second Vice President and Minister of Labor and Social Economy, Yolanda Díaz, during a Sumar event

Sumar leader and Second Vice President and Minister of Labor and Social Economy, Yolanda Díaz, during a Sumar EP event

Regarding social policies, the vice president has indicated –in an unclear manner– that “if we know how to leave something behind it is the domination of women , their lack of freedom, but also the lack of freedom that implies for men a form of masculinity that is accompanied by the obligation to dominate women, a form of masculinity that we do not share, which we have seen in the Madrid Assembly with Mr. Smith attacking our colleague Edu Rubiño , who is with us today (sic)”. “There is no room for free women in the country of Mr. Feijóo(P.P.) and Abascal’s (VOX) masculinity” , she added.

Ortega Smith says he does not apologize for his conduct in the Plenary because there is a "double standard" with Vox

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The Debate
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Evaluating Yolanda Díaz's management​

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By Luis Molina Temboury | March 14, 2022


In his book A People Betrayed , historian Paul Preston explains, with a wealth of episodes, that during the last century and a half the Spanish elites have been an obstacle to progress due to their corruption and ineptitude. And that this unfortunate attitude has caused serious social problems that the same elites have tried to resolve through repression, sometimes using extreme violence.

The bloody Franco dictatorship (Preston provides extensive documentation on this in other books) was a period of intense exercise of both baseness, although the arrival of the Opus Dei technocrats significantly reduced the level of ineptitude. Ineptitude diminished rapidly after the new democratic consensus, but with niches of dramatic growth, as during the long gestation of the financial-real estate bubble, whose responsible watchdogs did not want or did not know how to see in the data that they sang for soleares. The consequence was that, once again, many at the bottom paid the price for the ineptitude or corruption of a few at the top, in addition to suffering in their ears the tiresome sermon of collective responsibility. The real culprits got off scot-free this time, always so flamenco, and they got away with it, advising painful measures that they would not suffer. A classic.

Corruption, which during Franco's regime remained at stratospheric levels thanks to an extensive collaborative network between economic and political power, struggled to remain rooted after the Transition. Like incompetence, both vices know how to protect and succeed each other well through a network of complicit silence, if not mafia-like practices, which delays the true knowledge of History. It took us many years to learn of the foundational and endemic corrupt nature of the PP, we are still in it, of the adventures of Pujol, the protégé on the left and right to obtain political gain, or of some in the PSOE, whose practices were metastasizing throughout Andalusia. The process of knowing the truth is even slower at the top of the State, the latest episode with a King Emeritus who was once exemplary and now silent, enjoying his dark fortune as if nothing had happened... in the happy company of kings and princes like him.

Looking at the glass half full, it can be said that, although with exasperating delay, the corruption and ineptitude of the elites has diminished considerably due to the denunciation of the press and the action of justice, although the Spanish people continue to watch brand new chapters, waiting for explanations and apologies that take a long time to arrive and putting up with the denial of the obvious, the complicit silence or the you more of the politicians.

Social dialogue
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In civilized countries, and following the recommendations of international organizations, the ideal is that labor issues are resolved by consensus through social dialogue between the two parties in a potential conflict: representatives of employers and workers. It is evident that this system favors social peace and progress, so the role of politicians should be to encourage and bless with the norm the possible consensus.

Spain is a country where social dialogue has been improving and is currently working reasonably well. One only has to see the patience and responsibility of union representatives in moderating their demands in crisis situations or the concessions of employers to achieve a consensus favourable to workers when the economy improves, as has happened with the latest labour reform.

The problem arises when politicians in the style described by Preston and the usual elites, turning on their media loudspeakers, instead of celebrating agreements, position themselves against one of the parties, mainly the workers, in order to dynamite the dialogue. Take for example what happened with the increases in the minimum wage to which I referred in this article , an issue in which the mercenary ideologues of the big companies disguised as technical economists, the neoliberals accustomed to lying as an argument, on this occasion accompanied by other technicians from intermediary companies whose activity consists precisely in squeezing workers who receive the minimum wage, or the Governor of the Bank of Spain and his experts, systematically positioned against the workers, do not cease to proclaim misfortunes for the increases in the minimum wage, even though they contradict the evidence of the data.

For those who think that the consensus on minimum wage increases is broken by the employers' association, which has done nothing but give in to the powerful media avalanche and then join in, it should be remembered that, in July 2018, within the framework of the IV Agreement for Employment and Collective Bargaining, the employers' association and the unions reached an agreement to increase the minimum wage to 1,000 euros in 14 instalments in 2020. That is exactly the scandalous and dangerous figure now set by the Government in 2022, with the approval of the unions, but now without the employers' association, at the end of a pandemic that has mainly affected workers with the lowest salaries and with a record number of employed workers, to the discredit of those who deny the beneficial effects of the increases.

It is no coincidence that the CEOE president is now demanding that electricity prices not be affected by the rise in gas prices, nor that his opinion coincides with the offensive of the electricity lobby, perhaps even more powerful than the banking lobby, which has brought its “prestigious technical economists” out of their austerity -seeking hiding place to urgently defend the same nonsense in the media. The businessmen who suffer from the brutal rise in electricity prices, whose utility consists in fattening the obscene profits of the large electricity companies at the cost of the collapse of many energy-consuming companies, must have been amazed by the opinion of their president, but it seems that where there is a captain, the sailor does not command.

The processing of labor reform
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The passage of the latest labour reform through Congress was an episode that should be included as an appendix in a possible reissue of Preston's book, as it clearly confirms his arguments. It is rare to witness an open-chested battle between the corrupt and inept against the hard-working Spanish people, although the recent crisis of the PP could suggest that we are facing a new cycle in which both defects, to the greater astonishment of the audience, shamelessly air their differences in public.

For the processing of the latest reform, an unprecedented pact in which workers gain rights, this time the best allies were available. The document had been agreed upon, in an exercise of tenacity and patience by the Minister of Labour (you can see where the title is going), between a modern employers' association determined to leave behind the years of entrenchment and some corrupt prisoners and majority unions aware that it is better to consolidate something less than to go back much further later due to a probable revengeful change of the norm.

The three parties had previously been the protagonists of a greater feat, when they agreed to avoid layoffs in the face of the massive cessation of work activity due to COVID-19. The cruel nightmare that we would have had to endure if they had not agreed to support millions of families by resorting to ERTES can be imagined from the data in graph G.1 below. For now, hats off!

After having saved jobs in the face of the greatest labour crisis since the post-war period and then having held out at the negotiating table to design a better future for the people, one could begin to think of a well-deserved monument to the protagonists and collaborators who had made the new reform possible, but... not so fast, the approval of Congress was still missing. Some optimists, blinded by the success of the negotiation and fleetingly forgetting that stepmother Spain prone to bringing out its two demons, glimpsed a broad consensus, but the story would be different, more realistic and traditional.

In a Dalinian-Berlangian exercise, inept and/or corrupt deputies burst in to make Spanish history again. Needless to say, the Francoist extreme right was in favor of boycotting the law: the worse, the better. The right of the PP yearned for its previous law excluding unions, so its deputies would not give in either, even if the new law was signed by the businessmen. Nor would the patriotic separatists on one side or the other, who, confident that others would get involved for them, once again made use of their nationalist blinkers so as not to see the working people on either side and to demonstrate once again their power to annoy. The deputies of the dying Ciudadanos party offered to lend a hand, thank goodness, but it was still not enough to guarantee approval. A couple more votes had to be added, which were desperately sought from the two UPN deputies, the coalition with Ciudadanos and the PP of the Navarrese regionalists, who, by exchanging a few cards, finally joined the task, again, thank goodness, just barely. But there was still another but. Just at the time of the vote, both deputies suffered a fit of ineptitude, corruption or perhaps a combination, and surprisingly voted the opposite of what they had promised. The Spanish people were once again stunned to witness a reissue of the “tamayazo”, which condemned the people of Madrid to decades of unbridled corruption, this time on a national scale and in the Congress of Deputies.

Had it not been for the hand of God, like that of Maradona for the Argentines in that football World Cup, materialized this time in the finger of a PP deputy who insisted on repeatedly clicking on the option he did not want, the Spanish people would have seen once again that history repeats itself, the social agents who architected the reform would have been left with nothing after so many months of effort, and it is likely that the minister would have thrown in the towel in the face of such nonsense, causing an unnecessary political crisis in the midst of the economic crisis caused by the pandemic and on the verge of another that would come from Putin's war.

Employment management by the 2nd Vice President and Minister of Labour
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Let us now turn to the history of data. Some insist that past data with “adjusted simulations” provide better conclusions than the known data of the present. This magical method, capable of fulfilling wishes, was widely used by the representatives of the men in black after the bubble crisis, who defended the disastrous results of their wage devaluation policies with the argument that, according to their complex models, if these measures had not been applied, the data would have been worse.

Although I love science fiction, when it comes to evaluating political action I prefer to avoid time travel, which is even more mind-blowing if it is backwards, and to rely on published statistical data. This is what I did in this article , which verified the disproportionate temporary nature of employment in Spain compared to the EU with data published by EUROSTAT, or in this other one mentioned above , in which I explained that according to official Spanish statistics on the labour market, increases in the minimum wage have not destroyed employment in Spain, but have created it in all areas where there are rumours or simulations of something else.

To answer the question in the title, we have statistical series that stand out for their immediacy, such as those on Social Security affiliation or summaries of registered unemployment and contracts, which can be known just a couple of days after the end of the month and which have the advantage of being mandatory administrative records. Either you are or you are not, without sampling or mathematical complexities.

The first verification chart, which condenses more than fifteen years of employment history, represents the evolution of employment according to Social Security affiliation data between January 2007 and February 2022.
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In G.1, it can be seen that the peak of employment during the financial-real estate bubble occurred in July 2007, when 19,493,050 members were registered according to the monthly average of the daily data. During the PSOE Government, the bubble burst, causing an abrupt fall in employment in construction that dragged down employment in industry and, to a lesser extent, in services. The fall in employment continued to a minimum of 16,150,747 members in February 2013.

Only since 2014 did employment begin to rise steadily, until 2019, shortly before the outbreak of the pandemic, when it recovered the maximum level of the bubble, no less than twelve years later, but having generated a bigger problem. The excessive and chronic temporary nature of employment worsened with the labour reform of 2012, and the growth of inequality due to wage devaluation added a new distinctive scourge to Spain in the European tail end: an alarming level of job insecurity and poverty.

Redirecting labour regulations that had driven a significant percentage of well-educated young people from Spain, that had condemned 30% of the population to precarious employment, that had been driving unsustainable pockets of child poverty even in households with workers in employment, that, in short, had been increasing an inequality that not only hampered the progress of the people, but also the economy itself, which had become a jammed machine that sucked wealth upwards and distributed poverty downwards, was a major challenge for whoever was going to pilot labour policy in the apparently fragile coalition government.

Minister Yolanda Díaz arrived at the Ministry of Labour in January 2020, but her first task was not to develop the regulatory reform to alleviate temporary and precarious employment because the pandemic broke out. As has been said, the mandatory confinement left millions of workers without activity, which threatened a tremendous wave of layoffs that was saved by using the ERTES, an old resource that appeared in a 1995 regulation that was modified several times, the last in the PP's labour reform in February 2012. Nobody had foreseen that the ERTES would serve to save a crisis of these proportions, so many economists celebrate the firm and rapid decision of the Sánchez Government and the willingness of the social partners to use this resource and save people before the bills, a 180-degree turn with respect to the previous sad and failed labour policy.

The new policy proved to be a resounding success, saving thousands of companies and millions of working-class families from ruin. In February 2022, 19,694,272 average Social Security affiliates were registered, the ninth consecutive monthly historical record, unexpectedly recorded two years after the greatest labour crisis since the post-war period. In those two years, the labour market has absorbed and recovered 4.7 million jobs, 3.5 million that were inactive in a situation of ERTE and an additional 1.2 million that were lost in the crisis. These data already seem sufficient to highlight Yolanda Díaz's aptitude at the head of the Ministry of Labour and to establish her provisional position in the best history of Spain yet to be written, but let's continue.

To better visualise what has happened, G.2 represents the variations in the monthly affiliation data compared to the same period of the previous year, which cushion the sawtooth of the employment curve in G.1, significant of this exceptional rate of Spanish temporary employment that disproportionately creates and destroys employment depending on the month of the year.

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In G.2 it is clearly seen that the recovery of employment after the explosion of the real estate bubble took no less than six years, until 2014, when after its initial sharp decline, employment was recovering under the Zapatero government, but the "inevitable" austerity policy imposed by Brussels even before the arrival of the PP in December 2011 brought it down again, causing a second enormous accumulated pocket of destruction that was reflected in an unemployment rate that reached almost 27% in the first quarter of 2013. An unusual figure.
It is also clear that since 2014, when the sadistic measures applied to people to save the numbers of finances whose loss of control had caused the crisis culminated, employment has picked up speed, one would say not because of the measures but in spite of them, when the torture hit rock bottom. After the new sharp collapse of employment due to the pandemic, managed in a spectacularly effective manner with the use of ERTES, employment has taken off again with a force never seen before and also on an increasing trend.
But, as has been said, the minister's objective upon her arrival at the ministry had not been to solve the unforeseeable employment crisis caused by COVID-19, but rather the problem of temporary and precarious employment, for which the labour reform was designed. Once it has come into force, it is time to verify with data whether it is being effective.

The Minister's management of excessive temporary and precarious employment
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In order to assess the reduction in the temporary employment rate that the labour reform aims for, the EPA for the next few quarters will have to be consulted. A semester would begin to give good clues and a year should be enough to draw conclusions. Regarding the reduction in precariousness, we will have to wait a long time. The Survey of Living Conditions, the Annual Survey of Salary Structure, the Decile of Salaries in Main Employment or the statistics of the Tax Agency will still take a year and a half or more to give a definitive answer. In the meantime, we will have to draw on other statistics with less lag that can give good clues, such as the SEPE statistics on employment contracts, whose series are handled below.

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In G.3, the employment and contract series have been represented in the form of indices, taking as a starting point the period before the first crisis (January 2007) and using twelve-term moving averages. Moving averages are a simple statistical tool that consists of representing the data of a period as the average of that period and other previous ones, in this case the previous 11 months plus the current one, to cushion the fluctuations, which, being extreme in the case of contracts, make it difficult to visualise trends. In these smoothed curves it is clearly observed that after the bubble crisis, labour contracts decreased sharply, that they began to recover with the Zapatero Government, but that with the aforementioned turn of the screw due to austerity during the PP mandate they fell again. From 2013, hiring was encouraged, with a spectacular rise that for a bad analyst would be very good news, but it is not for someone who knows the abnormal behaviour of Spain with respect to the EU (again the article on temporality ).
It is not good news for employment that the number of contracts increases sharply if there are many of them of short or very short duration that are frequently terminated, which had been happening for almost 40 years before the last reform. It is not worth celebrating that many chickens enter the coop (contracts, in this case) without checking that they are not leaving through another channel. So the explosion in hiring after the 2012 labour reform was not good news. It was, of course, that employment increased, but it left as a consequence this new increase in temporary employment, chronically very high, and that precariousness soared, due to excessive labour rotation which, added to the policy of wage devaluation, mortgaged the life plans of a large portion of Spanish workers.
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The comparison in the months of February represented in G.4 (the monthly fluctuation is very high, so it is advisable to compare the same months) shows that at the beginning of the recovery in 2014 the contracts had decreased compared to the times of the bubble (1.1 million in total vs. 1.4 million then) and in a greater proportion the permanent ones. In February 2007 the permanent contracts were 12.5% of the contracts and in February 2014 9%, a symptom of worsening, not so much because there were fewer contracts, as has been commented, but because the temporary nature of the contracts, which was chronically high, increased.
February 2007, in the midst of the bubble, was not a month in which temporary employment was low. The chronic defect of the Spanish labour market that had been dragging on since 1986, a very high rate of temporary employment, remained between 1992 and 2006 at around 34%, more than 20 pp. above the average rate in the EU. In February 2020, the rate differential had fallen, standing at 13 pp. above, but still double the European rate. If the rate was then lower than in the times of the bubble, it was not because of a policy that sought to achieve it, since it had been growing after the PP's labour reform, but because of the very dynamics of the excess of temporary employment in Spain, with a disproportionate destruction of temporary employment in crises, and a greater creation of temporary employment in recovery cycles. The PP's labour reform did not correct this defect, but rather enhanced it, sharpening labour turnover.
The effects of the PP's labour reform would be noticeable in that temporary contracts rose sharply. In February 2020, just before the pandemic, there were 420,000 more monthly temporary contracts than at the beginning of the recovery, in February 2014. The number of permanent contracts was similar to that of the bubble times, 180,000, but their weight in the total number of contracts was lower, due to the greater number of contracts (11.1% in February 2020 vs. 12.5% in February 2007). The hiring situation was therefore very bad before the pandemic, when the first coalition government came into being.
After two years of Yolanda Díaz's management (between February 2020 and February 2022), with employment at record levels after overcoming its biggest drop, temporary contracts have fallen significantly (by around 300,000) and permanent contracts have risen (140,000), which is good news in both senses, which can be summed up by the fact that the proportion of permanent contracts out of the total number of contracts in February 2022 was 21.9%, a figure never seen before in the entire historical series.
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The SEPE data also allow us to check the evolution of temporary contracts according to their duration, which is represented in G.5. The first thing that draws attention in this graph is the large portion of temporary contracts of indefinite duration, which should decrease considerably after the latest labour reform, which has repealed contracts for work or service, in which the time was not previously fixed.
But the most striking thing by far in G.5 is the increase in the percentage of contracts lasting one week or less, which went from representing 13.6% of all contracts in February 2007 to 27.2%, exactly double, thirteen years later; from 191,805 contracts, a figure that was already very high at the time, to 433,874, an incredible magnitude. Before the last labour reform in Spain, a huge volume of temporary contracts were signed each month, 1.42 million in February 2020, and of these, 30.6% were very short-term. Another serious partial problem to be solved when the portfolio in the Ministry of Labour changed.
Since Yolanda Díaz arrived at the Ministry until two years later, with the pandemic in decline, temporary contracts as a whole fell by 20.4%, and those of seven days or less duration by 37.8%. With record levels of employment. Compared to the time when employment began to recover, in 2014, temporary contracts have deflated much of the excess generated by the PP's 2012 labor reform, but with a very significant difference: in February 2014 the average number of Social Security affiliates was 16,212,304, while in February 2022 there were 19,694,272, three and a half million more employed people.
Imagen6.jpg

An early indicator of the effects of the labour reform on the temporary employment rate, which will be provided by the official quarterly EPA, can be observed by observing the monthly evolution of the percentage of permanent contracts out of the total, which is represented in G.6.
A clear indication that the reform is having immediate effects is that this proportion (blue line) jumped in January 2022 to 15%, to continue its progression in February 2022 to a historic 22%.
Given that the fluctuations are very marked throughout the series, and even more so after the entry into force of the latest reform, another interesting series to observe in the coming months will be the 12-term moving average. In this smoothed curve, represented in red in the graph, it is clearly observed that after the worst of the pandemic, the proportion of permanent contracts has a very upward trend, which will foreseeably be reflected in an improvement in the temporary nature of employment in the next EPA data.
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And to finish with the verifications on the data, graph G.7 represents the long series, from before the bubble, of the evolution of monthly temporary contracts according to their duration, leading monthly indicators that can also give good clues about the foreseeable results in the medium and long term of the labour reform.
The data on contracts broken down by duration are not published two days after the end of the month, like the monthly summaries. They take a few more days, but in any case they allow early monitoring of the possible effects of the labour reform. The data for February 2022 were published on 11 March.
The graph shows the explosion of very short-term contracts (seven days or less) following the PP's labour reform, and the evolution of permanent contracts, the other largest volume of monthly contracts (see G.5), which corresponds mainly to work and service contracts, which should fall considerably from April with the new reform.
For the moment, in view of G.7, it can be anticipated that even before the reform, presumably due to a reinforcement of the fraud inspection work in this type of contract, positive results were perceived in the case of open-ended contracts, which registered a monthly downward trend with a record level of employment. And positive results were also recorded in very short-term contracts, 7 days or less, which, although with an upward trend after the pandemic, still maintained a level much lower than two years earlier with a higher level of employment. In February 2022, the series of moving averages of very short-term contracts shows a stabilization, which is also a very good sign, which will have to be followed in the coming months.

Summary
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Yolanda Díaz's management at the head of the Ministry of Labour and Social Economy has been of monumental excellence.

From her ministry, the collapse of employment during the COVID-19 crisis was avoided, which rose in a surprisingly short time to historic levels; avant-garde regulations have been approved, even at an international level, such as the rider law , or urgent, such as the teleworking law; the reduction of inequality among the most vulnerable workers has been pushed by defending and applying increases in the minimum wage; social dialogue and collective bargaining have been successfully promoted and precariousness in hiring has been reduced even before the regulatory change of the labour reform. Since it came into force, the data, just a couple of months later, indicate that the reform will mark a before and after in the fight against job insecurity and excessive temporary employment.
The minister's merit is all the more remarkable for having had to face a powerful gang of politicians who, for their own personal interests, have positioned themselves against a historic social pact between the representatives of workers and employers. She has demonstrated that she has baraka (this cannot be verified with data, but rather indicatively by facts) by miraculously overcoming a corrupt political intrigue expressly designed to overthrow the reform and remove her from office. And she has also overcome stubborn resistance within her own ranks, obtaining the unanimity of that part of the left that does not conceive the regulatory framework of the labour market as a constructive place for dialogue and consensus, but as a disorderly field of normative revenge.

Corollary
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Although in Spanish politics it is not well-regarded that someone at the top makes an effort and makes things better for people (see the atmosphere in the Congress of Deputies against the Sánchez Government before, during and after the pandemic), the case of the management of Minister Yolanda Díaz at the head of the Ministry of Labor is worthy of highlighting, thanking and celebrating.

Here's a toast to her from someone who is not a member of any party.

Let us hope that the minister will have the opportunity to continue to manage the foreseeable negative effects on the labour market of the terrible war that is ravaging Europe so well. The protection of workers and employers against the fluctuations in prices and supplies or the labour integration of refugees will give her the opportunity to once again demonstrate what she is capable of.
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Published in eldiario.es , Work / Employment , Work and employment
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About Luis Molina Temboury​

Economist specializing in statistical analysis of inequality. Convinced that to reverse the escalation of extreme inequality we will have to agree on a limit to wealth. The sooner the better. Member of Economists Against the Crisis.
 
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Eltitoguay

Well-known member

Rolando Astarita [Blog].​

Marxism & Economics.​

Final Collapse of Capitalism and Socialism :​

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In this note I address a problem that has been debated for a long time, and is still being debated, in Marxism, namely, whether there is any reason, from the point of view of Marx's theory , why the capitalist system, at a certain point in its development, should collapse because of its economic contradictions.
Is there an objective, "blind" mechanism that leads to the final collapse of capitalism, or is the revolutionary intervention of the working class necessary for this to happen?
Does Marx's theory contain an idea of the end of capitalism due to purely economic causes?
Or did Marx think, on the contrary, that there is no collapse of capitalism without revolution?

Some Marxists lean towards the first alternative, that is, they think that the system will collapse regardless of whether the working class triumphs in a revolution against capital, and that therefore the intervention of the proletariat is only essential to open the way to socialism, not to cause the collapse of capital.
They maintain that, as a result of the contradictions of the system, there comes a time when the productive forces stop growing, and capitalism stagnates, more or less definitively.
It is common for militants and leaders of various Trotskyist currents to defend this position.

Other Marxists, on the other hand, think that capitalism will not end up, for purely economic reasons, in a final stage of stagnation; and that there are no permanent economic crises, or ones with no way out.
Therefore, if the working class does not put an end to the capitalist mode of production, it will find a way to recompose accumulation and redevelop the productive forces.
Marxists who defend this position also maintain that the contradictions and crises of the capitalist system will, in a tendency, be increasingly acute or generalized; and that this will push, in an increasing way, the working class to act.
Ernest Mandel, a Trotskyist leader now deceased, defended this idea.

Let us note that although the polemic continues today within the most radical currents, it has a long history, especially since this debate was intense during the Second International (see, for example, Colletti, 1983).
The question, moreover, is linked to the political strategy of Marxists, and to the possibilities and perspectives of a future socialist society, overcoming the capitalist mode of production.
The analysis of the arguments in play will also allow us to emphasize some ideas that are constitutive of Marxism, as opposed to utopian socialism.

Before developing the theme, I will state my own position.
Although I am convinced that an approach similar to Mandel's is the one that comes closest to Marx's theory, and the one that most agrees (which is the important thing) with what has happened in the last 100 or 150 years, I nevertheless think that the thesis of final stagnation can have relative support in some important passages of Marx's work.


I begin by analyzing those passages that are frequently cited by the supporters of the thesis of the economic collapse of capitalism (CEC).


The idea of the end of capitalism due to economic causes

The most clearly defined passages in Marx's favour of the CEC thesis are found in the “Prologue to the Critique of Political Economy”, and in his considerations on the implications of the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.

In a well-known passage from the Preface to the Critique, Marx argues that “[a] social formation never perishes until all the productive forces for which it is amply sufficient have been developed…” (Marx, 1980, p. 5). Given this premise, and given that Marx was convinced that the capitalist system would be superseded by a social regime based on collective property, it can be said that he necessarily had to postulate that from a certain stage of its evolution the system could no longer develop the productive forces. It is therefore not surprising that this thesis is put forward almost as a starting point by the defenders of the CEC. They can also find some support in the following statement, which is found a little before the previous one:
“At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or… with the relations of production within which they have been operating hitherto. These relations are transformed from forms of development of the productive forces into fetters of the productive forces. An epoch of social revolution then begins.”

The formulation here is ambiguous, however, since “entering into contradiction” is not synonymous with preventing any further development. Nor does the metaphor of “bindings” help us to pinpoint in what specific sense the relations of production are “binding” the productive forces, since binding can result in a suboptimal use of the productive forces; and suboptimal is not synonymous with stagnation (see Elster, 1990). In other words, a social regime may not be developing to its full potential (it is doubtful that capitalism has ever done so over a prolonged period), but it has not stopped growing. However, since Marx speaks of an “epoch” of social revolution (not a revolutionary conjuncture), one might deduce that he had in mind a long-term stagnation of the capitalist system. It is in this sense then that the passage may fit with the CEC thesis. Before giving way to a higher regime, the capitalist system would have to have entered a phase of stagnation, since the "ties" of the relations of production would be so strong that they would not allow the further development of the productive forces.

The other fundamental reference of Marx that supports the thesis of the CEC is the law of the tendency of the profit rate to fall, presented in its most complete form in chapters 13 to 15 of volume 3 of Capital . This is because if the profit rate tends to fall in the long term, and since it constitutes the motor of capitalist accumulation, at some point accumulation should definitely collapse. Although the supporters of the CEC admit that capitalist crises bring into play forces that drive the rate of profit to rise, they maintain that, on average and in terms of tendency, these recoveries are not enough to bring the profit rate to its levels prior to each crisis. So the profit rate would have been falling, on average, for at least 150 or 200 years. Referring to this view, Maurice Dobb pointed out that if profits were to continually decrease, there would come a point at which “the system would have to stop abruptly, like a machine that had run out of steam” (quoted by Colletti). In a passage from Chapter 15 of Volume 3 of Capital , which is frequently cited by the defenders of the CEC thesis, Marx seems to consider a future scenario of stagnation caused by this downward trend; although the concentration and centralization of capital would also play a role:
“The rate of profit… is especially important for all new derivations of capital which group themselves together autonomously. And as soon as capital formation fell exclusively into the hands of a few large, definitively structured capitalists, for whom the mass of profit compensated for the rate of profit, the fire which animates production would be completely extinguished. In that case, production would fall asleep. The rate of profit is the driving force in capitalist production… Hence the fear of the English economists of the falling rate of profit. The fact that the very possibility of it worries Ricardo precisely shows his profound understanding of the conditions of capitalist production” (Marx, 1999, p. 332, vol. 3).

It would be a stationary state, there would be a long-term “dormancy,” and the causes would be economic. The revolutionary struggle of the working class is not necessary, or indispensable (always according to this passage), for this to happen.

Let us mention yet another idea of Marx’s, closely linked to the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, but with a certain difference. In the Grundrisse he argues that as capitalism continues to displace labour by machines, there may come a point where labour ceases to be “the great source of wealth” and labour time its measure (imagine a society in which all work, even skilled work, is performed by robots and other types of machines). In that case “production based on exchange value collapses” (Marx, 1989, p. 229, vol. 2).


The alternative view regarding the rate of profit

The critical view of the CEC thesis also finds support in Marx's work, and is related to concrete studies on the effects of crises on the rate of profit. Perhaps the most explicit assertion, contained in Capital , that the capitalist system does not fall for purely economic reasons is found in the same chapter 15, vol. 3 of Capital from which we extracted the passage that speaks of "slumber." A few lines below, Marx maintains that the idea that there is a limit to capital on the side of the rate of profit, as Ricardo does, is to approach the question "in a purely economic way, that is, from the bourgeois point of view." Colletti, who pointed out the importance of this passage years ago, comments that with this Marx is indicating “that the expiration of capitalism would have to be exposed in a way other than the 'theory of collapse' and, therefore, in a way other than the 'purely economic' way, for those who look at the system from another visual angle” (Colletti, 1983, p. 39). Colletti adds:
“In other words, objective tendencies such as the fall in the rate of profit can only make sense when they appear as real conditions and premises of the class struggle, i.e. of the clash at the subjective level. On their own, they cannot have decisive value . The illusion that they have such value gives rise to the various ‘theories of collapse’” (ibid., emphasis added).

In any case, this statement forces us to clarify the role played by the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. If the rate of profit tends to fall and fall, there is no doubt that there will come a time when the system will collapse or enter into a state of lethargy. That is why the supporters of the CEC thesis can maintain their position as long as they can demonstrate (although I do not see them doing so) that the rate of profit has been falling for a century and a half, or two centuries, and continues to do so. In contrast to this, what is decisive with regard to Marx's position is that he thought that the rate of profit recovered with crises, and therefore did not tend to fall over the centuries. He maintains that during crises forces are generated that tend to raise the rate of profit, which implies an idea of falls that are recurrently recovered through crises. In this regard, Marx asserts that the law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall “at a certain point opposes with the greatest hostility the very development of this productive force, and therefore must be constantly overcome by means of crises ” (Marx, 1999, p. 331, vol. 3, emphasis added). To maintain that the fall in the rate of profit “is constantly overcome by means of crises” is different from maintaining that the fall in the rate of profit is, in the long term, irreversible and leads to a final stage of stagnation. Even more clearly, in Theories of Surplus Value Marx explains that it is a mistake to speak of both a permanent fall in the rate of profit and a permanent crisis:
“When Adam Smith explains the fall in the rate of profit by an overabundance of capital, an accumulation of capital, he speaks of a permanent effect , and this is a mistake. In contrast, the transitory overabundance of capital, overproduction and crises are something different. There is no such thing as a permanent crisis” (Marx, 1975, vol. 2, p. 426).

However, the question then arises as to what role is played by the ideas, in the Grundrisse or in Capital , about the eventuality of a capitalism in which labour is fully automated, or in which the rate of profit is so low that there is no longer any impetus for the formation of new capital. My interpretation is that these are Marx's speculations about possible long-term scenarios. There is no indication that Marx considered any of these situations to be close to occurring , although theoretically they could not be ruled out in some indeterminate future. For this reason, we do not find any passage in which Marx maintains that, for example, living labour was on the verge of disappearing, or that the rate of profit was approaching – for example, at the time of the crisis of 1873 – a level so low as to imply some purely economic end point for the capitalist system.

In short, Marx seems to think that the recurring crises he witnesses constitute convulsive mechanisms with terrible social costs, which reestablish the conditions of profitability so that accumulation can restart. Although at the same time he speculates on the possibility of reaching a final stage of long-term stagnation. I emphasize that it is this last eventuality that is put in the foreground by the supporters of the CEC thesis. With the difference, with respect to Marx's writings, that these Marxists think that the capitalist system has already arrived (in 1914 or in 1930, sometimes in the 1970s, interpretations vary) at those scenarios that Marx only glimpsed, in a speculative way, for an indeterminate future.


Political implications

Before continuing with the examination of the CEC thesis, let us point out that the discussion on whether the capitalist regime must exhaust its forces in order to make the transition to socialism possible had, and continues to have, direct political implications for Marxists and left parties. Perhaps a high point of this discussion occurred on the eve of the seizure of power in Russia in 1917, since the political arguments were linked to the thesis contained in the Prologue. On the one hand, the reformist social democratic leaders (the Mensheviks) maintained that since capitalism had not exhausted its possibilities of development, the working class could not attempt an assault on socialism. On the other hand, Leon Trotsky responded that capitalism had exhausted its possibilities of development, and that it was possible to seize power. Trotsky's position on this matter was sharp and defined. He thought that the imperialist phase was one of “decline” and “last convulsions” of capitalism, and that this system had exhausted itself. This was the necessary condition for facing the seizure of power. This approach also explains his determination, in the years following the triumph of the revolution, to demonstrate that the productive forces continued to stagnate since the First World War. For if the productive forces were to develop again on a world level, he thought, this would have meant that the Bolsheviks had been mistaken “in the fundamental estimation of history” (Trotsky, 1976, p. 60). The idea, faced by Trotskyism at present, that there is a “senile” stage of capitalism, in which it has already exhausted its forces, is linked to this problem. Let us observe that this theoretical framework can determine other analyses of the situation. For example, in 1990 an English Trotskyist group maintained that capitalism could not return to Russia and Eastern Europe because the productive forces could no longer develop. If they had been able to develop, he argued, the revolution in 1917 would not have happened, nor would the USSR have been possible.


The “Prologue” and the Grundrisse

The interpretation I defend is that, apart from what is stated in the Preface to the Critique , in his economic writings Marx did not suggest that a period of definitive stagnation of capitalism was in sight; nor that the dynamics of accumulation would lead to a situation of definitive stagnation. This can be seen clearly in the Grundrisse , which was written at approximately the same time as the Preface. Martin Nicolaus has interpreted the Grundrisse as Marx making an “important extension” of the Preface’s statement that no formation disappears before all the forces within it have developed (Nicolaus, 1989). But rather than an “extension,” in the Grundrisse we find a vision other than that of permanent stagnation. The issue is not minor because it is Marx’s first systematic explanation of how capitalist accumulation generates, by its own dialectic, crises and periods of destruction of productive forces. And it is a fact that Marx presents a scenario of recurring crises which, if overcome by capital, give rise to new periods of development, which in turn lead to new and catastrophic falls . The relations of production, at a certain point, collide with the development of the productive forces (synthesized mainly in the accumulation of fixed capital), precipitating the crisis. But the crises impel the restoration of the rate of profit.

It is for this reason that Marx maintains in the Grundrisse that the contradiction of capital “discharges itself in great storms”, which are the modern crises “which increasingly threaten it as the basis of society and of production itself” (Marx, 1989, p. 363, vol. 1). A few pages later, referring to the inherent limits to accumulation that derive from the nature of capital, he points out that these are manifested in overproduction and “general devaluation”, for which reason “capital is at the same time faced with the task of restarting its attempt from a higher level of development of the productive forces , etc., with an ever greater collapse [collapse] as capital. It is clear, therefore, that the greater the development of capital, the more it will present itself as a barrier to production… apart from all other contradictions…” (idem, pp. 368-9; emphasis added). Which is in line with the idea, from Capital , that crises generate forces that allow the rate of profit to rise again, and that there are no permanent final crises.

I think that this dynamic, described by Marx for the 19th century, continued into the 20th century. For example, the rate of profit in the 1940s and much of the following decade in the US was higher than that in the 1920s. The rate of profit in the 1990s and 2000s, also in the US, while not recovering the high levels of the 1940s or the mid-1960s, was nevertheless higher than that of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The rate of profit in Argentina, according to government data, was higher from 2003 onwards than in the 1980s or 1990s. There is nothing mechanical in these developments, and studies should be done specifically to find out what is happening. These scenarios fit quite well into the vision of recurrent crises, discussed in the Grundrisse , and not into the thesis of a permanent crisis, or stagnation.


Unsolvable problems

Whatever Marx argued in the Grundrisse or Capital , the fact remains that in the Preface to the Contribution Marx argued that a social system cannot disappear until it has exhausted all the possibilities of development it contains. This continues to have political implications for Marxists, even if they are not as dramatic today as they were in 1917. If one agrees with the thesis of the Preface, there is only one way to argue that a socialist revolution is possible (from the point of view of social and material conditions) today, and that is to demonstrate that the capitalist system, on a global level, can no longer develop the productive forces. Within the framework of Marxist theory, the only way to do this would be to demonstrate that the rate of profit has reached such a low level, on a planetary level, that the formation of new enterprises and accumulation are no longer possible, and that there is no way for capitalism to alter this situation. To the best of our knowledge, no one has demonstrated any of these things. On the other hand, it has not been possible to prove, with data, that capitalism has been stagnant for 100 years, or anything similar.

Let us also clarify that this problem cannot be overcome with terminology. For example, it is quite common to hear supporters of the CEC thesis characterize present-day capitalism as “senile.” But if capitalism were “senile” it would mean that it has lost the strength to expand, develop productivity, or increase fixed capital. I do not see how to reconcile this idea with the expansion of capitalism to large areas of Asia, territories of the former USSR, and the Stalinist regimes of Eastern Europe in the last 30 years; nor with the revolutions of new technologies, or the investments to which they gave rise. However, on the other hand, many Marxists are convinced that today the conditions exist for a new type of society , even though the capitalist system has not exhausted its possibilities of development.

At this point, and given the few real prospects we have today for changing this society (the majority of the working class does not want socialism), it is necessary for me to clarify in what sense I am arguing that the conditions for a socialist change are given. I am putting it in terms of the development of the productive forces, and of the formation of a social force capable of transforming society . That is, the development of the capitalist productive forces and the world market make it theoretically feasible to redistribute working time and use the surplus for the benefit of the whole society, in order to end the most pressing material hardships of humanity, as well as to begin to overcome nationalisms and divisions between peoples. There also exists a class with the social force capable of making this change. Like many other Marxists, I maintain that from the point of view of material and social conditions , there is no reason to deny the possibility of change. The question thus arises as to how Marx's statement in the Preface to the Contribution can be correct .

My answer is that the thesis of the Preface, as it relates to capitalism, is mistaken, and that Elster is right when he claims that it is not only not applicable to capitalism, but also contradicts the rest of Marx’s work . Elster explains: “I believe that this simple sentence cannot take priority over all the other texts… which claim that capitalism will collapse before all the productive forces for which it has room have developed” (Elster, 1990, p. 187; emphasis added).

Marx's idea, according to Elster, is that pre-capitalist forms foundered on the development of wealth, that is, they were incapable of absorbing technological change, and were essentially conservative systems (we will not discuss here to what extent this aspect of the question contradicts what the Preface maintains). A classic example is that the slave mode of production did not admit refined tools, and therefore had insurmountable limitations as to the possibility of developing the productive forces. Another case is that of the medieval guilds, which did not admit large-scale cooperation. On the other hand, capitalism tends to permanently develop the productive forces (as Marx and Engels maintained in The Communist Manifesto ), and so far it has absorbed all technological changes. The only technological change that capitalism could not assimilate - we have already pointed out - would be the complete automation of production. But this is still far off on the horizon. For now, no technological change is on the horizon that capitalism cannot assimilate.

On the other hand, as Elster also points out, nowhere in Capital , or earlier in the Grundrisse , does Marx argue that technological change is slowing down, or that accumulation is entering a stage of historical decline. “[T]he general tenor of his [Marx’s] analysis is incompatible with the idea of a technological stagnation bringing about the downfall of capitalism” (Elster, 1990, p. 191). Nor does Marx anywhere in Capital claim that the working class should wait, in order to “take heaven by storm,” until the capitalist regime has shown that it has reached a stage at which there is no longer any possibility of further increasing fixed capital, or the productivity of labour.


Spiral development and fall of capitalism

Let us also note that, despite its air of radicalism, the idea that there will come a point in the evolution when capitalism will enter a stage of lethargy, or definitive stagnation, is more typical of great bourgeois economists than of Marx. For example, we find it in Ricardo and Keynes. Ricardo thought that the fall in the rate of profit would extinguish, in the long term, the fire of accumulation, as Marx recalls. Keynes also believed that the long-term fall in the marginal efficiency of capital would end up causing “the euthanasia of the rentier” (those who live off the income from capital). These are processes that are seen in the long term as “quiet slumber,” as if someone were to say that in the future a living being will gradually fade away, until it becomes extinct. It is a scenario in which contradictions are cushioned, to a certain extent. In Marx, on the other hand, the idea is that capitalism develops in a spiral, with violent convulsions and contractions .

Perhaps the passage in which Marx presents this perspective most fully is found in Chapter 24 of Volume 1 of Capital , in the section entitled “The Historical Tendency of the Accumulation of Capital.” The fact that he makes no mention of the rate of profit and recurrent crises is explained by the stage at which the theory is presented; however, it can easily be incorporated into the exposition. What we want to emphasize is that when exposing the active, that is, verifiable , tendencies of accumulation , Marx does not speak of a stage of appeasement or final stagnation in the development of the productive forces. He maintains that when reaching a certain stage of its development, capitalism “generates the material means of its own destruction” (Marx, 1999, p. 952, vol. 1). Capital increasingly socializes production (masses of human beings are stripped of ownership of their means of production and are subsumed under the command of capital), while capital is concentrated and centralized in the hands of a few. However, this occurs through the development of productive forces: cooperative work is extended and deepened; technology and science are applied to production; collective exploitation of the land and combined social work spread. By this same process, at one pole power and wealth increase, and at the other “the mass of misery, oppression, servitude, degeneration, exploitation” (idem, p. 953). This contradiction sharpens , and ends up exploding. But the process is not purely economic ; it occurs through and by human beings . “In the entrails of society, forces and passions are stirred that feel bound by this mode of production” (idem, p. 952). And then Marx adds that with increasing polarization “the rebelliousness of the working class also increases,” while “the capitalist process of production itself” generates more cohesion, discipline and unity. Which leads to the explosion:
“The concentration of the means of production and the socialization of labor reach a point where they are incompatible with the capitalist crust. It is blown apart . The final hour of capitalist private property is sounding” (ibid., p. 953; emphasis added).

Several issues are of interest here. First, we emphasize that in this description of Marx (which is maintained throughout the four editions of Capital that he himself revised) there is no historical phase or epoch of stagnation of the productive forces prior to the fall of the capitalist system . Second, in this scheme it is very simple, and would be entirely appropriate, to introduce the idea of recurrent, catastrophic crises; from which, if the system overcomes them, there is further development of the productive forces, which generates new crises. Third, we do not see a vision of an automatic, purely economic, final fall of capitalism. Marx points out that the capitalist mode of production generates “passions” and “rebellion in the working class”; as well as the organization and cohesion of its ranks. That is, rebellion, the agitation of passions (due to the increasing polarization between wealth and misery), and organization, are necessary ingredients for the hour of private ownership of capital to sound . Marx asserts that the capitalist crust is “ blown up ”; that is, there must be an active, subjective, conscious factor . Therefore, objective tendencies (derived, ultimately, from the dialectic of the law of labor value) are combined with subjective intervention . When Marx maintains, also in this section, that capitalist production “generates, by the necessity of a natural process, its own negation” (idem, p. 954), he is not meaning to say that the fall is produced by economic causes, but that the objective economic dynamic (in this aspect it is “natural”) generates the conditions for that fall.

There is a link in this argument, however, that Marx does not necessarily prove to be as he claims . We refer to his conviction that the growing polarization between concentrated wealth and widespread exploitation will, more or less inevitably, generate rebellion and, finally, an uprising against capitalism. Historical experience has shown that the processes are far more complex . For example, in the United States, the 12,000 richest families have annual incomes greater than those of the poorest 24 million people in the country. In 2010, in the United States, where abundance is sufficient for unbridled waste, one in eight people depended on food stamps to survive. Worldwide, 2.8 billion people live on less than two dollars a day, but in the mid-2000s, the average European cow received a subsidy of 2.2 dollars a day. These glaring contradictions do not provoke any radicalization to the left today. A question that refers to the problematic of ideology and politics (also to the experiences of the so-called "real socialisms"), and which exceeds the limits of this note. But here we emphasize that the contradictions between wealth and misery, increase in technology and fixed capital, and growing exploitation, etc., exist because there was a contradictory development of the productive forces .


Stagnation and utopian socialism

The discussion we present also has to do with Marx and Engels' critique of utopian socialism; in other words, it involves a constitutive question of Marxism , both as a critique of capitalist society and as a political project.

In a somewhat schematic way, we can present the question in this way. The utopian socialists saw only evils in capitalist society, and therefore found no social, material support for generating a new society in which exploitation did not exist. As Engels explained, for the utopian socialists, society “contained nothing but evils, which thinking reason was called upon to remedy.” Therefore, they sought to discover “a new and more perfect system of social order, in order to introduce it into society from without, by means of propaganda and, if possible, by example, by experiments that would serve as a model” (Engels, 1975, p. 123). In contrast, in the approach of Marx and Engels, it is necessary that the material and social conditions be generated so that a society without exploitation can emerge. That is why Engels emphasizes that “the mere will to abolish classes is not enough, but certain new economic conditions are necessary” (ibid., p. 156). But if there is only decadence and prostration in capitalism, and if, on top of that, this has been going on for decades, there is no way for these conditions to exist. The working class worldwide would be in dissolution (decreasing since 1914, or 1930); the productivity of labor would be in decline, etc. In this scenario, we would have to dust off the old ideas of utopian socialism. If “the world is only filthy” (as a leftist leader told me a few years ago, believing that with this he was suggesting something profoundly revolutionary), there is no way to find any lever for change in what already exists . The only path left would be the socialist phalanstery, organized in some remote place, to generate the new society with entirely new, uncontaminated men and women. Socialism would be quixotic.

The central idea of Marx's theory, of his critique of capitalism and of the possibilities of overcoming it, on the other hand, is that as the system evolves, the contradictions become more acute because there is simultaneously development and misery , expansion of productive forces and increasing exploitation . In a speech given in April 1856, and reproduced in the Chartist newspaper People's Paper , Marx expressed this vision in these words:

“There is one great fact characteristic of our nineteenth century… On the one hand, there have sprung up industrial and scientific forces which no epoch in the past history of mankind could ever have suspected. On the other hand, there are symptoms of decay which far surpass the horrors of the late Roman Empire. In our day, everything seems to be pregnant with its opposite. Machinery, endowed with the marvellous power of shortening and justifying human labour, we see it starving and burdening it. By some strange and frightful spell, the newborn sources of wealth are transformed into sources of want. The victories of technology seem to come at the price of loss of character. At the same time as humanity dominates nature, man seems to become the slave of other men or of his own infamy… All our inventions and progress seem to have as their result the endowment of natural forces with intellectual life and the stupefaction of human life by turning it into a material force. This antagonism between modern industry and science on the one hand, and modern misery and dissolution on the other, This antagonism between the productive forces and the social relations of our time is a palpable and incontrovertible fact. (…) We know that if the new forces of society are to work satisfactorily, the only thing required is that they should be mastered by new men; and these are the workers. They are, as much as machinery, an invention of modern times” (Marx in Marx and Engels, 1973, pp. 81-2).

This contradiction is not less today but greater than in the 19th century . But this can only be the case if the capitalist system is not stagnant .


Conclusion

To conclude what I have just said, I will relate an experience that I experienced personally. Several years ago (in 1990, to be exact), I had a conversation with a friend, an English Marxist and Trotskyist, very cultured and well-versed in the work of Marx, who defended the thesis that the productive forces had been stagnant since 1914.
I developed my argument in steps. First, I asked him if he agreed that the development of the productive forces generated the objective conditions for socialist transformation. He replied that he agreed with this. Secondly, I asked him if he did not agree with me that the means of production were much more developed in 1990 than in 1914; and if the same was not true of the working class worldwide. My friend had to admit that he did. “Undoubtedly the capacity to produce today is much greater; and the working class is much larger,” he told me. I then told him that the logical conclusion was that the productive forces had developed since 1914. He replied in all sincerity that if he accepted this conclusion, he would have to question the foundations of the Transitional Program (the founding program of the Fourth International), and that he was not prepared to do so. I then warned him that this was not a scientific criterion. As a response, my friend said “I have a problem.”
But he never changed his position (he died a few years after this conversation).
When I hear some staunch defenses of the thesis of permanent stagnation, and the automatic collapse of capitalism, I cannot help but remember that English friend.


Cited Works :
Colletti, L. (1983): Introduction to Marxism and the “collapse” of capitalism , Mexico, Siglo XXI, pp. 13-45.

Elster, J. (1990): Technological Change , Barcelona, Gedisa.

Engels, F. (1975): “From Utopian Socialism to Scientific Socialism” in Marx and Engels, Selected Works 2, Madrid, Akal, pp. 92-161.

Marx, K. (1999): Capital , Madrid, Siglo XXI.

Marx, K. (1989): Fundamentals of the Critique of Political Economy (Grundrisse) 1857-1858 , Mexico, Siglo XXI.

Marx, K. (1980): Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy , Mexico, Siglo XXI.

Marx, K. (1975): Theories of Surplus Value , Buenos Aires, Cartago.

Marx, K. and F. Engels (1973): Correspondence , Buenos Aires, Cartago.

Nicolaus, M. (1989): “The Unknown Marx”, in Marx (1989), pp. xi-xl.

Trotsky, L. (1976): Towards Socialism or Capitalism? New York, New Park Publications

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Eltitoguay

Well-known member
I want to emphasize that, unless I indicate otherwise, I do not have to totally agree with the articles of others that I transcribe (which, sometimes, contradict each other when addressing a topic).
I, as a leftist, can "eat almost anything and with everyone"...

...less dogmatisms, intransigence, sectarianism, and/or Cainite fundamentalism...

 
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Eltitoguay

Well-known member
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IS DEMOCRACY DIYING ?​


In the 1990s, democracy seemed to become the only possible political regime.
Three decades later, we find it under siege by populisms from within and by autocracies from without.
Can it survive the threats that Donald Trump on the one hand and the Chinese regime on the other represent today? Possibly yes, but it will have to be reformed.

This is not news: democracy has always been the most adaptable of known regimes. The unknown lies in the forms it will take and the processes that will shape them.

Andres Malamud

NEW SOCIETY 282 / JULY - AUGUST 2019

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Is democracy dying?​

Is democracy dying?
The short answer is “no.” The long answer, for anyone eager for details, is “of course not.” And yet, concepts such as “democratic recession,” “democratic erosion,” “democratic reversal,” and “the slow death of democracy ” are proliferating. Ironically, this is happening 30 years after Francis Fukuyama’s followers declared the eternal victory of democracy. It was clearly not that big a deal. But democracy was not eternal then, nor is it dying now. In the absence of black and white, today we combine drops of color among shades of gray. After all, democracy is the least epic of political regimes. Perhaps that is why, Winston Churchill would add, it is the least bad. Recently, European political scientists Anna Lührmann and Staffan Lindberg published an article on the “third wave of autocratization.”1Their argument is that every wave of democratization (there have already been three) is followed by a counterwave in which democracy retreats. However, based on a huge database, they conclude that there is no need to panic: the current democratic decline is milder than the previous counterwave, and the total number of democratic countries remains close to its historical maximum. Nevertheless, fatalists abound. Some see coups d'état in every corner. Others maintain that coups are out of fashion but democracies continue to crumble, now due to the erosive action of those who attack them from within.

Both arguments deserve consideration.


The classic problem: Coups d'éEtat​

The typical image of democratic failure is a general deposing and replacing a democratically elected president. This replacement implied a change of government but, above all, a change of regime. The usual adjective was “military”: a military coup gave way to a military regime. But it was usually an understatement that did not need to be reinforced: what other type of coup could it be? This has changed. Today all kinds of adjectives abound: soft, gentle, parliamentary, judicial, electoral, market-based, slow-motion, civil society… This profusion should not be naturalized. It is worth asking why we have gone from the classic concept of coup to this panoply of diminished subtypes.

With the Norwegian political scientist Leiv Marsteintredet we carried out a study that we titled, paraphrasing a classic text by David Collier and Steven Levitsky, “Coups with adjectives.” In it we observed that, although coups d’état are becoming increasingly rare, the concept is increasingly used.
What is the reason for this gap between what we observe and what we name?

We were able to identify three causes.

The first is that, although coups are increasingly rare, political instability is not: in Latin America, several presidents saw their mandate interrupted in the last 30 years. Authors such as Aníbal Pérez Liñán demonstrated that the causes are different, and the consequences as well: now, even if presidents fall, democracy remains.2. However, inertia leads us to use the same word that we used before, as if Augusto Pinochet and Michel Temer embodied the same phenomenon.

The second cause is what in psychology is called “prevalence-induced conceptual change,” a phenomenon that consists of expanding the coverage of a concept when its occurrence becomes less frequent. A more intuitive way of naming this phenomenon is inertia.

The third cause is political instrumentalization: those who suffer instability find it useful to present themselves as victims of a coup and not of their own incompetence or of a constitutional procedure such as impeachment.

The contrast between current “coups” and classic coups is so evident that adjectives are needed to disguise it.

A classic coup meant the unconstitutional interruption of a government by another agent of the State. The three constitutive elements were the target (the head of State or government), the perpetrator (another State agent, usually the Armed Forces) and the procedure (secret, rapid and, above all, illegal).
Today, although interruptions of mandate continue to occur, it is increasingly rare for them to contain all three elements. In the absence of one of them, the qualifiers that, seeking to justify the use of the word "coup", make it clear that it is not so much a coup have multiplied.
With Marsteintredet we argue that the proliferation of adjectives confuses four different phenomena3, which are expressed in the graph.

From the combination of the three classical constituent elements, the following possibilities emerge:

a)
If the perpetrator is a state agent, the target is the head of state and his removal is illegal, we are dealing with a classic coup d'état .

Typical examples include the replacement of Salvador Allende by Augusto Pinochet in Chile in 1973 (Coup d'état against a democracy and a democratically elected Marxist president, directed from another democracy, capitalist, like the USA), and that of Isabel Martínez de Perón by Jorge Rafael Videla in Argentina in 1976.

b)
If the head of state is illegally removed but the perpetrator is not a state agent, the act would be a revolution .
However, those who prefer to stretch the definition use “civil society coup”, “electoral coup” or the more ubiquitous “market coup”, which in the graph are designated as “coups with adjectives of type 1”.
The market coup is cited, for example, as the cause of Raúl Alfonsín’s resignation in 1989, in Argentina, while Nicolás Maduro denounced an “electoral coup” when he lost the legislative elections in 2015.

c)
If the perpetrator is a state agent and the dismissal is illegal, but the target is not the head of state, we witness what is called a self-coup .
This word is misleading, because it refers to a coup that is not directed against oneself, but against another government body, such as when the president closes Congress. These cases include the so-called “judicial coups” and the “slow-motion coup,” which we call “coups with type 2 adjectives.”

The archetypal self-coup is that of Alberto Fujimori in 1992, in Peru, but the judicial coup applies to cases such as that of Venezuela when, in 2017, the Judiciary decided to withdraw the legislative powers of the National Assembly.
I will refer to the slow-motion coup in the next section.

d)
If the perpetrator is a state agent and the target is the head of state but the removal procedure is legal, it is a political trial or, as they call it in the United States and Brazil, impeachment.
The controversy arises because, even if the judiciary ratifies the procedure, the victim can claim bias and question its legitimacy. Here arise the so-called “soft coup”, the “parliamentary coup” and the even more paradoxical “constitutional coup”.

We call them “coups with adjectives of type 3”.
The removals of Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992 and Dilma Rousseff in 2016 in Brazil have been denounced by their victims as soft coups or parliamentary coups, given that there was no use of military force and both processes were channeled through Congress with the consent of the judiciary.

Coups with adjectives are distinguished by the absence of one of the three classic components of a coup d'état. The debate over whether such a dismissal was a coup or not continues to inflame passions, but is nevertheless becoming less and less relevant. Because, lately, democracies do not break down when an elected government falls, but when it remains.


The current problem : Slow Death​

The current problem is the slow death.

Until the 1980s, democracies died suddenly. Literally.
Not today: now they die little by little, slowly.

They bleed to death amid the indignation of the electorate and the corrosive action of demagogues.

Looking further back in history, American political scientists Steven Levitsky and Gabriel Ziblatt warn that what we see today is not the first time this has happened: before dying suddenly, democracies also died from within, little by little.4The specters of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler haunt his 2018 book, How Democracies Die , as an example of how democracy is always under construction and the elections that build it can also demolish it. This work is a call to vigilance in order to maintain freedom.

Although the comparison of Hitler and Mussolini to Hugo Chavez is clearly exaggerated, the authors stress the similarity of the routes that led them to power: as little-known figures who were able to capture public attention, the key to their rise lies in the fact that established politicians ignored the warning signs and either handed them power (Hitler and Mussolini) or opened the doors for them to take it (Chavez). The abdication of political responsibility by moderates is the threshold of victory for extremists.

One problem with democracy is that, unlike dictatorships, it is conceived as permanent, and yet, like dictatorships, its survival is never guaranteed. Democracy must be cultivated on a daily basis. Since this requires negotiation, compromise and concessions, setbacks are inevitable and victories are always partial. But this, which any democrat knows from experience and accepts through training, is frustrating for newcomers. And impatience breeds intolerance. Faced with obstacles, some demagogues relegate negotiation and opt to capture the referees (judges and control bodies), buy off opponents and change the rules of the game. As long as they can do this gradually and under apparent legality, argue Levitsky and Ziblatt, the authoritarian drift does not set off alarm bells. Like a frog in a bain-marie, citizens may take too long to realise that democracy is being dismantled.

The authors leave three lessons, and each of them is associated with a challenge :

The first is that it is not institutions, but certain political practices, that sustain democracy.
The distinction between presidentialism and parliamentarism, or between majority and minority electoral systems, delights political scientists, but it does not determine the stability or quality of government.
The success of democracy depends on two other things: tolerance toward others and institutional restraint, that is, the decision to do less than the law allows. Indeed, constitutions do not oblige one to treat rivals as legitimate opponents for power or to moderate the use of institutional prerogatives to guarantee fair play. However, without informal norms that go in that direction, the constitutional system of checks and balances does not work as Montesquieu and the founding fathers of the United States foresaw , nor as those of us who adapt that model in other latitudes would expect. The first challenge, then, is to behave more civilly than the law requires

The second lesson is that the practices of tolerance and self-restraint are best served in homogeneous – or exclusive – societies.
The success of American democracy owed as much to its Constitution and its parties as it did to slavery first and then to segregation.
The challenge of the present is to practice tolerance and self-restraint in a plural, multiracial and even multicultural society, where the other is at once very different from us and part of us.
This challenge challenges all democracies.

The third lesson is that the problem of polarization is in the dosage.
A little polarization is good, because the existence of differentiated alternatives improves representation; but too much is harmful, because it makes agreements difficult and, consequently, worsens policies.
The challenge for Democrats is not to eliminate the rift but to dose it.
Levitsky and Ziblatt put it this way:
"Polarization can shatter democratic norms. When socioeconomic, racial, or religious differences give rise to extreme partisanship, in which societies are divided into political camps whose worldviews are not only different but mutually exclusive, tolerance becomes harder to sustain. Some polarization is healthy, even necessary, for democracy. And indeed, the historical experience of Western European democracies shows that norms can be maintained even when there are considerable ideological differences between parties. But when social division is so deep that parties are assimilated to incompatible worldviews, and especially when their components are so socially segregated that they rarely interact, stable partisan rivalries eventually give way to perceptions of mutual threat. And as mutual tolerance fades, politicians are more tempted to abandon contention and try to win at all costs. This can encourage the rise of anti-establishment groups that reject democratic rules outright. And when this happens, democracy is at stake".5

Levitsky and Ziblatt conclude their analysis with a heresy: they claim that America ’s founding fathers were wrong. Without innovations like political parties and informal norms of coexistence, they argue, the Constitution they so painstakingly drafted in Philadelphia would not have survived. Institutions turned out to be more than just formal regulations: they are wrapped in an overlay of common understanding of what is considered acceptable behavior.
The genius of the first generation of American political leaders “was not that they created infallible institutions, but that, in addition to designing well-thought-out institutions, they slowly and painstakingly implanted a set of shared beliefs and practices that helped those institutions to function well.”6

For many, Donald Trump's rise to power marks the end of these shared beliefs and practices.
The question that arises is whether institutions can survive without them and for how long.


The new challenges​

We humans are living through the best period in our history. Never before have we been so numerous, so healthy, and so democratic. However, in the West we believe something else: we sense that, for the first time in decades, the next generation will live worse than the current one. Both things are true: although the West led global progress in the last two centuries, today it is non-Western societies that are growing the most. At the same time, inequality is increasing in the West. Faced with the accumulation of frustrations and relative deprivation, that is, the perception that others are doing better than us, citizens are rebelling at the polls and in the streets. Democracies are facing turbulent times that, however, will not be homogeneous. The impact will be different between old Europe and the ever-renewing USA , but also between both and Latin America, called by Alain Rouquié “the extreme West.”
Together with the Argentine Guillermo O'Donnell, the American political scientist Philippe Schmitter is one of the fathers of transitology – that is, the study of democratic transitions.7
His object of study is what he calls, paraphrasing the “really existing socialism” that justified the limitations of the Soviet system, “really existing democracies.” According to Schmitter, there is nothing new in the fact that democracies are in crisis. The gap between the democratic ideal and effective regimes has always required constant adjustments, so adaptive capacity, as much as crises, is a constitutive element of real democracies.
For Schmitter, the seriousness of the current crisis is due to the fact that it involves a set of simultaneous challenges rather than consecutive ones, which could be faced through gradual reforms. The economic crisis coexists with the crisis of legitimacy, and changes in the economic structure overlap with transformations in mass communication. As if that were not enough, there are threats, but no alternatives to democracy, such as those that the Soviet Union could present. The reputation of the regime depends on its performance. The democratic emperor is naked and his subjects have noticed it. Uncertainty and turbulence may no longer be features of the times but a constant of the coming democracy. Populism is one of its most ubiquitous symptoms.

Before continuing, a clarification is in order: populism is a phenomenon that manifests itself in democracy. Regimes such as Maduro in Venezuela or Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua are no longer populist, but authoritarian. That being said, the exacerbation of populism, understood as the Manichean conception of a people victimized by an oligarchy, can corrode and, in extreme cases, end democracy. In a 2018 article entitled “Do the poor vote for redistribution, against immigration or against the establishment?”, Paul Marx and Gijs Schumacher published the results of an experiment carried out in Denmark.8, but it is not difficult to see how well it travels to other regions. It shows that lower-class voters vote for different reasons than middle- and upper-class voters.
Surprisingly, the cause is not immigration: there is no disagreement on that issue.
What distinguishes the poor is their propensity to vote against established parties and career politicians even to the detriment of their own interests, for example, by supporting proposals to roll back social policies.
When they get angry, the poor commit a theoretical heresy and stop voting with their pocketbooks.
Democratic parties are in danger if they do not understand that anger is stronger than interest.

The Italian-Argentine sociologist Gino Germani described the source of populism as “status incongruity.” In the case of Peronism, or Latin American populism in general, this meant that sectors that had risen economically did not find political and social recognition, and sought it through a leadership that promised to break the oligarchic order. Populism in developed countries reverses this logic: here the incongruity is due to previously dominant sectors feeling threatened by rising social groups, whether ethnic minorities as in the US or immigrants as in Europe. The decline in relative status links the phenomena of Trump, Brexit, Matteo Salvini and Viktor Orbán.

The new European nationalisms call into question not only democracy but also its greatest international by-product: regional integration. Understood as a process by which neighbouring states merge areas of sovereignty to decide jointly on common problems, integration found its pioneer and most advanced case in the European Union. Brexit is only one of the three crises it currently faces, with immigration and the euro being the most threatening to its integrity.

In other regions, the threat to integration is less serious: after all, what has not been integrated cannot disintegrate. In Latin America, for example, regional integration is a discourse that has not taken root. Despite some progress in policy coordination and the movement of people, Latin American borders remain expensive and hard. Formal borders, that is. Because where the region has made a lot of progress is in informal integration, that which is not carried out by treaties but by bandits. The three areas in which Latin American societies have integrated the most are corruption, smuggling and drug trafficking. In all three, but especially in the first, there is active state intervention; in the other two the State is responsible, but above all, a victim. It is to be expected that a fourth dimension of integration will also be informal, involve a lot of money and have a high political impact: it is the transnationalization of organized religions. Evangelical religions, in particular, will consolidate their regional networks, benefiting from access to power in two key countries, Brazil and Mexico.
If national States do not strengthen the rule of law and the capacity to implement it throughout their territory, Latin American integration will increasingly be a matter of preachers and criminals.
Like their democracies, a dirty-minded person would say.

The reality is less grim, though not reassuring. Today, Latin American democracy is less at risk of being broken up or captured by the mafia than of being irrelevant. Common sense and academic research agree on one thing: the economy is the main determinant of electoral results. Just as recession favors the opposition, economic growth favors the government because voters hold it responsible for its performance. This is true in central countries, where the good results of public policies depend above all on internal factors. But what happens in peripheral countries, where the economy depends on external factors? Brazilian political scientists Daniela Campello and Cesar Zucco have shown that, in South America (note: not in all of Latin America), the popularity of a president and his chances of reelection depend on two variables that are not his fault: the price of natural resources and the international interest rate.9
The price of natural resources determines the value of these countries' main exports and is set primarily by China's growth. The interest rate determines the availability of capital for foreign investment and is set primarily by the US central bank ( the famous Fed). Thus, when natural resources are expensive and interest rates are low, presidents are re-elected; when the relationship is reversed, the opposition triumphs. This dynamic has negative effects on democracy, because good governments can be ousted because of bad times, while bad governments stay in power thanks to winds they did not generate. The solution to this dilemma for democracy is probably not better political information, but more economic development.

This discussion leads us to an extreme case, which combines economic collapse with democratic breakdown:
VENEZUELA
Traditional political scientists wrongly assume the State as a given and study power in terms of a political regime. Thus, when we see an authoritarian regime, we expect that at some point it will collapse and a democratic transition will begin. And by believing, we made others believe. Now the majority of Venezuelans hope that Maduro's government will end, either by an internal coup or by external intervention, and that democracy will rebuild the country. But democracy is a mechanism to elect the driver who drives the State car, and in Venezuela that car does not have an engine. The Venezuelan economy does not produce 80% of what it consumes, including food and medicine; it only produces oil – and less and less.
Given that the US , its main trading partner, has become self-sufficient in gas and is visibly reducing its dependence on foreign oil, its interest in Venezuela's reconstruction is less than the costs it could entail. Of the two countries that have sufficient resources to rebuild a country of this size, only China would be interested in doing so, and not for free.

In this context of economic ruin, political authoritarianism and popular uprising, there are five scenarios that open up for the Bolivarian Republic.
A comparison with similar cases helps to illustrate them :

The first scenario is a successful democratic transition like the one that Tunisia, the cradle of the “Arab Spring”, went through.
There they managed to get autocratic President Ben Ali on a plane, send him into exile in Saudi Arabia and establish a democratic and pluralist regime.
Optimistic Venezuelans are hoping to follow the same path and retire Maduro in Cuba or Spain.
Probability: low.

The second scenario is less encouraging and consists of the Egyptian route, where the pro-democracy tide managed to overthrow dictator Hosni Mubarak but, after a brief democratic experiment, the authoritarian regime managed to rebalance itself under another leadership.
A Bolivarianism without Maduro appears as a viable alternative, which would reduce the pressure on the regime without changing it.

The third scenario is Zimbabwe, a devastated country where authoritarianism and inflation coexisted for years without calling the regime into question.
The final dismissal of Robert Mugabe after 37 years in power did not open the doors to democracy or solve the economic problems. This is the Venezuelan situation by default .

The fourth scenario is Libya, a vast and sparsely populated country where a poorly planned and poorly implemented foreign intervention broke Muammar Gaddafi's monopoly on violence and failed to build another.
The consequence was the effective disappearance of the State
, whose nominal survival camouflages a myriad of tribal and mafia groups that share territorial control and natural resources.
Given the lack of control of Venezuela's borders and the presence of Colombian criminal organizations on its territory, this development is increasingly plausible.

The fifth scenario is Syria, a country in civil war where the sides do not coexist fragmentarily, as in Libya, but rather dispute the territory militarily.
The probability of this development is low because the weapons, in Venezuela, are all on the same side.
The possibility of China investing astronomical sums to extract natural resources from Venezuela decreases from the first to the fourth scenario and disappears in the fifth. This presents a paradox: the better Venezuelan democracy fares, the more likely it is to become an economic protectorate.
As alternatives to Liberal Democracy, Fascism and Stalinism were knocked out in the twentieth century.
The Venezuelan tragedy and its possible Chinese drift exhibit the two alternatives that arise in the twenty-first century : on the one hand, the utopian inefficiency of charismatic leadership; on the other, the dystopian efficiency of digital autocracy.
Democracy will be less utopian or less efficient than its rivals, but, as Karl Popper wanted, it will continue to be the only political regime that allows us to get rid of our rulers without bloodshed.

  • BIBLIOGRAPHY :
    1.
    A. Lührmann y S.I. Lindberg: «A Third Wave of Autocratization is Here: What is New about It?» en Democratization, 1/3/2009.
  • 2.
    A. Pérez Liñán: Impeachment of the President and the New Political Stability in Latin America , FCE Buenos Aires, 2009.
  • 3.
    L. Marsteintredet and A. Malamud: ob. go.
  • 4.
    S. Levitsky and D. Ziblatt: How Democracies Die , Ariel, Barcelona, 2018.
  • 5.
    Ibid., p. 137.
  • 6.
    Ibid., p. 247.
  • 7.
    PC Schmitter: “Real-Existing Democracy and its Discontents”, paper presented at ISCTE/Instituto Universitario de Lisboa, Lisbon, 22/3/2019.
  • 8.
    P. Marx y G. Schumacher: «Do Poor Citizens Vote for Redistribution, Against Immigration or Against the Establishment? A Conjoint Experiment in Denmark» en Scandinavian Political Studies vol. 41 No 3, 2018.
  • 9.
    D. Campello y C. Zucco Jr.: «Presidential Success and the World Economy» en The Journal of Politics vol. 78 No 2, 2016.
 
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Eltitoguay

Well-known member
(...) If the perpetrator is a state agent, the target is the head of state and his removal is illegal, we are dealing with a classic coup d'état .
Typical examples include the replacement of Salvador Allende by Augusto Pinochet in Chile in 1973 (Coup d'état against a democracy and a democratically elected Marxist president, directed from another democracy, capitalist, like USA (...)
I see an error in the Wikipedia definitions about Salvador Allende and his Govern in the previous message.

According to Wikipedia:
"Salvador Guillermo Allende Gossens[A] (26 June 1908 – 11 September 1973) was a Chilean socialist politician[4][5] who served as the 28th president of Chile from 1970 until his death in 1973.[6] As a socialist committed to democracy,[7][8] he has been described as the first Marxist to be elected president in a liberal democracy in Latin America.[9][10][11]"

But several decades before, even in Chile itself, there had already been democratically elected Marxist governments in Hispanic America, as Wikipedia itself reflects in other articles:
  • The Popular Front of Chile , center-left political coalition, made up of the radical, communist, socialist, democratic and radical socialist parties, formed in 1937. It won the presidential elections of 1938. It was dissolved in 1941.
  • The Victory Bloc of Costa Rica , a coalition of the Republican and Communist parties , won the 1944 presidential election. And claimed to have won the next 1948 election, but the last was rejected by the oposition.

And as an added bonus, on the other side of the Atlantic, the same thing had also happened in Western Europe:
Except in Costa Rican's example these and others democratically elected Marxist participation or majority governments in diferent nations of the World, democratically ceded power when they lost the elections; and/or were violently deposed from their democratic mandate, by coups by states encouraged and/or directed from other nations governed by fascism, or later, from other capitalist democracies (generally, the USA).
 
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Eltitoguay

Well-known member

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HISTORIC VICTORY FOR THE FRENCH NEW POPULAR FRONT IN FRANCE !

  • 08.07.24
  • FRANCE
  • ELECTIONS
    GettyImages-2160460412.jpg.webp
PEOPLE CELEBRATE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE VICTORY OF THE LEFT AND THE DEFEAT OF THE FAR-RIGHT IN NANTES, FRANCE, ON JULY 7, 2024.

Historic victory for the French New Popular Front​

HARRISON STETLER
Professor and independent journalist based in Paris.

The French election was set to give victory to Marine Le Pen's far right. But the New Popular Front united around a programme of social change, allowing it to become the largest force in the new National Assembly.

 There is nothing inevitable about the rise of the far right. French voters proved this by once again overwhelmingly rejecting that possibility on Sunday. On July 7, the left-wing alliance Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP) made a historic turnaround in France's snap parliamentary elections, emerging in the second round as the largest bloc in the incoming National Assembly.

An alliance of parties hastily formed less than a month ago, the NFP has dashed expectations of an imminent victory for Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National. After dissolving the National Assembly on June 9, President Emmanuel Macron could be forced to govern in “cohabitation” with an opposition cabinet. The leaders of the NFP – which brings together France Insoumise, the Socialist Party, Les Ecologistes and the French Communist Party – claim the right to form the next government and implement their common programme of “breaking” with the Macron era.

Presented in mid-June, the NFP platform includes the repeal of Macron’s unpopular 2023 pension reform, the redistribution of wealth, investment in public services and the recognition of the Palestinian state.

“Our people have clearly avoided the worst-case scenario. Tonight, the Rassemblement National is far from having the absolute majority that the experts predicted just a week ago,” declared an exultant Jean-Luc Mélenchon, minutes after the publication of the first exit polls at 8pm. “The lessons of this election are unequivocal: the defeat of the President of the Republic and his coalition is clearly confirmed,” continued the founder of France Insoumise, the largest party in the NFP. “The president must bow down and admit his defeat without trying to avoid it in any way.”

The largest party or coalition in the National Assembly usually has the first chance to form a government. However, Sunday’s vote resulted in a hung parliament, with a three-party political field divided between the NFP, Macron’s centrist bloc and a right-wing pole dominated by Le Pen. These results point to a period of intense parliamentary instability that will be extremely difficult to navigate politically, especially for the ruling coalition.

According to the final results, the New Popular Front will have 182 seats in the new lower house. In second place, the Macronists won 168 seats, followed by Le Pen's National Rally, allied with a splinter minority of centre-right Republicans, with 143 seats. The NFP's success follows the 2002 legislative election, when 142 deputies were elected under the New Popular Ecological and Social Union (NUPES). For its part, the Rassemblement National recorded a significant increase in its seats in parliament, compared with 88 in the outgoing legislature.

Macron’s centrist coalition, Ensemble, has lost almost eighty seats, though it has avoided a total electoral defeat. The pivotal party of the last National Assembly, which sustained Macron’s minority government for the past two turbulent years — allied to the majority centre-right Républicains faction, opposed to party leader Éric Ciotti’s alliance with Le Pen — was able to hold on to forty-five seats, short of the sixty-one deputies elected in 2022.

Republican Front

The left-wing alliance was essential in preventing what had been billed for weeks as an imminent Le Pen victory. Across the country, left-wing voters and progressives greeted the result with a huge sigh of relief, if not outright jubilation. Car horns celebrating the left-wing victory could be heard throughout the French capital well into the evening, with huge crowds gathering on Paris’s Place de la République to cheer on the Nouveau Front Populaire and chant anti-fascist songs and slogans.​

“France is not and will never be a skin colour: all skin colours are French,” France Insoumise leader Mathilde Panot told thousands of supporters gathered outside the roundabout near the Villette canal in Paris’s 19th arrondissement. It was a stark contrast to the mood among supporters and cadres of Rassemblement National, which held its vigil a few miles away in a pavilion in the leafy Bois de Vincennes park, east of the city centre. Speaking to reporters, Marine Le Pen said the election results meant a year of parliamentary chaos that would only strengthen the far right.

“I have too much experience to be upset,” Le Pen said, with her supporters chanting “Marine présidente ” in the background. “We will lose another year: another year of uncontrolled immigration; another year of loss of purchasing power; another year of explosion of insecurity.” The National Assembly cannot be dissolved until June 2025.

For much of the past month, the dominant narrative of this election placed the far right at the apex of national power. Almost all opinion polls and seat projections pointed to the National Rally and its allies winning a strong place in Parliament, if not an outright majority. On 9 June, Macron’s dissolution of the National Assembly came shortly after the far right won first place in the European Parliament elections. Its strength was confirmed in the first round of the early legislative elections on 30 June, when Le Pen’s party won more than 33% of the vote, five and thirteen points ahead of the NFP and Macronist blocs respectively.

On Sunday evening, the official president of the National Rally and presumptive candidate for prime minister, Jordan Bardella, blamed the peculiarities of the French two-round voting system. Bardella lashed out at a second round of voting biased by “unnatural political alliances designed by any means to prevent the French from freely choosing a political alternative.”

A critical ingredient in blocking a far-right victory was the resurgence of the so-called “republican front,” with the NFP and the Macronist centre withdrawing more than two hundred competing candidates ahead of the July 7 runoff. Although it is again in third place in the seat count among the three blocs, Rassemblement National came out on top in the popular vote totals in the second round, with more than ten million people across France casting their ballot—something to be expected given that Le Pen’s party fielded the largest number of candidates in the second round. The NFP won more than 7 million votes in the second round, closely followed by the Macronist bloc with some 6.3 million. July 7 again saw a significant increase in voter turnout, reaching its highest level for a legislative election since 1997.

Balance of power

The balance of power in the incoming parliament is a difficult one for the Nouveau Front Populaire. An absolute majority in the National Assembly requires 289 seats, meaning the chamber remains heavily tilted in favour of the right. While NFP leaders maintain that some points of their programme, such as raising the minimum wage and freezing prices for basic goods, could be enacted by government decree, other elements would need to obtain a majority in parliament. The Senate, meanwhile, is dominated by centre-right Republicans.​

Barring another surprise move by Macron, the NFP will have to come up with a prime minister who can defend the alliance’s programme while avoiding the near-constant risk of a vote of no confidence from the combined opposition forces to its right. Socialist Party leader Olivier Faure said in his victory speech on Sunday that “our only compass will be the programme of the NFP,” before calling on the Macronist centre to “acknowledge defeat and not combine votes with the far right to prevent the NFP from governing.”

If France Insoumise remains the leading force in the alliance and can point to the electoral success of a "breakaway" programme, the centre of gravity in the NFP could shift towards tactical concessions to government. Compared to the outgoing National Assembly, these elections have slightly tilted the balance between France Insoumise and the centre-left Parti Socialiste in favour of the latter. The two parties, the main forces in the alliance, won seventy-seven and fifty-nine seats respectively.

Several France Insoumise MPs dismissed in June — in a purge of figures working for a new left-wing alliance beyond Mélenchon’s influence — won re-election as dissidents against the party’s official candidates. Re-elected on Sunday in a tight race in the Somme, François Ruffin left France Insoumise late last week, consummating his growing break with the Mélenchonist force. Last week, Ruffin laid out his three conditions for a national unity government that would include the left: the repeal of Macron’s pension reform, the reinstatement of the wealth tax and a constitutional reform to facilitate referendums.

For his part, Macron appears willing to bide his time and look for any opportunity to split the left-wing alliance. On Monday morning, he rejected “for the moment” Prime Minister Gabriel Attal’s offer to resign, and figures in the presidential coalition predicted that negotiations and manoeuvring to form a government could last several weeks. Having shocked the country with his dissolution of the National Assembly, the president is no doubt looking to see if he has any other aces up his sleeve.

 
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Eltitoguay

Well-known member
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Macron refuses to name a New Popular Front government, now what?​

New Popular Front candidate for prime minister Lucie Castets speaks to the media after her meeting with Macron on August 23.
New Popular Front candidate for prime minister, Lucie Castets, speaks to the media after her meeting with Macron on August 23.

Beloved Blacksmith
August 27, 2024 9:55 p.m.Updated on 08/28/2024 05:30h

More than 50 days after the legislative elections, France still has a caretaker government and prime minister. After the After the Olympic Games truce , Emmanuel Macron launched a first round of consultations with the leaders of the main political parties on Friday, after which the head of state announced that he had rejected the proposal to appoint Lucie Castets, representative of the New Popular Front, the coalition of left-wing parties with the largest number of deputies.

“Institutional stability dictates that this should not be the chosen option,” the Elysée Palace announced in a statement on Monday . A government “based solely on the programme and parties proposed by the alliance with the most deputies, the New Popular Front, would be immediately censured by all the other groups represented in the National Assembly,” the president said.
(More:
Macron calls on parties to form a government amid new tensions within the progressive bloc)

How is the Prime Minister decided in France?​

The appointment of the prime minister is the exclusive prerogative of the head of state and the Constitution does not require a vote of investiture or a vote of confidence in parliament after the appointment. It also does not impose conditions on the president as to who can be appointed, nor does it set a time limit for doing so.

In a country accustomed to absolute majorities in parliament, the fragmentation of the current National Assembly forces a search for new formulas, after Macron unexpectedly called the legislative elections in June. Now, in the absence of large parliamentary majorities, Emmanuel Macron has decided to set a prerequisite for the appointment of a new prime minister: that there be an agreement between several political forces in such a way as to guarantee the ability to withstand a vote of no confidence.

If the motion of censure is activated, the vote of 289 deputies (of the 577 that make up the lower house) would force the government to resign and the president to accept the resignation. In this context, Macron is hiding behind the fact that the rest of the political parties – including his party – have announced that they will vote to censure any government of the New Popular Front (NFP).

In the last legislative elections , the NFP obtained 193 seats, not enough to withstand a potential motion of censure voted by the presidential coalition (166), the right (47) and the extreme right (142). Thus, the head of State is both judge and party in the current process of forming a government: the parliamentary blockade of the NFP, in which his party participates, is the reason he hides behind to prevent the New Popular Front from trying to form an executive.

How do the other parties justify their blockade of the NFP?​

Initially, the presence of France Insoumise (LFI) was the argument used by centre and right-wing parties to deny the NFP the possibility of governing. The possibility of ministers coming from LFI was cited as a red line by various political leaders, including Macron and the still Prime Minister, Gabriel Attal.

But on Sunday, LFI leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon surprised everyone by proposing a NFP government without the presence of conscientious objectors, but with the support of his party. Thus removing the obstacle that Macron and the right had put in place. Mélenchon's announcement caught the party leaders off guard, and they had to change their discourse: the problem was no longer the presence of conscientious objectors, but the programme.
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Gabriel Attal was the first to downplay Mélenchon's "pretensions of openness" and stated that, even without a seat in the government, the rebels would demand "the pure and simple application of their programme, without openness or compromise." A statement that is contradicted by various statements by Lucie Castets, who has proposed seeking parliamentary agreements outside the coalition, also proposing a "more collaborative" working method for the Assembly.

On the other hand, Jordan Bardella and Marine Le Pen confirmed on Monday, after their meeting with Macron, their intention to censure any left-wing government, with or without the presence of LFI. “We will not allow a policy that intends to considerably aggravate immigration, regularize illegal immigrants, suppress the anti-squatter law and other things that the majority

How does Macron hope to resolve the deadlock?​

From the outset, Emmanuel Macron has declared his desire to launch a government that can count on the support of centrist MPs, the right and part of the NFP (excluding France Insoumise). The president has stressed his rejection of central measures in the NFP programme, such as the cancellation of the latest pension reform, which was approved against public opinion and which the progressive coalition could suppress with its votes and those of the far right.

While the right has shown itself in favour of a parliamentary pact for a technical government – excluding being part of such an executive – the coalition of progressive parties remains united and has announced that it will vote against any prime minister other than Lucie Castets .
Only a part of the Socialist Party (PS), hostile to Mélenchon, seems ready to break with the NFP. However, the secretary general of the PS, Olivier Faure, does not belong to this current; in fact, he has been one of the main actors in the union of the left.

Following this strategy, Gabriel Attal – who is also the Prime Minister and head of the Macronist party – has reached out to a part of the progressive forces, assuring them that he is “ready to evolve” in his methods and that he supports “the appointment of a Prime Minister who does not come from [their] ranks”. The names of two Socialists, Bernard Cazeneuve and Karim Bouamrane, are in the running. In recent days, the hypothesis of a technocrat, coming from a large institution and outside of political parties, has also been raised as a possible solution.

For the moment, the President of the Republic has called for a new round of talks with the Socialist Party (PS), the French Communist Party (PCF) and Europe Ecology-The Greens to try to find “ways” of cooperation with the parties in the presidential bloc.
The rebels have not been invited, nor have the National Rally of Marine Le Pen and her ally Eric Ciotti.

What has been the NFP's reaction?​

The Elysée announcement sparked an avalanche of criticism from the parties of the New Popular Front, which refused to attend the second round of consultations and announced that they would only return to the Elysée to “discuss the details of cohabitation”. “We are faced with a President of the Republic who wants to be at the same time President, Prime Minister and head of the party. Institutions cannot function like this,” Lucie Castets complained on Tuesday morning on public radio France Inter.


The LFI deputies, for their part, have announced that they will present a motion to impeach Emmanuel Macron in the National Assembly (although the viability of this option, in the current circumstances, is slim). Several LFI members, as well as the leader of the Communist Party, Fabien Roussel, have called for “a great popular mobilization” for September 7 and have asked “the French people to mobilize, in the streets, in Parliament, in their workplaces, in front of the prefectures and in the offices of the deputies.”

Along the same lines, the leader of the Socialists, Olivier Faure, also announced on France 2 on Tuesday that he would take part in these demonstrations (although part of the PS has distanced itself from the demonstrations). A few days ago, Faure used a quote from Alain Delon's character in the famous film The Leopard on Twitter to summarise Emmanuel Macron's position: "Everything must change so that nothing changes."
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HISTORY

French socialism until the end of the Popular Front​

By Eduardo Montagut | In this article we will present a few brushstrokes that will allow us to approach the history of French socialism until the end of the Popular Front.
Eduardo Montagut
EDUARDO MONTAGUT
MARCH 10, 2014, 17:04

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Léon Blum, leader of the French socialists at a Popular Front rally in 1936.

The experience of the Paris Commune undoubtedly had a clear influence on the entire universe of the French left in the last third of the 19th century.
In 1876 the first Workers' Congress was held in Paris, although it did not lean towards any specific ideological orientation.
In 1879 Guesde created the French Workers' Party, although divisions soon arose between leftists and revisionists. Guesde, despite declaring himself a Marxist, had made a very superficial reading of Marx's thought.
On the other hand, there was the branch of Jaurès , a character of much greater intellectual worth than the first. In his project to achieve a socialist society he tried to unite participation in political and parliamentary life in the Third French Republic with strikes, although it is evident that his reformism was more important.

These two great routes would end up joining together in the SFIO, or Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière in 1905.
The new party was clearly a success in the elections in 1914.
The French socialists would end up supporting the country's entry into the war, a few days after Jaurès , an intense pacifist and one of the most faithful defenders of the spirit and letter of the Second International, was assassinated by a nationalist fanatic.
Guesde was Minister of State between 1914 and 1916.

French socialism did not participate in the governments of the 1920s, although it had a decisive influence on French politics through its parliamentary power. Some examples can be cited. In the Cartel des Izquierdes (1924-1926) the socialists supported the radical government of Edouard Herriot , who took a series of secular measures, which provoked the animosity of Catholics and the right. The socialists would support the next Herriot government in parliament in 1932.

In 1920, a very large group left the party at the Tours Congress to form the PCF.

Guesde and Blum refused to be subordinated to the directives of the USSR. To deal with the consequences of the division on the left, the socialists counted on the strength of their leader Léon Blum , in addition to maintaining the majority of local posts, such as mayors.
French socialism reaffirmed its defence of being a class party, maintaining its faith in the revolution, but, as we have seen, it ended up clearly accepting the parliamentary game and gradually took away from the Radical Party its leading role in the defence of secularism, a fundamental issue in interwar France.

The socialists finally came to power thanks to the Popular Front, an initiative of the communists to stop the fascist and reactionary temptation in France.
On February 6, 1934, French democracy was seriously threatened by a strong fascist mobilization, which, taking advantage of the economic crisis, tried to take power in an assault that, with differences, could be reminiscent of that of Italian fascism.
But the mobilization of the democratic parties and the strength of the political and trade union left stopped this initiative dead in its tracks.

This climate was favorable for understanding between communists, socialists and radicals.

In June 1934, Thorez from the Communist Party launched a call for unity of the left. At the end of the following month, the socialists and communists signed the union pact and the Popular Front was born.

The first electoral test was posed in the municipal elections of May 1935, with not only the two parties of the Popular Front running together but also the radicals. The left rose in the cities, although the countryside remained in the hands of the right.
The relative electoral success encouraged the radicals to formalize their entry into the Popular Front: the liberal left made a pact with the working class.

The three forces of the left drew up a common programme, which was published in January 1936.
It was not a programme of deep structural reforms, except for the nationalisation of the arms industry and the change in the legal status of the Bank of France. The main objectives were more short-term: the creation of a fund for war pensions, the creation of a scale to regulate taxes according to income and the fight against tax fraud, without forgetting changes in labour legislation. We must bear in mind that each party had its own ideas and objectives. The socialists did want important structural changes, while the communists were more concerned about the party not stagnating and growing. The radicals, on the other hand, only wanted changes that were part of their more liberal ideology. In reality, the only thing they agreed on was their firm opposition to the aggressions of fascism from outside and inside.

The Popular Front won the elections in the spring of 1936, and the rise of the socialists and communists was notable, in contrast to the clear decline of the radicals.
The socialist Léon Blum became president of a cabinet made up of radicals; the communists did not enter the executive, supporting him in parliament.
A very notable aspect of the political change was the entry of women into the government.
Blum tried to contain the crisis with a package of measures inspired by the New Deal, with the aim of increasing the purchasing power of workers. We must bear in mind that, as soon as the Popular Front won, the French workers' movement launched a series of strikes with factory occupations, in an ambivalent feeling of euphoria at the victory and fear that their demands would not be met. In the end, on June 7, the Matignon Agreements were signed , in which employers and unions agreed on a significant wage increase.

The government passed labor legislation that established a forty-hour week, collective agreements, and paid vacations of twelve days per year of seniority.
The Wheat Office was created to benefit peasants, with annual price fixing and crop reductions. It nationalized the arms industry, promoting it by approving rearmament and railroad construction.
A public works policy was launched.

In relation to internal fascism, the government dissolved the fascist leagues: Jeunesses Patriotes, Solidarité Française , Francistes and the Croix de Feu .

Despite the agreements, the right, the businessmen and part of the middle classes ended up opposing the Popular Front government. The economic crisis was not resolved. The franc was devalued and capital flight increased. Blum resigned. Chautemps was tasked with forming a new government, but the economic problems continued to be unresolved. At the end of 1937 a new government crisis broke out when the communists and radicals broke away definitively; Chautemps had to resign in 1938.

One of the most controversial points of the Popular Front of France government's management had to do with the Spanish Civil War.
Although the French left was, logically, inclined to the cause of the Spanish Popular Front and the Second Spanish Republic, diplomatic interests prevailed in relation to pressures from the United Kingdom and the complex relations with the fascist powers, ending up not getting involved in supporting the efforts of the cause of the Spanish Republic.

 
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DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP

ALGERIA in an awkward and dangerous situation​

By Jesus A. Nunez Villaverde.
Published on 11 Sep 2024.

: Algerian flag flying in front of the Algerian embassy in Dongzhimen, Beijing. Algeria

Flag of Algeria flying in front of the Algerian embassy in Dongzhimen, Beijing.

The fact that the campaign managers of the only three candidates allowed by the National Independent Election Authority (ANIE) to participate in the presidential elections held in Algeria on the 7th have signed a joint statement, in which they maintain that “the figures announced by ANIE contradict the content of the minutes delivered by the polling stations” gives a clear idea of the botched job.

It was already taken for granted, without a shadow of a doubt, that Abdelmadjid Tebboune would win again, with no chance for either Youcef Aouchiche of the Front of Socialist Forces
or Adelali Hassani Cherif of the Movement of the Society for Peace.

The only unknown to be cleared up was how many of the 23.5 million potential voters (out of a total population of 46.7 million) would go to the polls this time. And even then, those charged with masking the population's weariness with a political game that is becoming less and less attractive to them have not been able to succeed in their task.
The Algerian regime, as if there had never been a Hirak movement (2019-2021) that, within the framework of the so-called "Arab Spring", shook the country with a democratic aim, seems determined to go back in time.
Still waiting to know the final results , and with the official figure of 39% participation in 2019 as a reference (a historic record of abstention), the ANIE already announced on the same night of the election that the participation had been 48%. A figure that, in the absence of real competition between candidates, was intended to show that at least Tebboune had managed to reverse the trend of a population increasingly disappointed with a political class determined to maintain a status quo alien to its interests and needs. A figure that clashes with the fact that three hours before the polls closed, the same ANIE spoke of 26%. A figure that, the next day, when it announced that Tebboune had obtained 95.65% of the votes (58% in 2019), with 5,329,253 ballots in his favour out of a total of 5,630,196 cast, was now 23%. It is not surprising that the socialist candidate claims that what happened puts the country “in an uncomfortable and dangerous situation.”

The Algerian regime, as if there had never been a Hirak movement (2019-2021) that, within the framework of the so-called “Arab Spring”, shook the country with a democratic aim, seems determined to go back in time. Everything seems to indicate that it seeks to reproduce a status quo like the one managed for decades by the National Liberation Front (FLN), as a single party,
focused on the idea of stability at all costs and with the military as supreme guardians.
Along these lines, Tebboune has dedicated himself to consolidating his personal power, supported both by the FLN (although he has officially presented himself as an independent in the elections) and by the powerful Armed and Security Forces, with the addition of a dozen political forces that have progressively accommodated themselves to his dictates, from the Islamist group El Bina al Watani, to the liberals of the National Rally for Democracy (RND) and the Moustakbal Front.
Meanwhile, the Hirak movement has been fading away, especially since the pandemic.

In short, in these five years there has been a clear deterioration of the political scene – as was evident in the public letter signed by the main representatives of 11 political forces on July 23rd. And the situation is no better in the economic field. Its timid reforms – partially opening the door to foreign investors, who are not attracted by the conditions imposed by the regime – have not prevented that, in a country where more than 44% of its population is under 25 years old, the youth unemployment rate exceeds 31%, inflation is above 9% (it was 2% in 2019) and foreign exchange reserves have fallen to 67 billion dollars (when in 2013 they reached 192 billion).

And although the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with the resulting increase in oil and gas prices, gave Algeria a respite from the pressure of citizens over the widespread lack of well-being and the dissatisfaction of their basic needs, that period is now over. Indeed, for a country where income from the sale of hydrocarbons accounts for around 20% of GDP and 40% of public revenues, the current fall in international prices is already being felt on the streets, with a visible reduction in imports and a growing lack of certain consumer products available to Algerians.

Tebboune has not achieved any better results on the international scene, despite his greater activism, beyond having felt courted as a necessary supplier by several European countries determined to reduce their energy dependence on Moscow. On the one hand, neighbourly tensions with Morocco continue to increase, and on the other, he has once again entered into a crisis with France, while losing ground to Rabat in the Saharawi dispute.

 
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(This ABC is the Spanish newspaper of right-wing, Christian, monarchical ideology)

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Why Socialism Has Failed (So Far) in America :​

MANUEL TRILLO; 09/03/2020

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Although there was a somewhat successful American Socialist Party in the 20th century, historian Aurora Bosch explains that the dominance of the major parties and the identification of that ideology as "anti-American" prevented its consolidation.​

The current candidate of the Socialist Party of the USA, Howie Hawkins, assures ABC that, although Bernie Sanders is not in his opinion a socialist in the traditional sense, he has contributed to opening a new debate.​


In recent weeks, the United States has witnessed the unusual event that a politician who defines himself as a "socialist", Bernie Sanders , is positioning himself as a serious contender to challenge Donald Trump for the White House.

Unlike in Europe, where it is part of the political landscape, this term traditionally arouses suspicion in a large part of the population.
However, it is not alien to American history and there was once a much more important workers' movement than one might think today. And even a relatively successful socialist party emerged.

Despite the prevailing two-party system, the United States has not always been divided between Democrats and Republicans; the reality is much richer. In the first decades of the young nation that emerged from the War of Independence against the British (1775-1783), the struggle for power was between the so-called Federalist Party of Alexander Hamilton , which advocated strong central institutions, and the Democratic-Republican Party of Thomas Jefferson , which defended states' rights.

The latter would eventually give rise to the current Democratic Party in 1826, which for a long time embodied the conservative ideology and had its stronghold in the southern states. Opposing it was the Whig Party, from which in turn the Republican Party would emerge in 1854, championing the abolition of slavery and with President Abraham Lincoln as its emblematic figure.

«Mass parties were very early – Aurora Bosch , professor of Contemporary History at the University of Valencia, explains to ABC – and as such they expanded their membership as the vote spread and they had an organization and political action aimed at capturing the vote of the new majorities. They were and are large coalitions, which incorporate different fractions within themselves.»
"These early mass parties were those that managed a very weak federal state and gave it a national sense," explains Aurora Bosch.
«In the case of the Democratic Party, as early as 1826 it was able to incorporate the demands of the first workers' parties in the main cities of the east» and «at the same time it represented the interests of the Irish immigrants in New York, of the planters in the south, of the family farmers in the west...», highlights Bosch, author of «A History of the United States 1776-1945)» (Crítica, 2005). In addition, she explains, «these early mass parties were those that managed a very weak federal state and gave it a national sense», which is why «they were called constituent parties».

Following the Civil War (1861-1865), industrialization, economic development and population explosion spread throughout the country on the back of capitalism and the free market. It was the "golden age" of large corporations and multimillionaire magnates such as John D. Rockefeller , Andrew Carnegie or JP Morgan . But it was also the time of the migratory avalanche and social conflicts.

As early as the 1860s, a wave of beatings, assaults and murders broke out in the coal mines of Pennsylvania, blamed on the so-called Molly Maguires , a secret society of immigrants of Irish origin who felt discriminated against compared to the natives. In trials of dubious fairness, the culprits were convicted and ten of them executed in 1877, which marked the end of the organization.

But that same year a major railway strike called for wage cuts was supported by 100,000 workers and paralysed much of the country's freight traffic. Seen by many as the beginning of a communist insurrection , the strike was harshly repressed by federal troops, state militias and private company armies, and resulted in hundreds of deaths.

In 1876, just a century after the Declaration of Independence, the Workers Party of America (WPUS) was formed, the first Marxist party in the world after the German SPD, according to Aurora Bosch in her work on American history.
In the heat of the railroad strike, its activism grew and it renamed itself the Socialist Workers Party (SLP).

The rise of the Knights of Labor​

But the organisation that took greatest advantage of this rise of the labour movement was the noble and sacred Order of the Knights of Labor , which by the 1880s numbered more than 700,000 members – about a tenth of the US workforce. It had “an ideology of working-class republicanism, adapted to the conditions of the 1880s and infused with socialism,” says Professor Bosch. “Although they continued to believe that wage labour was a threat to the republic because it created a series of dependent citizens,” she says in the book, “they were not trying to return to the days of small, independent producers, but to extend democracy to the workplace, as the only way to maintain the republic as a form of government, through the guarantee of workers’ rights and their participation in the profits.”

However, the failure of the Knights' third strike in March 1886 against railroad magnate Jay Gould , which the "Wizard of Wall Street" broke up thanks to detectives from the sinister Pinkerton Agency, marked the beginning of the decline of the Order. Added to this were the events of May 1 of that year in Haymarket Square , Chicago. That day, anarchists were protesting against the killing of four strikers by the police and in the middle of a rally a bomb was thrown at the officers, killing seven of them, among other victims. Fear of communist revolt soared and support for the Knights of Labor plummeted.

In memory of the tragic events at Haymarket, May 1 was established as , which is still celebrated today in much of the world, although, curiously, not in the United States.

In 1886, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) was founded, which embodied a new, more pragmatic and conservative trade unionism of skilled workers, far removed from ideology and political action.
Socialism and revolutionary radicalism began to be perceived as foreign, alien to the American spirit.

However, social tensions did not disappear in the 1890s. During those years, the United States suffered the worst economic crisis in its history until then and in 1894 a national railroad strike was organized, from which the figure of Eugene Debs emerged , called to lead what would become the American Socialist Party , founded in 1901.
This party, which sought to connect with the political tradition emanating from the revolution of 1775, managed to exceed 900,000 votes in 1912, 6% of the total, in the presidential elections. But that was its ceiling, because the majority of citizens continued to turn to traditional parties in search of the answer to their demands. In addition, World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 came, which upset the panorama and unleashed the fear of the " red menace ", which ended up condemning the American Socialist Party.

The Communist Party was formed in 1919 , but it only gained some prominence after the depression of the 1930s. In any case, the conservatism of the AFL and, even more so, the world wars reinforced patriotic and capitalist sentiment, so that neither socialists nor communists managed to take hold as they did in Europe.

According to Aurora Bosch, the failure of the socialists is influenced by "on the one hand the ideological hegemony of liberalism, which is difficult to fight against" in the country, and on the other hand the tendency, "since the appearance of the most massive workers' movement," to "identify socialism as foreignism and therefore consider it anti-American." In her opinion, "this is key, even if there was a socialism like Debs's that linked the American radical political tradition - that is, deeply democratic much more than the Europeans - with the class struggle."

In this regard, Bosch also highlights "the strength of the corporate, judicial, state and federal response against the first attempts at organisation of the labour movement in the 19th century."

The exclusion of the black minority​

He adds that "the most oppressed and poorest sector of the population, the black minority, was generally excluded from this struggle, because of its own oppression in the South, because of the racism of the unions in the North, until the 1930s, when they joined the CIO and the Communist Party's unionism, which was a main objective of action." "But then they were already integrated into the Roosevelt Coalition of the Democratic Party," he notes.

Today, the specialist reflects, "the association of socialism and radicalism in general with anti-Americanism can still be used as it is known subliminally or crudely by the Republican Party campaign and will certainly continue to be effective, in part also because of how Americans see themselves," she notes, referring to "the importance of non-interference by the federal state and the conviction that no one will defend their interests better than themselves, as well as the issue of individual responsibility in a broad sense, including making one's own fate."

However, he does see a change in the perception of the term socialist in American society, as “we are in a new political scenario after the recession.” “We have seen it with the Republican Party and Trump,” he explains. “We saw it in the 2016 campaign with Sanders and we are seeing it in this campaign. Indeed, it seems that for many Democratic voters, after the inequality with which the Great Recession has been resolved, measures characteristic of democratic socialism – even more moderate than those in Europe – do not seem anti-American.”

Howie Hawkins, candidate for the Green Party and the Socialist Party of the USA

Howie Hawkins, candidate for the Green Party and the Socialist Party of the USA.

Howie Hawkins, Socialist Party USA candidate: “Sanders has succeeded in opening up the conversation”:​


The candidate of the minority Socialist Party of the USA - also from the Green Party - claims that Bernie Sanders has succeeded in making people talk about socialism in the USA, something that was previously banned.
According to Howie Hawkins , the senator from Vermont, he campaigns for an "old-fashioned New Deal liberalism", not "a traditional socialist programme of social ownership and the democratic management of the means of production".
However, he acknowledges that he has succeeded in getting people to talk about socialism and that it has benefited his party. Sanders' socialism, he points out, is identified with his successful social programs. "Until Sanders, socialism was an obstacle to conversation. Now it serves to start it," he assures ABC. In this sense, he highlights that "millions of Americans talk about what democratic socialism means, it has opened the debate."

According to him, US business and political elites have historically “denigrated” democratic socialists, most notably in their repression of the Red Scare after the world wars. “Their propaganda equated them with repressive one-party states,” he notes.

The Socialist Party's platform - inherited from Eugene Debs's 20th-century platform - includes "three life-or-death issues," he notes: an eco-socialist green new deal to avoid climate catastrophe, a bill with job guarantees, incomes above the poverty line, affordable housing, healthcare for all, free education, retirement, and nuclear disarmament.
As for regimes like those in Cuba or Venezuela, he advocates that the US lift sanctions and efforts to change their regime; Their people should decide their government.

(This ABC is the Spanish newspaper of right-wing, Christian, monarchical ideology)
 
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MAY 2020

The American Left after Sanders :​

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The consequences of Bernie Sanders' strong performance in the primaries will not be easily dispelled. To a large extent, he won the "battle of ideas" within the Democratic Party and managed to shift it to the left. A strong debate is now looming over the strategies that the left should adopt and how to intervene in the always complex scenario of the Democratic Party.
Figures such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez embody the generational change.
Patrick Iber ; May 2020.

Since 2015, Bernie Sanders has been the standard-bearer of the left in the United States.
When he announced his candidacy for the presidency, only a few believed that it would be anything more than a protest campaign. Sanders described himself as a “democratic socialist” and called for a “political revolution,” positioning himself far outside the boundaries of traditional American politics. He was not even a formal member of the Democratic Party, although he was running for the presidential nomination for that party. Five years later, in early 2020, he was, for a time, the favorite in the race for the Democratic nomination.
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Sen. Bernie Sanders at a rally at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, on Feb. 18, 2020.

In the 2020 Democratic primaries, the incumbent senator from Vermont performed well in the first three of the four early voting states . All told, he tied in the Iowa caucuses , won the New Hampshire primary, and won again in the Nevada caucuses, where he received strong support from working-class Latino voters. By then, projections had him as the Democratic front-runner. Then, in late February, Joe Biden, Barack Obama’s vice president who is considered a politically moderate Democrat, won South Carolina, the first early state with a significant African-American population. In an instant, many of the remaining candidates dropped out of the race, and on March 3, which is known as “Super Tuesday” because of the number of states holding simultaneous primaries, Biden dominated the scene. Sanders’ path to the nomination faded away.

While he remained in the race, Sanders demonstrated that the electorate for a social democratic agenda in the United States was much larger than most expected, but at the same time not large enough to stage what would have essentially been a takeover of the Democratic Party. Although his age will not allow him to run again, the consequences of his strong showing will not be easily dissipated. Sanders has largely won the “battle of ideas” within the Democratic Party, shifting it substantially to the left. But how American left organizations will seek to move forward in a post-Sanders era remains a matter of heated debate.

The strategy moving forward depends in part on whether you believe Sanders actually had a chance of being elected or, rather, that his chances of winning were illusory. Some Sanders supporters remain bitter that the party establishment favored Hillary Clinton in the 2016 primary, feeling that it tilted the playing field in their favor. In 2020, they again saw the Democratic establishment unify around Biden, who had struggled to generate enthusiasm, rally volunteers and secure donations. “What the establishment wanted was to make sure that people would unite around Biden so they could beat me,” Sanders said . Candidate Pete Buttigieg, for example, who had tied with Sanders in Iowa, dropped out after a phone call with Barack Obama . Amy Klobuchar did the same, and the support of Klobuchar and Buttigieg was essential in boosting Biden against Sanders on Super Tuesday.
Many on the left, skeptical that the Democratic Party is truly a vehicle for progressive change, feel their candidate was simply unacceptable to the party.

From a party perspective, there is little mystery in this. Sanders was not a formal member of the Democratic Party, but chose to remain independent throughout his political career as a senator.
This may have been an advantage in the general election to appeal to voters alienated from the party, but it was certainly not an advantage in the primaries, where most voters, almost by definition, identify as Democrats. In addition to programmatic divergences and hostility from party elites, who feared the implementation of Sanders’s program, there were also ordinary voters who feared that choosing him as the Democratic candidate would prove too risky in a year when the bottom line is defeating Donald Trump. (Polls suggested that both Sanders and Biden could beat Trump with roughly equal odds in the November election, but this did not allay fears that running a “socialist” might not be a smart political move.) Even those who supported much of Sanders’s agenda did not see him as capable of successfully implementing it. Among his most ardent supporters, little attention was sometimes paid to the problems he would have faced if elected, from “investment strikes” to various forms of political obstructionism. In the end, both the Democratic Party establishment and the majority of voters rejected Sanders. He mustered the support of just over 30% of voters, which would have only served to win in a divided arena. Once the competition was reduced to just two candidates, his chances all but disappeared.

There was, perhaps, some chance in February, when another outcome was still possible. Sanders was and remains very popular and seen as genuine, but in taking the lead he had to prove that he could be the candidate not just of the left but of the entire party. Had enthusiasm continued to grow, perhaps the party would have had to accept him. But Sanders continued to rival the Democratic Party itself, making it difficult to imagine that he could unite it after victory. He received little support from African Americans, the group most loyal to the party and some of those who had the most to lose. Culturally, his campaign remained wedded to the left in a way that did not allow it to forge the necessary coalitions.

In my case, for example, I returned to my home state of Iowa to canvass door-to-door for Sanders before the caucus . As part of that campaign work, I attended a rally of more than 3,000 people in Cedar Rapids—a city well known for the smell of oatmeal, due to a factory located just outside. In addition to a speech by Sanders himself, the rally featured a performance by the band Vampire Weekend and prominent figures such as filmmaker Michael Moore and Marxist philosopher, theologian, and African-American human rights activist Cornel West. The crowd was enthusiastic, but I left worried: there were probably more volunteers from other states than people from Iowa. I also noticed the absence of a plan to expand the movement beyond the left (represented by figures like Moore and West, who are highly respected but don’t mean much outside that space) and young people (represented by the many popular bands, like Vampire Weekend, who played for free at the Sanders campaign). The next day, speaking to voters door-to-door, I met many who had supported Sanders in 2016 but now thought Elizabeth Warren or Buttigieg were a better choice.

Sanders needed to broaden his appeal beyond those who identified with “socialism.”
But it wasn’t simply a matter of convincing people of the candidate’s merits: it was a matter of persuading skeptics that they had a place in his campaign and that his strategy of change would pay off. Sanders claimed that he was the only one who could bring young people and disillusioned abstentionists to the polls. But those groups did not mobilize in early voting states in a way that would fundamentally change the race. At the same time, relations soured between different groups of voters. Warren, the second-most progressive candidate in the primaries, gathered around her a loyal group of supporters represented by highly educated progressive professionals. Warren’s campaign gained considerable momentum in late 2019, when Sanders was still recovering from a heart attack. As she topped the polls for the first time, many pro-Sanders outlets, such as Jacobin magazine , launched attacks on Warren, eroding relations among her supporters. The kind of online behavior of some Sanders supporters was seen as rude , which may have deterred some from joining the campaign. Fundamentally, the identity of the left has been built around the shortcomings of “liberalism”—in its American sense, where it is more or less synonymous with progressivism—making it difficult to imagine how to forge the necessary coalition with the more moderate wings of the Democratic Party.
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Sanders at a campaign rally in Michigan.

There were voices within Sanders’s campaign urging him to find ways to expand beyond his traditional base, but the candidate was finding it difficult to change the message that had taken him this far and that he had been advocating with great consistency since the 1960s. I saw some of this firsthand. During the primaries, I served as a campaign consultant, part of the foreign policy advisory team. (In my day-to-day life, I teach U.S. and Latin American history at the University of Wisconsin.) I had no direct contact with Sanders, no access to behind-the-scenes discussion or debate. But I was available to help craft messages and proposals in an area where Sanders had to tread carefully. He comes from the anti-imperialist tradition of the American left, and his critics have been eager to link him to Venezuelan “socialism.” Overall, I think he handled the campaign well, making clear that he had no interest in defending authoritarian governments, while emphasizing the need to establish a relationship with Latin American countries based on equality and nonintervention and criticizing the way the Trump administration's bluster helped entrench hard-line figures in the region.

But when Sanders began to lead in the polls, he inevitably faced increased scrutiny. One interviewer released a tape of Sanders from the 1980s in which he explained that Cubans had not rebelled against Fidel Castro during the U.S.-sponsored operation to overthrow him at the Bahía Cochinos (Bay of Pigs), saying that “he educated the children, he gave them health care, he completely transformed society.”
All of that is fairly accurate. When presented with the clip, Sanders responded, “We are totally opposed to the authoritarian nature of Cuba, but it would be unfair to say that it’s all wrong.” Again, nothing false: but it seemed to many people (and headline editors) that Sanders was praising Fidel Castro. This raised questions about both his views and his chances of being elected. What kind of socialist is he? Liberal journalist Chris Matthews practically had a nervous breakdown on live television, pontificating: “I think if Castro and the communists had won the Cold War there would have been executions in Central Park and I might have been one of those executed. And there would have been people celebrating.” Matthews, who certainly had no such doubts , said he was not sure whether Sanders’ vision of “socialism” resembled that of Cuba or Denmark. At the very least, this controversy was perceived as a major liability in Florida, an important state in the general election. In a state with many anti-Castro Cuban opinion-mongers (not to mention Venezuelan and Nicaraguan migrants, etc.), these statements constituted proof that Sanders either did not recognize the essentially repressive nature of Castro’s government, or that he was caught up in revolutionary nostalgia.

I spent a few feverish days trying to provide Sanders with a set of ideas on how to approach the issue. In my view, he should avoid talking about Castro, use questions about these remarks as an opportunity to make his ideas about socialism clearer while explaining that people did not have to identify as “socialists” to support his campaign. He could highlight his long and well-documented defense of civil liberties in the United States. He could emphasize the setback that Trump’s policies represented regarding the Obama administration’s diplomatic opening toward Cuba and how this served to reinforce the most repressive wing of the Cuban government.

As a candidate, Obama also faced accusations—many of them racially charged—of being out of touch with mainstream American politics. In 2008, a video of his church pastor, Jeremiah Wright, saying “God damn America” surfaced, and Obama responded with a moving, nuanced speech about the complexities of race in the country that distanced him from his pastor and displayed great political skill. This calmed fears about Obama’s “unelectability” and showed that he knew how to navigate the obstacles put in his way. I thought the Cuba issue would give Sanders a similar opportunity that we could take advantage of. But in a debate a couple of days later, he basically reiterated his previous position, circling around criticizing American interventionism in Latin America. Again, everything he said was true, and even morally correct, but it fed into a broader perception, I think, that he didn’t have the skill he would need in the months ahead. Among other things, this made him an “unacceptable” candidate in the general election, leading voters and the party to their verdict on Super Tuesday.

In 2016, Sanders stayed in the primary race even when it was clear he had no chance of winning, seeking to maintain his influence on the party platform. This year, he made a different choice. The spread of the coronavirus and the various forms of lockdowns and social distancing put in place to combat it made voting dangerous. (Still, in Wisconsin, where I currently live, the Republican legislature and judges rejected the Democratic governor’s attempts to delay the election until it could be held safely.) Because of the staggered primary voting schedule, many states still had elections pending. Rather than put people at risk, Sanders dropped out of the race and decided to throw his support behind Biden.

Although Sanders and Biden have been personal friends for some time, Biden does not have much credibility on the left. He has a reputation as a mainstream Democrat. But he has come to realize that the support and enthusiasm Sanders generated has become a significant part of the party, and he must adapt to this new context. Against the backdrop of multiple crises, including the federal government’s catastrophic response to the Covid-19 pandemic and the potentially destructive effects of climate change, many young voters fear that Biden does not share their sense of urgency. But unlike Clinton in 2016, Biden has invited members of Sanders’ campaign staff to join his team . Biden has also tried to incorporate some of Sanders’ and Warren’s policy proposals, hoping to generate some enthusiasm among Sanders’ youthful base . In May, Biden and Sanders jointly announced the formation of unified task forces to develop the party’s policy platform , with three out of eight members chosen by Sanders.

During the pre-campaign, Biden struggled to attract large, enthusiastic crowds. But with the coronavirus making large campaign events impossible, mass gatherings are likely to be less relevant to the November results. In my hometown of Madison, I have yet to see a lawn sign supporting Biden, but I did see a few in support of “Any Able-Bodied Adult 2020.” Current polls suggest that lying low and not being Trump should already be a winning strategy, though the 2016 result warns against overconfidence.

Organizations on the left, meanwhile, are divided.
The Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) has refused to endorse Biden. Critics say this decision will doom DSA to irrelevance in the years to come (although it is unclear whether Biden would have wanted or benefited from DSA’s endorsement).
Some socialists see Sanders’s defeat as a sign of the limits of such electoral strategies within the Democratic Party and have pinned their hopes on a third party. However, beyond a few prominent commentators, the vast majority of Sanders’ supporters will vote for Biden in November. The mixed response on the left in some ways shows that the “cult of Bernie” imagined by some critics was no such thing: his supporters are thinking for themselves and not even necessarily following the lead of Sanders, who has been clear on the importance of electing Biden. But whatever they do, members and organizations on the left will have to look to the future.

Sanders has brought many leading lights of the American left into positions in the political world that were unthinkable a few years ago.
Among them, perhaps, is his likely successor as the symbolic leader of the American left: Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.
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Unlike Sanders, Ocasio-Cortez is not ambiguous about her place in the Democratic Party, although she said in January that “in any other country, Joe Biden and I would not be in the same party, but in America we are.”
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It is a statement that sums up the challenge that the American left will always face: without constitutional reforms or changes to the electoral system, it will have to participate in a party that is not a left-wing party. Still, there are those who are hopeful. In May, it was announced that Ocasio-Cortez will serve on the special advisory body on climate change. And, looking to the future, she possesses formidable political talent. “The way she expresses herself seeks to create a majority on terms that Bernie is not interested in,” said Max Berger, a progressive member of Warren’s team. “If Bernie is Moses, then Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez is Joshua.”
In this case, perhaps someone less burdened by the legacy of the past will be able to carry the flag of the future.
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Eltitoguay

Well-known member
I wonder what colorful fabrications the nationalists and racists fabricate in SE Asia when they want to cast doubt on the wholesomeness of immigrants, where eating dogs and/or felines(?) is more normal?
"They ate my kids", maybe?
This could lead to a contest of one-ups-manship among such types.
Not related to emigration and its demonization, but to hunger:

My mother's family (and most of her surroundings) had to eat stray cats, in their own country in Western Europe, for several decades. They told children like my mother that it was a rabbit... They also took advantage of the potato peelings that other wealthier families discarded, as a substitute for the potato itself...

And the above (and really worse and more degrading things) with my grandfather having a job as a miner, and my grandmother and the two oldest children working as seasonal workers in agriculture. (During vendimia, the grape harvest, for example, they were paid with the grapes in the worst condition, and bread. And they ate that for days and weeks... Our own "grapes of wrath", I guess).

...Excuse the offtopic, cos I know that it does not have a strict relationship with the comments of the US electoral campaign (or maybe it does?)...(By the way, all this under a political and economic regime very much to Trump's taste: not in vain does he finance and share his "circle of advisors-ideologists" with the political heirs and nostalgics of that regime.)



Postscript: This musical film (very famouse in Spain) was recorded in the same real mine where my grandfather worked (his colleagues are extras), in one of the regime's campaigns to soften, before international public opinion, the harsh working conditions and the regime's criminal repression against the miners , whom he even locked underground without supplies for days, to eliminate their protests and strike attempts.
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The attempt to disguise, sweeten and deny the reality in the mines of the time is so crude and childish that it achieves just the opposite effect: if in a musical film it tries to falsify and idealize life in the mine, it already shows subhuman conditions. ..what will be the reality? : The reality included that the miners were locked underground for days, without water and food, in the face of protests or threats of strike.
So, contrary to what was officially intended, the song "Soy minero" by A. Molina from the film became an anthem of resistance among the miners.
The final images in last song, showing the structure of the forklift that went down to the mine are still recognizable today. For the film, the shanty town that surrounded the mine during film's times, and where its poorest workers lived, was eliminated.

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("My illnesses have no cure")
The "voice of the narrator" takes the opportunity to criticize the struggles of the British miners, contrasting it with the "peace, joy and love of work" that reigns in the mines of the Regime.

("In a small new jug")
If, despite being a total sweetening of mining life, it is clear that the best attitude in the face of a collapse is...singing with joy: imagine the real conditions... Only the large representation of the mine owners wears helmets.

("I'm a miner")
In a previous shot, the representative of the mine owners tells the miners: "You have finished your day: now you can go up to the surface; and better, if it is singing happily"...


And after working all day in the mine, plus the sporadic work of my grandmother, mother and uncle, my family could not buy any type of meat.
 
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Eltitoguay

Well-known member
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© La Felguera Editores, 2019.
AGENTE PROVOCADOR es un magazine realizado por La Felguera Editores.


The Southern Flag Next to the Black Fist: When Hillbillies and Rednecks Allied with the Black Panthers

(Part 1 of 2)
Servando Rocha

They looked like hillbillies and revolutionary rednecks, they dreamed of a utopian community called Hank Williams Village and achieved what seemed impossible: making the southern flag wave alongside the black fist.

“There was a time when I thought that only blacks were colonized ,” Huey P. Newton said in 1969, already installed as leader of the Black Panthers. He was referring to the idea that he had planned since the creation of the Party a few years earlier, and that stated that blacks should fight exclusively alongside their own people . Perhaps the government’s parapolice extermination policy, which had put a price on their heads, dynamited their headquarters and shot these very people, had a heavy influence. It seemed like an open war, and perhaps it was. They were armed, but they knew that a face-to-face fight would mean an uncertain and lost war. In 1969, in the midst of a climate of armed uprising, a step forward was taken in joining with other organizations, with the ultimate goal of creating an Anti-Fascist Front, a National Revolutionary Alliance that would confront white power. It was the metamorphosis of Newton and his people. It was said that fascism ruled Amerikkka . When Newton said “colonized,” he really meant “exploited,” gradually bringing the sometimes confusing and equivocal rhetoric of the Panthers, typically between Marxism and Maoism, into the mix. The consequences of this discourse became increasingly clear. At every step they took, the Panthers encountered more and more exploited, white and Latino revolutionary groups, people crying out for unity.
Rainbow Coalition. Young Patriots alongside black and Puerto Rican activists

RAINBOW COALITION. YOUNG PATRIOTS ALONGSIDE BLACK AND PUERTO RICAN ACTIVISTS

The Panthers
' collaborations with other groups outside of black power began initially with the American Communist Party , in which Angela Davis was a member. However, after several meetings and encounters, clashes arose between the two. Bobby Seale, another of their leaders, did not hesitate to describe as a "dirty fascist tactic" the claim, as did part of the press and the police, that they were directed by official communism. SDS, the leftist students from which the Weathermen would emerge, the first white armed group of Marxist-Leninist ideology, were described as "petty bourgeois," the same as the angry ones who in a few months would take up arms, who were seen as almost suicidal, representatives of a suicidal style à la General Custer that they rejected and had seen so many times. However, the groups with which they would work most closely would be others: the Young Lords , who emerged from Puerto Rican gangs and the ghettos; the Red Guard , made up of pro-Chinese from San Francisco and, above all, a "strange" group that emerged in Chicago, perhaps less known than the rest, which responded to the name of Young Patriots. They had all the appearance of hillbillies and revolutionary rednecks. Greasers who loved guns and could tell stories of fathers and mothers quick with their rifles, of cabins lost in the middle of the mountains, of the almost ancestral distrust of the government itself that would delight Jim Goad, author of the Redneck Manifesto , or the country punk singer Hank Williams III. They listened to country music, loved motorcycles and guns, dressed impeccably and achieved what seemed impossible: placing the southern flag next to the militant black fist .

Members of the Black Panthers alongside other members of the Young Patriots. In the background, their respective symbols

MEMBERS OF THE BLACK PANTHERS ALONGSIDE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE YOUNG PATRIOTS. IN THE BACKGROUND,
THEIR RESPECTIVE SYMBOLS

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Militants of the Young Patriots

MILITANTS OF THE YOUNG PATRIOTS

Blacks, Puerto Ricans and revolutionary hillbillies from the Rainbow Coalition at a press conference

BLACKS, PUERTO RICANS AND REVOLUTIONARY HILLBILLIES FROM THE RAINBOW COALITION AT A PRESS CONFERENCE

The Southern flag and the crossed black and white arms, symbol of the alliance between the Young Patriots and the Black Panthers

THE SOUTHERN FLAG AND THE CROSSED BLACK AND WHITE ARMS, SYMBOL OF THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE YOUNG PATRIOTS AND THE BLACK PANTHERS

Poster published by JOIN, predecessor of the Young Patriots

POSTER PUBLISHED BY JOIN, PREDECESSOR OF THE YOUNG PATRIOTS

Greasers members of JOIN during a protest

GREASERS MEMBERS OF JOIN DURING A PROTEST

Young Patriots

YOUNG PATRIOTS
(continue)
 

Eltitoguay

Well-known member

The Southern Flag Next to the Black Fist: When Hillbillies and Rednecks Allied with the Black Panthers

(Part 2 and End)
Servando Rocha

« The integration of the Southern flag into his revolutionary discourse was a natural thing and was subsequently accepted without problems by black militants»​


They were young Southern émigrés, mostly from Appalachia, who had ended up in Chicago. Shortly thereafter, in 1968, they had already formed their group, partly in imitation of the Black Panthers themselves, but also based on their own legacy: years earlier, they had demonstrated in the city under the acronym JOIN . The Confederate flag had always been flown in the poor neighborhoods of the city where they lived . The future members of the Young Patriots did not see it as a racist symbol, but simply a reminder of where they came from. The integration of the Southern flag into their revolutionary discourse was a natural thing and was subsequently accepted without problems by the black militants . They cared for the unemployed, men and women living in extreme poverty, who had been repressed by police violence. They formed pickets, set up small soup kitchens for the community. They spoke of responding to police attacks and also of a revolution that seemed imminent. Ultimately, they had found an ideological and tactical bridge with Newton and the black rebels: the issue was not only racial but social. They, like the Panthers , were being exploited and would be so unless the country rose up against the bureaucrats and the bosses, against the real white trash . All this brought them closer to the thriving Illinois section of the Black Panther Party , with whom they began to collaborate actively, opening the Free Health Clinic in September 1969, while Huey P. Newton threatened to go all the way to the White House to tear it down. There was almost no difference between the Panthers and the revolutionary hillbillies, who like the former opened their soup kitchens and self-managed schools . However, they took their references from their own southern culture. So when the city tried to evict the residents of a poor Chicago neighborhood, they formed the Uptown Area People's Planning Coalition (UAAP), whose ultimate goal was to build a self-managed, working-class development on the same site, which they called Hank Williams Village, in honor of the country singer they all revered . By then, the group was already very famous and even had its counterpart in an allied motorcycle gang called the Lincoln Park Patriots. The Young Patriots took over the land, squatted on it, and carried out all kinds of activities there. But the redneck utopia did not prosper.

Black Panthers and Young Patriots during a joint rally

BLACK PANTHERS AND YOUNG PATRIOTS DURING A JOINT RALLY

Black, Puerto Rican and redneck activists during a rally

BLACK, PUERTO RICAN AND REDNECK ACTIVISTS DURING A RALLY

Work at Hank Williams Village

WORK AT HANK WILLIAMS VILLAGE

A moment from an assembly on the grounds of the future Hank Williams Village

A MOMENT FROM AN ASSEMBLY ON THE GROUNDS OF THE FUTURE HANK WILLIAMS VILLAGE

The result of the union between the Young Patriots and the Black Panthers, together with the Puerto Ricans, was the Rainbow Coalition (which published the newspaper Rising Up Angry ), but it would have little success:
within a year many of its participants had been killed or imprisoned, like Fred Hampton, Panther leader of the Illinois chapter and colleague of the hillbillies. Others had simply left the country, going into exile.
It was the end of a cycle, its greaser epitaph.

Cover of the first issue of Rising Up Angry (July 1969)

COVER OF THE FIRST ISSUE OF RISING UP ANGRY (JULY 1969)
Various issues of Rising Up Angry, the Rainbow Coalition's newspaper

VARIOUS ISSUES OF RISING UP ANGRY , THE RAINBOW COALITION'S NEWSPAPER

 

Eltitoguay

Well-known member

"I do not curse my fate because I was born a miner
And even though death is looming over me I am not afraid of dying
I am not jealous of money because it fills me with pride
To be the best driller in all of Sierra Morena,
From all over Sierra Morena...
I go down to the mine singing because I know that at the altar
My mother remains praying for the son who is leaving
And when I feel pain
Under the wind my singing...:
...I am a miner
and I tempered my heart with a pick and a drill
I am a miner
and with sugarcane, wine and rum I take away my sorrows
I am a driller because nothing scares me
And I only want the sound of a taranta
Comrade,
give it to the marro to sing while I sing,
To the beat of the marro I want to repeat to the whole world,
I am a miner
I am a driller because nothing scares me
And I only want the sound of a taranta
Comrade,
give it to the marro to sing while I sing,
To the beat of the marro I want to repeat to the whole world,
I am a miner"
 
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Eltitoguay

Well-known member
...Continuing with the musical interlude, and the old left songs that my grandfather liked to listen and to hum secretly...

The Fifth Regiment (Song by Rolando Alarcon):
"On July 18th
In the courtyard of a convent
The people of Madrid and the Communist Party
Founded the FIfth Regiment.
Come on, make a fuss, make a fuss...The machine gun sounds and goes up, and Franco goes for a walk...

With Lister, The Peasant,
With Galán and with Modest,
With Commander Carlos,
There is no militiaman with fear.
Come on, make a fuss, make a fuss
...The machine gun sound and goes up, and Franco goes for a walk...

With the four battalions
That are defending Madrid,
The best of Spain is leaving,
The reddest flower of the people...
Come on, make a fuss, make a fuss
...The machine gun sound and goes up, and Franco goes for a walk...

With the fifth, fifth, fifth
With the Fifth Regiment,
Mother, I'm going to the front,
To the firing lines.
Come on, make a fuss, make a fuss
...The machine gun goes up and Franco goes for a walk..."
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Eltitoguay

Well-known member
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When the Black Panthers, Latino gangs and rednecks united against the police. (Part 1 of 2)​

By Juanjo Villalba
June 10, 2018, 11:45pm
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Late 1960s. In one of the most violent periods in the United States, several seemingly antagonistic groups united in Chicago to fight against a state that oppressed them economically and through the police.
These were the Black Panthers, Latino gangs and southern hillbillies who had emigrated to the north.

That union of the black fist with the southern flag gave rise to Rising Up Angry, an organization that lasted 6 years and, apart from promoting social projects and peace between the gangs, published a newspaper named after them, in which they gave voice to the gang members of Chicago, people united under names as evocative as Egyptian Cobras, Young Comancheros, Black Angels or —and these will sound very familiar to you (in Spain)— The Latin Kings.

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MEMBERS OF THE CHICAGO LATIN KINGS IN THE MID-1970S.

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THE SOUTHERN FLAG NEXT TO THE EMBLEM OF THE BLACK PANTHERS DURING A JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE BETWEEN PANTHERS AND PATRIOTS.

The publishing house La Felguera has just published Sucios, grasientos, rebeldes. Una Revolución Greaser , a book which, apart from explaining the origin and the entire process of creation of this movement, compiles articles and covers from Rising Up Angry , the publication thanks to which we can have a first-hand account of what one of the most unexpected anti-system movements in history was like.
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To find out a little more about this story, we decided to speak with Servando Rocha, the book's editor and author of its prologue.

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FELIPE LUCIANO (SHOWING A MAN THE YOUNG LORDS PARTY'S 'PALANTE' NEWSPAPER), WITH TWO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION IN NEWARK (1970). IMAGE FROM LIBERATION NEWS.

VICE: In the book you say that this story is almost a secret. Of course it has been here in Spain until now, but is it also in the United States?
Servando Rocha:
Yes, in fact the history and role of the revolutionary greasers , from the Rising Up Angry newspaper in Chicago, is very little known. It began to be known after the first book published about them, Hillbilly Nationalists, Urban Race Rebels, and Black Power: Community Organizing in Radical Times , by Ammy Sonnie and James Tracy. The reason is difficult. In the United States, despite the great phenomena and organizations, they have been rediscovering their own history in a process that has taken time. Also due to current issues.

The experience we describe in our book, with the selection of texts from the incredible newspaper Rising Up Angry , has sparked a lot of interest in the US because it shows the unusual role of greasers and hillbillies from the South in the construction of cities like Chicago. The union between two symbols that were initially antagonistic, the Confederate flag and the black fist, was largely unknown, but that is how it was. This implies a redefinition of politics itself that, at times, goes beyond the predictable. All orthodox discourse is doomed to be a lie. We look for easy solutions, but the history of activist groups is sometimes not peaceful.


How do you get to it?
When we discovered current and very controversial groups like Redneck Revolt , who claim the history of groups like the Young Patriots, who are the germ of Rising Up Angry, or of newspapers like Rising Up Angry . We were surprised to see groups heavily armed with AR-15 semi-automatic rifles, mostly made up of men, although there were also several women, who showed up in August 2017 at the anti-racist protest in Charlottesville.

Hooded or with their faces covered with scarves and rifles on their shoulders, they stood up to the burly fascist paramilitary groups, KKK gangs and neo-Nazi organisations that had descended on the city. The end was a tragedy. It was horror set in motion, televised, narrated minute by minute. One demonstrator died and there were twenty wounded. Klan newspapers had claimed days before that for them Charlottesville would be the prelude to concentration camps, the dream of a return to totalitarianism: “Next stop: Charlottesville. Final stop: Auschwitz,” they stated in a manifesto.

Alongside the martial image of the far-right protesters, the cameras found other major protagonists. They carried signs that read “Defending our communities” or “Hang your local Klansman,” among others. They all carried southern Confederate flags, called themselves rednecks , hillbillies and white trash and proudly displayed their automatic weapons.
They had recently emerged in Kansas under the name Redneck Revolt, although many of their members belonged to the John Brown Gun Club, a shooting club made up of white working-class leftists. The armed racists had a significant adversary: Fire against fire. Charlottesville was one more point in a series of protests across the country where Redneck Revolt went armed under the slogan Make Racists Afraid Again . We initially published an article about them on the Agent Provocateur website .

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THE ASSEMBLED AND WHEELED 'STONE REVOLUTIONARY GREASE', RISING UP ANGRY.

The moment in which this alliance was formed was really complicated. What was the situation in the United States at that time?
The Black Panthers had changed course in their policy of alliances. In 1969, they decided to create a united front against fascism. They claimed that fascism ruled the country and were convinced that an armed confrontation would break out at any moment. There were shootings and murders every week against black militants, but also against Puerto Ricans. So they decided to create the Rainbow Coalition .

The groups they would work most closely with were others: the Young Lords, who emerged from Puerto Rican gangs and controlled some corners of Chicago; the Red Guard, formed by Maoists from San Francisco; and, above all, a strange group that emerged in Chicago that responded to the name of Young Patriots and was made up of numerous revolutionary hillbillies and rednecks , greasers who loved guns and told stories of fathers and mothers who were quick with the rifle, of cabins lost in the middle of the mountains and the ancestral distrust of the Government.

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GREASERS ON THE KANKAKEE RIVER STATE, ILLINOIS, 1969.

Armed groups have not yet emerged, something that will happen soon with the Black Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Black Panthers, and the Weathermen, who are the main groups. At the same time, the legendary Motherfuckers of New York are leaving the city and heading to New Mexico in search of such action.

This is the year when the 70s explode. From then on, activity is frenetic, but everything also falls apart. Soon the repression becomes very ruthless, cults and sects multiply, and the Manson family murders occur.
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COVER OF 'RISING UP ANGRY', OCTOBER 1969.
(Continue...)
 
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Eltitoguay

Well-known member

When the Black Panthers, Latino gangs and rednecks united against the police. (Part 2 and End))​

By Juanjo Villalba; June 10, 2018.

Why did it all happen in Chicago and not somewhere else? How did such seemingly isolated and heterogeneous groups come together?
The hillbillies settled in Uptown, one of the poorest neighbourhoods, in the late 1950s. They hung their Confederate flags on workshops, bars and factories, but they did so not with a racist connotation, but rather out of class pride. It reminded them of their proletarian origins.

Then JOIN was founded, an organization dedicated to fighting poverty and denouncing urban development plans, in what was already the famous gentrification. When the Black Panthers' self-managed social programs arrived, they became radicalized. There were dozens of gangs, some very dangerous. The city hid another map governed by these gangs, which killed each other every week. Some of the future Rising Up Angry and Young Patriots, all of them hillbillies , decided to meet with many of their leaders. They were respected by the gangs, because some were gang members, like the Goodfellows, from which the editorial collective of Rising Up Angry came directly .

They also faced off against the police and neo-Nazi groups. And then they decided on something that would later be seen in films like Warriors , which actually reflects real events, such as those that took place in New York in the early 70s, with the beginnings of rap and hip hop or street groups like the Ghetto Brothers, who were also involved in music. But in Chicago it happened before. They were the first to do it, to propose directing their hatred against a common target: the police, which in our book appears every five words by means of the omnipresent "pigs."

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A BLACK PANTHER STANDS NEXT TO A PATRIOT AT THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR A UNITED FRONT AGAINST FASCISM.

And how did they come into contact?
Meetings in parks and on street corners began, some of which were disastrous, but others not. The issue of territory was a very complicated one. The Black Panthers were also trying to do this with real urban armies like the Blackstone Rangers. You only have to look at a photo of their hundreds of members (estimated to be up to four thousand) fully armed and in uniform to understand that it was a real para-state. People like Fred Hampton were highly respected by the black gangs and proposed truces and alliances. It was not easy. A small problem could lead to clashes and deaths, while the police had put a price on their heads and on the members of the Rainbow Coalition.

What were the goals?
Stopping gang violence, controlling the police, destroying capitalism, feeling like the city really belonged to them.

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IMAGE BY M. JAMES FOR 'RISING UP ANGRY'.

What was the role of women in all this?
Their role was fundamental. Like the Panthers, Rising Up Angry created several Serve the People programs, such as The Fritzi Englestein Free Peoples Health Clinic, a self-run clinic located in a church, where the women of the group played a major role. The feminists who participated in Rising Up Angry, unlike other women's groups, decided to organize themselves in mixed groups. At the frequent community parties (Soul Dances) that served to unite the bands, they were seen in security services or mediating in the frequent fights, traditionally male roles.

They also physically confronted groups of neo-Nazis. They advised the girls in the neighbourhood on health and sexuality issues. The abortion clinics were controlled by mafias. When women went to them, they had to go through an ordeal. The girls in the group denounced this and collaborated with "Jane", the code name for the city's hotlines, which was actually the Chicago branch of Women's Liberation. For two nights a week, volunteer doctors treated those who came free of charge.

After reading the book, I watched the film Wild in the Streets . What is its relationship to the alliance between the Black Panthers, Latin gangs and hillbillies? The film left its mark on you. In fact, that’s where the name of the group and the newspaper comes from. Rising up angry is a phrase taken from the song “The Shape of Things to Come”: “There is a new sun. Rising up angry in the sky”, which can be heard on one of its soundtracks.



The Goodfellows and many others saw it during a meeting. The idea was the same as that which hovers over the unity between bands. It is curious to see that, if we compare Wild in the streets with West Side Story , two of the films that most influenced the youth of the world, there is a big difference.

On the one hand, there's almost a decade between the two, but Wild in the Streets is much more aggressive and violent, more contemporary and ruthless. They're proto-punks in a way, so it's no surprise that Circle Jerks , the hardcore band, covered it and changed the lyrics. The cover of the album they released under that name shows a crowd of punks. They all recognized themselves in that film.

In the prologue you recall the first scenes of Cash's film. What is his relationship with the movement?
Johnny Cash represents the hero of the South, the one who sings of reality. He doesn't lie, because he can't lie. And he does so with the ambiguity that Cash had. He was a patriot in his own way, but his country was that of the poor, the prisoners and the dispossessed, of the losers. In that sense, he became an icon for them, just as Hank Williams had been.

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COVER OF THE FIRST ISSUE OF 'RISING UP ANGRY', JULY 1969.

What did the creation of a newspaper like Rising Up Angry represent in this story ? Hundreds of countercultural newspapers were published in those years. Rising Up Angry , in addition to being published with a beautiful design and spectacular covers, was the first to give a voice to the voiceless, to the gangs. The “Stone Greaser Grapevine” section, which appeared in each issue, is a gem. It is dedicated to the gangs, who were photographed by Mike James, one of the founders and whom we contacted for this book. The photographs are impressive and, quite possibly, without these images and this newspaper there would be no graphic testimonies of that fascinating Chicago.
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DELIVERY CAR FROM 'RISING UP ANGRY'.


What criteria did you follow in selecting the Rising Up Angry texts that you include in the book?
We gave a very high priority to the relationship with gangs and the attempt to unite all of them. This seemed really surprising to us. A "pre-Warriors" alliance to make the revolution, which they believed in without a doubt, is something quite unique and unheard of. So, although there are other texts that speak of other issues, much of the material revolves around what was very special among the radical greasers, in their unity between the Confederate flag and activism.

How and why did this movement die? Because, did it? Or did it simply transform. What is left of it? Redneck Revolt?
Redneck Revolt claim that past. They parade around with anti-racist Confederate flags, which surprises many, especially in the United States, which has its own historical peculiarities as a country. They are not afraid to threaten racist and extremist groups specialized in this with armed violence. In some ways they have an opponent to be reckoned with.
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BILL “PREACHERMAN” FESPERMAN (WEARING A COWBOY HAT) GIVES A SPEECH DURING A JOINT RALLY BETWEEN THE YOUNG PATRIOTS AND THE BLACK PANTHERS IN CHICAGO IN SEPTEMBER 1969.THE WASHINGTON POST.

Do you think such an alliance would be possible now in the United States?
It is already happening. The Black Lives Matter movement is succeeding in uniting many struggles. The important thing is not to integrate all the names and realities into one struggle, but to respect the specificities of each movement and learn to coordinate together, because the goal is the same: to change the world.

And in Spain?
I wish so, but first we would have to reinvent the idea of neighbourhood and community, of city. These are times when we never stop talking about “community” but we don’t even know who our neighbour is. We are condemned to confront each other. We would have to lose respect for them and, in some way, make them “feel afraid”. But each country has its own realities. First we would have to see the other with a more open mind. Because the other does not exist, it is a hoax. The other is oneself.

Members of the Black Panthers of Zaragoza, in 1992. — Black Panthers Archive
Spaniards members of the Black Panthers, of Zaragoza city, in 1992. — Black Panthers Archive.

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Spaniards members of the Latin Kings, Madrid.

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Spaniards members of the Trinitarios - Dominican Dont Play.




PML-RC YOUTH GROUPS, DURING A "TRAINING CAMP" AND ON A PARADE.

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SPANIARDS NEONAZIS PARADE.


ULTRA-RIGHT GROUPS, TRYING TO ASSAULT THE HEADQUARTERS IN MADRID OF THE P.S.O.E. (SPANISH SOCIALIST WORKER PARTY).


What relationship do you see be
tween the emergence of these groups in the US and that of armed groups in Spain and Europe around the same time?

At the end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies, people began to talk about armed activism. It had clear antecedents in the Cuban or Angolan revolution, or in groups like the Tupamaros or the Brazilian radicals, but that radicalism did not resemble that of later groups like the RAF or the Red Brigades, or even our armed groups. It was not until the beginning of the seventies that the word terrorism began to appear again and again. Back then, the vision was very different.

There was a debate about the meaning of violence and terror. When some of these groups called themselves the vanguard, they separated themselves from the very conditions and movements in which they had emerged and began to resemble many of the things they claimed to detest. It has to be love and not hate that drives change in the world.
Violence, in and of itself, is not revolutionary, and this is something that many do not understand. It is a tool, something that sometimes happens, but it is not a program in itself, a method. This is what fascist bands do.
Becoming a specialist in violence only creates something monstrous.

Thank you, Servando!
 
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Well-known member

BBC News World​

What was Cuba's "Special Period" and why does its government fear that "difficult times" for the economy will return?​

Cuba

Tens of thousands of Cubans left the island in those years.
  • Dario Brooks
  • BBC News World
  • April 16, 2019
"To put it in good Cuban terms: the harshness of the moment requires us to establish clear and defined priorities, so as not to return to the difficult moments of the Special Period."
That is the phrase with which the president of Cuba, Miguel Díaz-Canel , recently referred to the complex economic situation that the island is going through.
A bad situation that could get worse , he warned.

A bad situation that could get worse , he warned.
The president blamed the US for bringing relations with Cuba "to the worst level" currently, as well as for tightening the economic embargo against the island.

He also criticized Donald Trump's government for exerting political and economic pressure on Venezuela - Cuba's main economic partner - which is severely affecting the Cuban economy.
"Against Venezuela, they have gone all out, repeating the script of the first years against the Cuban Revolution," Díaz-Canel told the Cuban National Assembly.
His words echoed what former President Raúl Castro (2008-2018) had said the previous week, when he warned Cubans to "be prepared" for the worst economic scenario that Cuba could face.
Diaz Canel and Raul Castro

Both President Díaz-Canel (left) and former President Castro (center) pointed out that there are unfavorable signs for the economy.

"We need to be alert and aware that we are facing additional difficulties and that the situation could worsen in the coming months," Castro said in his capacity as secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, the only political party permitted in the socialist country.
"It is not about returning to the acute phase of the Special Period of the 1990s. Today, the panorama is different in terms of economic diversification. But we must always prepare for the worst-case scenario", he said.
But what was the "Special Period" that Cubans experienced almost 20 years ago and why did it arouse so much fear?
For some, it is the worst thing they can remember from a country that has experienced all kinds of shortages for decades.


The origin of the " Special Period "
The early 1990s brought devastating news for Cuba: the end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
Moscow was the main trading partner of the government led by Fidel Castro and its end also meant the end of imports of fuel, food, machinery and investments of all kinds.
Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev

Cuban President Fidel Castro and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev have had a close relationship since 1964.

The hardest blow for Cuba was the oil crisis, as the cut in supply generated a chain reaction for the different economic areas of the Caribbean country, with its most severe effects between 1991 and 1993.
"Cuba was extremely dependent on the Soviet Union. The bulk of that economic relationship consisted of price subsidies for Cuban exports ," Carmelo Mesa-Lago, a professor at the University of Pittsburgh and an expert on the Cuban economy, told BBC Mundo.
Cuban exports, such as sugar or nickel, were bought by the USSR at very high prices, or exchanged for oil.
"The (Russian) Communist Party lost power, a new generation came to power and they no longer wanted to bear that burden ," he added.
Cuba imported up to 98% of the oil it needed from the USSR , a nation with which it had 72% of its trade.
A sugar mill in Cuba
Cuba's vigorous sugar industry was fueled by Soviet-made machinery and fuel.

Moscow became Havana's greatest ally a few years after Fidel Castro took power in 1959, at the height of the Cold War between the US and the USSR.
But when the Soviet bloc came to an end, Cuba was left without that vital support.
President Fidel Castro announced to his country in 1990 that they would go through a " Special Period in Time of Peace."
They would take economic rationing actions like those taken in cases of war to "save the Revolution in Cuba and save socialism."

How was the economic impact?​

Along with the United States' tightening of its economic embargo in the early 1990s - when laws such as Helms-Burton came into force - the loss of Soviet support was "brutal ," says Mesa-Lago.
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contracted 35% in three years , "one of the largest falls of an economy since the Great Depression (1929), now only surpassed by Venezuela," he explains.
"Imports stopped immediately, as did the supply of oil. That had a brutal effect. Mechanized agriculture depended on fuel. It was an immediate impact. The worst year was 1993, but the situation began in 1991," he added.
A camel in Cuba

Public transport was adapted due to the lack of fuel and access to vehicles provided by the USSR.
A man rides a bicycle in Cuba

Chinese-made bicycles became one of the main means of transportation in Cuba.

In addition, the injection of capital of Soviet origin, which between 1960 and 1990 amounted to around US$65 billion, was stopped.
"That's three times the total the U.S. gave to Latin America under President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress program," Mesa-Lago said.

And how did it hit the population?​

The hardships that the Cuban government experienced during the Special Period soon became hardships for the daily lives of Cubans.
For the island's inhabitants, this period is "synonymous with hunger, suffering and austerity ," explains BBC correspondent in Cuba, Will Grant.
A food distribution center in Cuba

Free food distribution centers ran out of supplies during the Special Period.

Food was rationed, but shortages gradually developed that led many Cubans to eat literally anything that was at hand.
"Steak was cooked from grapefruit peel. Cleaning cloths were used, and it was cooked like a steak. There was a very serious nutritional problem, and illnesses were caused by this problem," Mesa-Lago recalls.
Adding to the hunger were public health problems, such as thousands of cases (estimated at more than 50,000) of optic neuritis , a condition that caused temporary blindness and was linked to a lack of nutrient intake.
"Shocking stories from those fateful days abound on the island: of people having to sell family heirlooms to buy food, of stray cats becoming part of the menu," says journalist Will Grant.
A pharmacy with empty shelves in Cuba

The population had to resort to alternative remedies due to the lack of medication.

Cuba, a country that has always stood out for its high literacy rate and social security for its population, had serious problems with unemployment and maternal mortality.
"It was traumatic for the Cuban population, that generation remembers it with horror," says Mesa-Lago.

Is another " Special Period" coming ?
Both President Díaz-Canel and former President Raúl Castro have warned that difficult months could lie ahead for Cubans.
However, for now they rule out the possibility that this is a situation similar to that of the Special Period of the 1990s, the effects of which have not yet been fully overcome.
A blackout in Cuba

The current power outages remind many in Cuba of the long blackouts during the Special Period.

Fidel Castro and his government took several measures to recover the economy, such as opening the island to foreign tourism, allowing Cuban expatriates to send remittances , partially liberalizing the agricultural market and self-employment.
"Fidel was always opposed to market-oriented reforms. But he had a difficult situation and reluctantly accepted very timid reforms. There was no other solution. And that meant that there was not a total recovery, but a partial one," says Mesa-Lago.
Hugo Chávez 's arrival to the presidency of Venezuela in 1998 gave Cuba access to the oil it needed through an exchange of doctors and teachers.
Today, Cuba's economy is no longer almost entirely dependent on a single country, as was the case with the USSR, but it does continue to depend to a large extent on Venezuela being the commercial ally it has been for almost 20 years.
A butcher shop in Cuba

Cuba has gradually managed to recover its economy, but it is still suffering from the ravages of the Special Period.

Cuba receives around 50% of the oil that the island handles from the country led by Nicolás Maduro , and although in 2013 44% of trade was agreed with that country, the poor situation in the South American country has caused the exchange to contract to 17%.
Mesa-Lago's calculations say that Cuba would suffer a hit of 8% of GDP if it lost its agreements with Maduro's Venezuela , a hard blow but less than the 35% of GDP it lost in 1993.
" There is a lot of fear in Cuba today about what might happen if the Venezuelan regime falls," warns Mesa-Lago.

 

Eltitoguay

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Testimonial book seeks to ensure that the hunger of the 90s in Cuba is not a caricature​

Jorge I. Perez; August 12, 2022.
Miami, Aug 12 (EFE).

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Cuban writer and historian Enrique del Risco says that "Our Hunger in Havana", a book of testimony about the worst economic crisis in Cuba, was written so that "this story would not remain a caricature" of the so-called Special Period of the 1990s, when, according to urban myths, "people ate cats and floor blankets."
"For many, the 'special period' was the experience that defined our lives. I wanted to write about how we deal with that debacle, how we managed to survive and how we did not rebel, because, except for 'the maleconazo', Cuba endured that crisis," Del Risco, who is presenting his book in Miami this Friday, told Efe.

MEMORIES OF A POST-WAR WITHOUT WAR
According to Plataforma Editorial, from Barcelona (Spain), "Our Hunger in Havana", published this year and currently on a presentation tour with the author, is "a book of personal memories of that postwar period without war that in Cuba in the 1990s received the curious euphemism of 'Special Period'.
"In a tragicomic tone, the author describes and explains the debacle that led to cats and banana peels being considered delicacies, pigs being considered urban pets raised in bathtubs, and the virtual disappearance of public transport, gastronomy and alcoholic beverages," the publisher adds.
For Del Risco, a professor of Spanish, literature and creative writing at New York University (NYU), it is "a story told from below, from those who suffered, not from those who organized it."
Regarding the so-called Special Period, which in his opinion lasted a whole decade after the fall of the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe, this name responds to "a euphemism to hide the violent crisis that there was, not only economic, but political and social."
"It was one of the most complete crises in the history of Cuba," where people "became brutalized and used physical violence against their fellow man," he said in an interview at the Koubek Center at Miami Dade College (MDC), where he is presenting his work today as part of the Miami Book Fair program.
Winner of the 2018 Unicaja Fernando Quiñones Novel Prize in Spain for “Turcos en la niebla,” Del Risco says that in those years when, in addition to being poorly fed, people traveled by bicycle, “the only option that Fidel Castro presented was to go hungry until another supplier appeared.” In this case, Venezuela.
"For me it lasted from 1990 until October 1995 when I left, but it lasted much longer; I believe that the special period, at least in its basic stage, lasted until Chavez came to power (1998), when he began to send supplies, oil and, let's say, alleviated the economic situation in Cuba a little," says the author.

«SOMETHING LIKE THIS HAS NOT BEEN SEEN SINCE WEYLER»
"I was hungry every day. On a social level, there was a famine such as I don't think had happened in Cuba since the time of Weyler," says Del Risco.
The Cuban is referring to the "reconcentration" in fenced camps of the Spanish general Valeriano Weyler, carried out to militarily annihilate the Cuban independence uprising of 1895 and which cost many lives due to famine.

The symptoms of famine during this long period were very clear, both in the decrease in body weight of Cubans and in all the diseases associated with these circumstances that appeared, such as "scurvy, beriberi, polyneuritis," says Del Risco.

Although he wrote a large part of “Our Hunger in Havana” in a humorous tone, “to remember the past,” now the book “has become a kind of ‘déjà vu.'”
"Especially after July 11 (2021), which was much more massive than the 'maleconazo' of August 5, 1994. July 11 has allowed the regime to show itself in all its brutality, something it tried to conceal in '94," he stresses.

The writer does not hide the fact that the title is a play on the famous British-American film "Our Man in Havana" (1958), which deals with the life of a British spy on the Caribbean island, and he points out that, even so, his book deals with a national reality.

In the chapter “A Brief Course to Understanding Hunger,” he explained that he addresses how the body responds to small amounts of food that are ingested:
"You realised that, for example, corn did very little to alleviate hunger, that rice made you endure it a little longer, that potatoes were more or less like rice and that meat, on the few occasions when it came, gave you a different level of energy. It is a common experience for all of us who have suffered a lot of hunger," he explains.

In his opinion, "the great problem of the Cuban disaster has been the indolence of the world, to say the least."
"There is also the ideological and political complicity with the Cuban regime, which at that time saw it as the last bastion of utopia,"
the writer denounces.
For this reason, he emphasizes, "it is unfair and false to only blame the (US) embargo for Cuba's hardships."

"There are medical studies that say that Cubans became healthier during the special period because they reduced their consumption of fats, without thinking about all the people who died,"
the author lamented.

 
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